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ABSTRACT
This thesis, taking Kenya as a specific example is an attempt
to look at crime and social control in its historical specificity.
The thesis takes social control as the point of departure in its
explanation of crime. Underlying the analysis offered here is the
contention that any meaningful explanation of crime must start with
an appreciation of the relationship between crime and social con¬
trol, especially the role law in general and criminal law in
particular plays in the creation and development of specific social
structures and its consequences for the general social fabric.
In Chapter One, we shall look at criminological thought in
relation to the general nature of crime and social control. In
Chapter Two, we shall look at crime within a "traditional" social
structure, in particular the system of social control in a "State¬
less" society.
In Chapter Three, we shall look at crime and social control
within a colonial agrarian capitalist social structure. In Chapter
Four, we shall examine crime and social control in a neo-colonial
capitalist social structure.
In Chapter Five, we shall look at the "political" uses of
mundane criminal patterns within the context of colonial and neo-
colonial capitalist social control.
Chapter Six is a summary of the main conclusions and their
implications on modern criminological thinking with special refer¬
ence to the "third world".
GENERA! INTRODUCTION
During the recent past, attempts have been made to look at
crime, social control and social organisation. The results of
these attempts have been varied and have in most cases involved
some significant differences in approach, especially in the area
of control and its consequences for crime. However, such endeavours
as Clinard and Ahhott (1973) point out, have been more or less
restricted to an analysis of crime and control in "developed"
capitalist society. Consequently, there is an astonishing pau¬
city of such analyses on patterns and trends of social control
and hence of crime in "developing" countries. In this thesis, we
have attempted to contribute to such attempts through an analysis
of crime, social control and social organisation with special
reference to Kenya.
In Kenya - as is the case with most of the third world -
economic development, political and social organisation are often
viewed as conceptually separate entities. However, jointly un¬
folding as an overall complex of social growth process, they are
significant in their occurrence and impact. Part of this occurr¬
ence has been the rapid introduction of the Western capitalist
mode of production and its inevitable corollary of capitalist socio¬
economic and political institutions. A significant aspect of these
institutions has been the introduction of Western capitalist law,
especially criminal law and its implied notion of the State. This
has entailed the introduction of a rational-legal system of social
control. With reference to this, the aim of this study can be said
to be an analysis of the consequences of socio-economic, political
2.
organisation and social change on the system of social control and
hence of crime in Kenya and by extension the "third World". Having
set our task as the study of social control and its consequences
for crime in the wider context of social organisation and social
change, we would like to record here that our task was at various
stages hampered by some methodological problems. As a result, our
method can be said to be more or less deductive in the sense that
we have started from certain general conceptions and have proceeded
to apply these to the available information.
Methodology
Since the beginning of colonialism in Kenya, the most remark¬
able phenomenon which confronts any student of Kenyan historical
development is both the dearth and the volume of available inform¬
ation. The political changes which have taken place since independ¬
ence in 1963 have meant that it is now possible to have access to
a lot of comparative material on both the colonial and post-colonial
periods. In this connection most material on general socio-economic
and political development is available from official sources, es¬
pecially the relevant departments of the government of Kenya.
However, due to the acrimonious political developments which
took place during the "Snergency" period 1952-1960, a great deal of
the source material dealing with political and socio-legal control
appears to have disappeared. As Zwanenberg (1975) observes, most,
but not all, of the information concerning the control of "Natives",
especially those records kept by the "Native" Commissioner and the
Chief Secretary appear to have been burnt except for those records
that happened to be elsewhere just before the "Emergency" was lifted.
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This also seems to have been the case with police records and to a
certain extent prison records. The absence of this material did
hamper our analysis of social control and hence of crime during the
colonial agrarian capitalist period. We were especially limited
in the area of socio-political control and its consequences for
the African social fabric. Material dealing with Emergency and pre-
Emergency control in the African tribal areas, in particular the
Administration of criminal justice appears to have been selectively
destroyed, thus making it impossible for us to provide an indepth
analysis of this aspect of colonial "political" control. To a
certain extent this did affect the analysis of "mundane" criminal
control since most official documents appear to have been burnt.
Thus an analysis of colonial capitalist control in Kenya based on
source material was limited by methodological problems - hence our
deductive method of starting from the general concepts and examining
these on the basis of available information.
In spite of these methodological problems, there is still a
great deal of information available which is extremely useful to
a study of this nature. The Prison's department and the Attorney
General's office and to quite a large extent the Kenya Archives pro¬
vide a wealth of material except for some minor limitations. In
some instances, the "imposition" of the thirty year rule on official
records limits the availability of some of this material. In some
other instances, as Zwanenberg (1975) notes, the general government
tendency to destroy records indiscriminately for what in Kenya has
often been referred to as "Security" reasons, leaves a lot of the
records available incomplete - hence limiting their usefulness as
sources of research data . This limitation significantly hampered
our analysis of both the colonial and neo-colonial capitalist con¬
trol systems. This was particularly so in relation to colonial
land and labour control and political and socio-economic control
during the transition from colonialism to neo-colonialism. This
limitation hampered our analysis of the official records of the
crime phenomenon in Kenya immediately after independence. We
thus had to use a deductive method in our analysis of the trends
and patterns of the recorded number of offenders. According to
popular opinion at the time of independence, the recorded number
of offenders was expected to decrease. However, at independence
and after, the opposite happened. It is important to note here
that the effects of the "thirty year rule" became more conspicuous
during our analysis of neo-colonial political and economic control
especially during the Kenya People's Union period. It was parti¬
cularly difficult to obtain case records dealing with political
control especially those records which had ideological overtones.
This to a certain extent limited our analysis of the type of poli¬
tical and socio-legal control exercised through the Provincial
Administration and its consequences for crime during both the colo¬
nial and neo-colonial periods. Despite these limitations, we found
a great deal of records still available.
1
See R.M.A. van Zwanenberg; Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya
19"!9—1939- East African Literature Bureau, 1975? p.29U-
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For example, our analysis of economic, political and socio-
legal control during doth the colonial and neo-colonial periods
would have been impossible without parliamentary and legislative
records such as the Constitution of Kenya and the various Acts we
have examined in this thesis; land and labour records were pro¬
vided by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance
and Economic Development. Armed with such information from the
above sources and from such other sources as the Attorney General's
office and the Ministry of Home Affairs (especially the Prison's
department), we were, while not ignoring its limitations, able to
undertake an analysis of crime and social control in the wider
context of social organisation and social change.
In Chapter One, we have attempted an examination of crimino¬
logical thinking in relation to the general nature of crime and
social control in the context of the wider social structure. In
Chapter Two, we have examined the phenomenon of crime within a
"traditional" social structure. Here we have focussed our atten¬
tion on the system of social control within a "Stateless" society
and its consequences for crime.
In Chapter Three, we have attempted as it were, a synthesis of
colonial agrarian capitalist control, especially socio-legal con¬
trol in the context of the wider social organisation and social
change. Here, we have endeavoured to bring out the consequences of
social control, especially law on the general social fabric, crime
included. In Chapter Pour we have examined social control and hence
crime in the context of neo-colonial social organisation and social
change. We have here focussed our attention on the consequences of
6.
rapid social change on general social organisation and by extension
its consequences for crime.
In Chapter Five, we have attempted a synthesis of official
rates and patterns of "crime" within the context of colonial and
neo-colonial social control. In Chapter Six we have endeavoured
to summarise our main conclusions in the context of comparative
criminology, with special reference to the "third World".
CHAPTER ONE
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis, taking Kenya as a specific example is an attempt
to look at crime and social control in its historical specificity.
The thesis takes social control as the point of departure in its
explanation of crime. Underlying the analysis offered here is the
contention that any meaningful explanation of crime must start with
an appreciation of the relationship between crime and social control,
especially the role law in general and criminal law in particular
plays in the creation and development of specific social structures
and its consequences for the general social fabric. Implied in our
approach is a radical departure from the traditional emphasis on
crime, in particular the etiological approach to the explanation of
crime as though it were empirically isolated from the general nature
of social control especially law.
In our attempt to look at crime in its historical specificity,
we shall place greater emphasis or rather attention on the system
of social control within a specific social structure. In this con¬
text, we shall examine the uses of law in capitalistic society,
especially the particularistic uses of law in given capitalistic
social structures. Taking Kenya as a specific example, we shall
look at crime and social control in a traditional (stateless) social
structure, an agrarian capitalist social structure and in a neo-
colonial capitalist social structure in our. attempt to demonstrate
that crime is a specific social phenomenon rather than a general
social phenomenon. In this sense we shall seek to demonstrate that
it is not every system of social control that produces crime, but
specific systems, especially those where law in general and criminal
9.
law in particular plays an important role in the maintenance of a
given social order. However, we start with a discussion on what
is meant hy crime and social control.
THE MATURE OP CRIME AMD SOCIAL CONTROL
Guenther (1970) argues that crime is generally accepted as
an act or omission prohibited by law and punishable by the State.
Kennedy (1976) contends that crime is a violation, by act or
omission of any criminal law, a specific conduct leading to a
1
harm and an act construed as a harm against the State. Implied
here is that an act is criminal only if it has been proscribed and
detailed as such by a law which is created and recognised by the
State as a bonafide part of its legal order, a law that describes
the proscribed act as a harm against the State and prescribes a
"punishment" for it. In other words an act is criminal if it is a
violation of a specific law which has what Kennedy refers to as
politicality and penal sanction as its chief characteristics. This
implies that the elements of politicality and penal sanction are
as crucial to the legal definition of behaviour as there are
2
commonly propounded dimensions of criminal versus not criminal .
Moreover, since politicality and penal sanction imply the State, it
follows that crime as defined by criminal law cannot be empirically
isolated from criminal law as a social phenomenon since they are
both created through a range of elaborate social processes within
the political and legal institutions of the "rational-State".
1
Kennedy's notion of harm is different from ordinary harm and refers
specifically to legitimated harm.
2
See generally M. Kennedy; "Beyond Incrimination" some neglected fac¬
ets in the theory of punishment. In W.J. Chambliss and M. Mankoff:
Whose Law, What Order, Wiley, New York, 1976.
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This leads to our contention that crime is a unique and
specific social behaviour and not simply a deviation from social
norms and values that are not criminal law. An implication of
this position is the proposition that crime is absent in societies
without the State since the basic characteristics of criminal law -
politicality and penal sanction - are absent. This entails the
argument that "crime" as opposed to deviance cannot be found in any
situation where social norms rather than criminal law exist as
"3
guides for social action e.g. in tribal society . This is signifi¬
cant to the study of crime because it touches upon the most basic
nature of crime; that it is not a universal social phenomenon but
rather it is a unique form of intended "harm" which is limited to
specific countries and to a definite period in history^.
The history of crime thus inextricably rests upon the nature
of social control, especially criminal law which as Smith and
Fried (197^4-) point out in turn is not only the history of those
practices which are intended to separate the criminal from the
"normal" but is itself subject to contingency and political processes.
This involves a recognition of the creation of criminal law as a
process of political conflict and compromise. Further, this im¬
plies that the penal system is also an instant of the socio-legal
processes of the State. Consequently the legal definition of what
is criminal cannot be separated from the political workings of the
State. Hence the reactions to crime and the criminal, as they are
^See later discussion in Chapter 2
Si. Kennedy; "Beyond Incrimination", op.cit.
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represented in the system of social control - law in particular -
depends on the way law is used in specific social structures.
This leaves law, especially an explanation of the origin and en¬
forcement of criminal law as the most viable basis for the struc¬
tural explanation of crime.
We cannot therefore accept Durkheim's contention that crime
is present in all societies at all times. An acceptance of his
position would imply, on our part, an acceptance that social con¬
trol, law in particular, is found in all societies and that it is
a response or rather a consequence of crime. Our contention is
that we can only meaningfully explain crime by putting emphasis
on the historical specificity of social control. Prom this position
we can examine the historically and culturally contigent manner in
which crime is dependent on law and how law is used within specific
socio-political and economic systems.
Traditional criminology using the assumption that crime and
social control can be empirically isolated has mainly focused the
bulk of its attention on the etiology of crime in its attempts to
provide an analysis of criminal behaviour. The system of social
control and law in particular together with the way it is used has,
when not ignored, been given a secondary position and its signifi¬
cance to the explanation of the behaviour we refer to as crime has
been seriously underestimated. Social control, especially law has
been treated as though it existed in a distant and irrelevant world
and its inters-relatedness with crime, particularly as an agent for
defining and also we could argue for legitimising criminal behaviour
has received little if any attention. In the following discussion,
we shall try to redress this imbalance by looking at the central
tenants of traditional criminology with special reference to why
it has failed to provide a comprehensive and structural analysis
of crime. In relation to this, we shall not indulge in any de¬
tailed analysis of particular traditional theories about crime but
shall restrict ourselves to what is central to most of them - the
radical differentiation of crime and the criminal from the system
of social control, law in particular.
TRADITIONAL CRIMINOLOGY
Throughout the history of traditional criminology, since the
classical views ofBecarria, cutting right across the whole trad¬
itional criminological board, starting with the early positivist
views of Enrico Ferri and Garofalo, the social positivism of Quetelet,
Guerry and Bonger, the biological positivism of Lombroso up to the
biological positivism of Eysenck and Trasler including the early
sociology of crime e.g. that of Robert Merton, Cloward and Ohlin,
Albert Cohen, Sutherland and Cressery, the central concern has been
the location of the causes of crime"'. Underlying this approach
has been a rather simplistic view of society as a behavioural scale
with normal behaviour as it is represented by what is legal on the
one hand and crime as the abnormal (pathological) on the other.
Included in this has been the general assumption that something can
See for example H. Mannheim; Comparative Criminology Yols. I and II.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1965> N. Walker; "A Century of
Causal Theory" in H. Klare and D. Haxby (eds.) Frontiers in
Criminology, Pergamon Press, London, 1967-
13.
be done about crime, that is, it can be treated or prevented .
Armed with this belief, traditional criminology has over a long
time sought to explain crime in terms of either individual char¬
acteristics or determinate social factors (involving multiple
n
factors) , hence its pre-occupation with the etiology- of crime
based on the primacy of the criminal actor as the major point of
g
departure rather than, the criminal law .
To seek to explain crime in this way implies an acceptance of
criminal law as the "normal" which leads to the treatment of crime
and criminal law as independent variables empirically isolated
from each other. Thus treating as irrelevant to the explanation of
crime the social processes by which law (criminal law) is made or
changed and the values on which it rests and their distribution in
society including the process by which law is maintained and en-
9
forced . Implied here is that traditional criminology rests on an
^H. Mannheim; Comparative Criminology, op.cit. especially p.20
See also N. Walker; "A Century of Causal Theory", op.cit. p.17
7
See for example the positions adopted by the multiple-factor
theorists in G. Told; Theoretical Criminology, Oxford University
Press, New York 1958, D. Gibbson; Society, Crime and Criminal
Careers - An Introduction to Criminology, Prentice Hall, Eaglewood
Cliffs, N.J. 1968, E.H. Sutherland and D.R. Cressey; Criminology,
Lippincott, New York, 1970 and A.L. Guenther; Criminal Behaviour
and Social Systems, Rand McNatty and Co., Chicago, 1970.
g
See generally B. Matza; Delinquency and Drift, Wiley, New York,
1961;.
9
M. Phillipson; Sociological Aspects of Crime and Delinquency.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1971» pp. 6-7.
11+.
implicit acceptance of the social "status quo" which means that
despite the emphasis traditional criminology places on the effects
of social factors e.g. economic status, ethnic affiliation and the
fa.Tnily, its emphasis is still on the criminal. The sense in which
crime is a peculiar reaction to legal institutions gets little if
10
any attention at all . Crime is treated as though it were the
decisive factor implying that the social reactions against crime,
however much they seem to vary historically and culturally remain
11
at the level of an uninvestigated mysterious automatic response
Thus the structure of power, wealth and morality which patterns the
reaction against crime and sustains the authority of existing social
12
arrangements is given a tacit stamp of approval
To the extent that traditional criminology accepts the exist¬
ing official definitions and practices as its defining criteria,
"it becomes little more than a covert tool of social policy and a
1 3
conservative force in society" . Implied here, as Phillipson (1971)
points out is an acceptance of criminal law as a given, which
leads to its ideological endorsement. In the realm of the social
structure and its associated cultural elements, the position adopted
by traditional criminology narrows its field and the only factor
left to explain argues Taylor, Walton and Young (1973) is the
behaviour that deviates from the legal. The major pursuit of
traditional criminology then becomes the radical differentiation
of the crime and criminal from the normal and conventional (as it
10
D. Matza; Delinquency and Drift, op.cit. p. 61+.
11
I. Taylor, P. Walton and J. Young; The New Criminology, Routledge
and Kegan Paul, London, 1973*
12
Ibid especially p.29




is represented in law) . In this context, law (criminal law in
particular) and its administration are deemed secondary or irrele¬
vant. In those cases where it is recognised, talking ahout crime
e.g. in the nation State is seen as rule violation only in the
limited sense that it involves violating the rules of relatively
large minorities or majorities who are powerful, well organised and
highly fearful of individuals or loosely organised small groups who
i v 15lack power .
The role of sovereign power and "by extension "instituted
authority" is hardly considered in traditional criminology implying
that the process of "becoming an ordinary criminal is unrelated to
the political process of the State. Thus traditional criminology
succeeds in doing the impossible; "the separation of the study of
16
crime from the workings and the theory of the State" . Hence
traditional criminology lacks any systematic theoretical attempt to
link the phenomenon of crime and the process of becoming criminal
to the central features of the State, especially the way law in
general and criminal law in particular is used to maintain and con¬
solidate specific social structures. In other words the system of
social control in particular the criminal law as a force in defining
and perpetuating crime is not conceived as part of the reality of
17
the crime problem . As long as traditional criminology continues
to ignore the significance of social control, any shift within it,
for instance from the biological position of Lombroso to its modern
"1 )
D. Matza; Delinquency and Drift, op.cit. pp.11-12
15
J. Lofland; Deviance and Identity, Prentice Hall, Eaglewood
Clifts, M.J. 1969-
16
D. Matza; Becoming Deviant, Prentice Hall, Hew York 1969? PP .1^3-1^44-
17
R. Quinney; The Social Reality of Crime, Little Brown and Company
Boston Mass. 1970, p.310.
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bio-psychological explanations e.g. Eysenck, is not significant since
it is not a shift of emphasis from the criminal actor to the system
of social control'' .
In the following discussion, we shall examine alternative
approaches to the explanation of crime, identify where these have made
a contribution to our approach with special reference to why we
still find them insufficient explanations of crime structurally.
NURKHEIM ON CRIME ANN SOCIAL CONTROL
Nurkheim (196I43) argues that crime is not only a "normal social
fact" but that it is
"present not only in the majority of societies of one parti¬
cular species but in all societies of all types
Its form changes, acts thus characterised are not the same
everywhere, but anywhere and always, there has been men who
have behaved in such a way as to draw upon themselves penal
19
repression" .
This implies that Nurkheim saw crime as an inevitable feature of
group life and that it cannot be completely eradicated. For crime
to disappear, he argues that it would depend on the unanimity of
feeling among all societal members, but even then, he claims crime
20
would not disappear but simply change its form
18
A. Cohen; Nelinquent Boys. Free Press, Chicago, 1955? PP« 28,
35, 67 and 129-131.
19
E. Nurkheim; The Rules of Sociological Method. Free Press,
New York, 19614(a), pp.65-66.
20Ibid. p.67
Taken within the context of the historical period in which
Burkheim made his utterances, his ideas are significant and mark
a major shift from traditional criminology's standpoint to locating
crime within the social structure. Taken as a whole and in general
terms, Durkheim recognised that there is no such thing as "natural
crime" and that there are no crimes that are always crimes in them¬
selves irrespective of cultural definitions. To Burkheim, crime was
not due to the motivational factors of individuals, hut a factor in
21
"public health" implying that it is an integral part of society
As far as he was concerned, crime marked the boundaries of society
meaning that it was bound up with the "collective conscience" or
22
rather the social structure itself . Hence his contention that
crime is functionally dependent on the general social order. In
this sense, Burkheim was informed by his awareness that crime was
23
linked to social control . In this sense, he saw crime as an
aspect of human phenomenon that is defined as illegitimate within
the existing "collective conscience". In short, he sees crime with¬
in the totality of society i.e. as a product of the relationship
between man as an individual and a society structured into different
divisions of labour^". Consequently crime can better be understood




See generally E. Burkheim; The Bivision of Labour in Society.
Free Press, New York, 1962+ (b). Yol. 2.
23
E. Burkheim; The Bivision of Labour in Society, op.cit. See also
E. Burkheim; Two Laws of Penal Evolution. Economy and Society,{
1973, PP.285-307.
P)
See generally E. Burkheim; The Bivision of Labour in Society, op.cit
18.
division of labour, for instance, when social arrangements are out
25
of accord with man's nature and needs . Thus Durkheim, unlike
traditional criminologists, links the analysis of crime with the
26
political sociology of production and the State . In fact Durkheim
does not only bring in the issue of politics and social control in
his analysis of crime, he goes much further and talks about a
specific system of control, law in general and penal law in parti¬
cular27.
In the Division of Labour, Durkheim (19611b) sees law as the
visible symbol of social solidarity. Here, he argues that law sym¬
bolises social organisation and that we can find reflected in law
28
the essential varieties of social life . However, Durkheim attempts
to demonstrate that law is not universal by arguing that law re¬
produces the principle forms of social solidarity as opposed to
custom which represents social relations which convey diffuse re-
29
gulation .
Durkheim's most significant contribution to our approach how¬
ever is to be found in his definition of crime and the way he links
this to law, in particular repressive law which he maintains forms
30the bulk of Penal Law . Based on his contention that law is the
25lbid. pp. 37U-375-
26
See generally E. Durkheim; The Division of Labour in Society.
27
Ibid. See also E. Durkheim; Two Laws of Penal Evolution, op.cit.
28




visible symbol of social solidarity, Du.rkh.eim argues that an act is
criminal when it offends strong and defined states of the "collect¬
ive conscience"
"In other words, we must not say that an action shocks the
common conscience because it is criminal, but rather that
it is criminal because it shocks the common conscience. We
do not reprove it because it is a crime, but it is a crime
31
because we reprove it" .
Implied here is that an act is not criminal unless it is an infringe¬
ment of a rule or breach of sanctioned conduct as it is represented
in law.
Although Durkheim does not go into a detailed discussion of law
and the State, he does demonstrate his awareness of their relation¬
ship, especially as it affects crime, when he links the State with
the creation of criminality in his argument that "constituted auth¬
ority" has sufficient force to attach penal sanction spontaneously
to certain rules of conduct. He further claims that it (constituted
authority) is capable of "creating certain delicts or of increasing
the criminological value of certain others". In this sense, Durk¬
heim makes a significant link between crime and penal sanction
(implying constituted authority) which in itself implies that crime
is impossible without penal sanction ("punishment")32.
Thus Durkheim rejects determinism as it is used in traditional
criminology and argues that the nature of collective sentiments
^Ibid. pp. 80-81
32Ibid. pp. 83, 85
20.
(organised, or diffuse) accounts for "punishment" and consequently
for crime since for Durkheim crime was impossible without "punish¬
ment". Durkheim was then able to state that the analysis of "punish¬
ment" would provide a more meaningful explanation of crime. In
his Two Laws of Penal Evolution, he goes on to link the evolution
of punishment with criminal behaviour and maintains that a struct¬
ural understanding of crime would be impossible without an under¬
standing of the nature and evolution of punishment in particular
33
penal sanctions . Durkheim breaks further away from traditional
criminology in his analysis of punishment and the absolute power
structure in the context of social change . Informed by his aware¬
ness that absolute power is more of an aberation of the division of
labour rather than an independent social factor, Durkheim directly
links punishment with social organisation. In the context of social
solidarity as Durkheim sees it, absolute power is not a represent¬
ation of "public health". To Durkheim, it represents a pathological
division of labour hence the reason why he directly links it with
severe and primitive punishment. This view is underlined by his
supposition that "the intensity of punishment is greater the more
societies approximate to a less developed type and the more the
35central power assumes an absolute character" .
In the context of absolute power and social change, for example,
the change from "primitive" social organisation to what Durkheim
refers to as "developed types", he argues that the nature of
33




punishment, for instance, its severity, intensity and. form cannot
"be separated from the nature of social organisation, especially the
power structure. This he maintains is indispensable to a proper
understanding of the various changes in penal sanctions . To
Durkheim the qualitative changes of punishment can better be under¬
stood within an understanding of the quantitative changes in social
organisation and power. Thus Durkheim, demonstrating a remarkable
sense of historicity rarely found in his time, recognised the import¬
ance of general social change and specific social changes in the
explanation of criminal behaviour and deviance in general.
However, in relation to crime as it is defined in this thesis,
some aspects of Durkheim's analysis do raise some questions. For
example in the Division of Labour, Durkheim claims rightly that the
State or rather "constituted authority" does create crime through
its use of law. He then goes on to say that the power of reaction
which is proper to the State ought then to be the same sort as that
which is diffused throughout society. In relation to social control,
he argues that the power of reaction which is given over to govern¬
ment organisations is only an emanation of that which has been diffuse
37in society since its inception . As we shall show in later dis-
Q
cussion , within specific social structures and at particular times
in history, State reaction does not simply necessarily emanate that
which has been diffuse in society since its inception. For example,
36Ibid. pp. 29I4-306.
37J E. Durkheim; The Division of Labour in Society, op.cit. pp. 83, 105-
.O
See Chapters 2, 3 and I4..
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colonial agrarian capitalism and social control demonstrates
that the power of State reaction or "constituted authority" is
relatively autonomous and that it is capable of ignoring whole
specific societies and taking into account aspects of social action
which are foreign to that society. In this sense, "crime" can have
very little to do with those acts which directly manifest violent
dissemblance between the agent and the collective type and instead
have everything to do in Durkheim's terms, with those acts that
offend the organ of the common conscience as it is perceived by that
organ, i.e. the State through the law.
Durkheim's application of law, in particular repressive law
(implying penal sanctions) to society raises some questions. In
the Division of Labour, and later in the Two Laws of Penal Evolution,
Durkheim claims that in "primitive society" law is wholly repressive.
Durkheim here is acting on the assumption that "penal law" is uni¬
versal i.e. it can be found in all societies. However, as we shall
show in later discussion^ and as Spitzer (1975) also points out,
penal law as it is defined in this thesis is historically specific
and therefore cannot be generalised to all societies.
For the moment our aim is to note that Durkheim made a remark¬
able and significant effort to locate the study of crime within the
social structure. He was pre-occupied, not with the aetiology of
crime and the individual criminal, but with the system of social
control and its consequences for individual human action within





for him to conceive of crime outside a general analysis of social
organisation in specific societies.
We are however aware that others besides Durkheim have attempted
to explain crime taking social control as the main point of depart¬
ure. We shall examine briefly some of them in the following dis¬
cussion. We shall restrict our attention to their general impli¬
cations with special reference to the historical specificity of
crime and social control.
THE INTERACTIONIST PERSPECTIVE ON CRIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL
The Interactionist perspective, commonly associated with
Lemert, Becker,Kitsuse and Schur among others was born out of a
general sociological and criminological reaction against traditional
criminology. In contrast to the traditional approach, the Inter-
actionists chose social control and its consequences for deviance
as .the main point of emphasis.
"This was a large turnaway from older sociology which tended
to rest heavily upon the idea that deviance leads to social
control. I have come to believe that the reverse idea i.e.
social control leads to deviance is equally tenable and the
potentially richer premise for studying deviance in modern
society"^1.
As Schur (1971) points out, the interactionists see deviance, not
as a separate entity, but as a continuously shaped and reshaped out¬
come of the dynamic processes of social interaction. Implied here
] "1
See E. Lemert; Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control.
Prentice Hall, Eaglewood Cliffs, 196?. P.V.
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is that deviance is not a single quality present in some kinds of
behaviour and/or individuals and absent in others, but rather it is
a product of a process which involves a response of others to that
behaviour and/or individual^2. According to the interactionists,
for an act to be deviant then several factors must be present, (a)
the act must be a violation of a rule and (b) there must be a
) "3
response from others'. Implied here is a process (active and on¬
going) involving an audience which eventually determines whether any
class of episodes becomes deviant or not^. Involved here is an
awareness by the interactionists that the crucial variable in the
explanation of deviance is the social rules and the labels or social
reaction aimed at individuals who contravene such rules - hence the
emphasis on social control. Lemert (1967) underlines the importance
of social control to the interactionist approach in his contention
that social control should be taken as an independent variable worthy
of study in itself rather than something derived from the fact of
deviance. In this sense, he claims that social control becomes a
"cause" rather than an effect of the magnitude and variable forms of
deviation .
^2See generally H. Becker; Outsiders - Studies in the Sociology of
Deviance. Free Press, New York, 1963-
^3Ibid. p. 1h.
^"See generally K.T. Erickson; "Notes on the sociology of Deviance"
in H. Becker; The Other Side, Free Press, New Tork, 1961+, pp. 9-21.
E. Lemert; Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control.
Op.cit. p. 18.
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Lemert informed by his awareness that one cannot talk about
"abstract" delinquency due to the variability of social control
argues for an examination of social control, involving an analysis
of social change in general. Thus Lemert, and by implication the
interactionist perspective in general calls for an examination of
social control, not as an end in itself, but as an integral part of
a broader analysis of social change and its implications for deviance.
As Lemert puts it,
"The most pretentious claim for our point of view is that it
opens the way to subsume deviation in a theory of social change.
Even more important it gives a proper place to social control
as a dynamic factor or "cause" of deviation"^.
Lemert's claim is significant in that it moves the interaction¬
ist perspective away from the deterministic approach of traditional
criminology while at the same time it demonstrates the inherent
tension within the interactionist perspective, in particular the way
in which the interactionists go about explaining deviance in the
broader context of social control and social change. The way in
which Lemert himself and the interactionist perspective in general
discuss deviance and social control, in particular their etiological
concern of how an individual becomes a deviant makes the most crucial
claim of the approach - that it places the study of deviance in a
general theory of social change mainly pretentious.
For example Lemert (1967) argues that deviation should be seen
as a consequence of the extent and form of social control. In this
^Ibid. p. 26.
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sense he puts the emphasis on social control and maintains that
social control must he taken as an independent variable rather than
a constant or merely reciprocal societal reaction to deviation.
However, Lemert in his own analysis of passive and active social
control in relation to primary and secondary deviation, especially
in his insistence that the distinction between primary and second¬
ary deviation is indispensable to a complete understanding of dev-
) 7
iance in society fails to transcend the influences of traditional
criminology. As a result, Lemert deals more with what happens to
an individual once the deviant label is applied to him rather than
the process by which certain types of behaviour come to be created
as deviant labels. In this sense, there appears to be an inherent
reluctance on the part of Lemert, and by implication the interaction-
ist perspective in general to shed off the influences of traditional
criminology, in particular its concern with aetiology. This serious¬
ly limits the applicability of the approaches claim to place the
study of deviance in a general theory of social change. In relation
to crime as it is defined in this thesis, the above shortcoming is
even more significant.
For example, Becker (19&3) argues that social groups create
deviance by creating rules whose infractions constitute deviance
and by applying those rules to particular people and labelling them
) R
as outsiders . Becker however does not provide us with an explan¬
ation of the process by which the rules he refers to are made and
^7Ibid. pp. 17-18.
) R
H. Becker; Outsiders, op.cit. p. J.
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the effects of that process on deviance. Such an explanation would
inevitably involve an analysis of social change. Instead, Becker
is preoccupied with the issue of the transactions which take place
h9
between some social group i.e. the moral entrepreneurs - and one
that is viewed by that group as a rule breaker without being speci¬
fic as to where these fit in the larger social order.
Although deviance, as Kitsuse (1962) maintains, may be conceived
as the process by which society interprets acts as deviant and de¬
fines those who so act as deviant and accords them the treatment
that the society (at that particular point in time) considers appro¬
priate, in the context of social change, one has to be more definite
and explicit. The way in which deviance in a normal product of
stable institutions; an important resource which is guarded and pre¬
served by forces found in all human organisations as Erickson (196I4.)
contends must be clearly spelled out i.e. the historical specificity
of the social processes involved must be stated categorically. This
holds, whether we are talking about labelling, social reaction or
primary and secondary deviation.
As Scot and Douglas (1972) point out, talking about deviance
as a "property" or label that is conferred upon individuals does not
tell us why that "property" exists at all and neither does it tell
us what role that "property" or label plays in the larger social
order. An almost exclusive concentration on social reaction to
deviation as it affects the persons to whom the reaction is directed
without any detailed analysis of the role that reaction plays in the
Uq
H. Becker; Outsiders, op.cit. pp. 114.7—163.
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definition of behaviour as deviant or not is an insufficient explan¬
ation of deviance in the broader context of social control and social
change. Without it Lemert and the social interactionists in general
remain wrapped up within the traditional concern with aetiology
and fail to lay open the structural inequalities in power and inter¬
est which underpin the process whereby laws (rules) are created and
enforced^. As a result, they leave untouched the way in which
authority and interests enforce and maintain sets of laws, rules
and norms which in themselves are part and parcel of the creation of
deviance and/or crime.
Thus the social interactionists fail to expose fully the way
social control, especially law is used in the maintenance of speci¬
fic social structures and its consequences for the general social
fabric, deviance and crime included. Therefore, an examination of
the problematics of societal reaction is by itself an inadequate
explanation of deviance, crime in particular without reference to
the way deviance and indeed crime is shaped by society's larger
structure of power and institutions, especially the way these affect
£1the shape of law and social reactions to it . Hence the inter¬
actionists do not answer the question as to why some laws are adopted
or rejected in a given situation and to what extent its develop¬
ment is determined by the basic social relations i.e. the productive
relations. They also do not adequately explore the causal relation¬
ships between social control, law in particular and the organisation
^1. Taylor, P. Walton and J. Young; The New Criminology, op.cit.
pp. 168-169.
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of society and its consequences for crime and/or deviance.
To meaningfully answer the above questions, it is important
to recognise that any meaningful analysis of crime and/or deviance
cannot be separated from the social processes within which laws
or rules are formed which require or prohibit people to behave in
certain ways. A meaningful and comprehensive analysis of deviance,
must of necessity shed off the influences of traditional crimin¬
ology and take into account the historical, political and socio¬
economic environment in which social control finds its expression
and legitimacy. Without this, it is impossible to explain crime
and social control in the wider context of social change in specific
social structures. A meaningful and structural analysis of dev¬
iance, requires a conscious and deliberate move towards what we
may here refer to as the political economy of crime.
Radical criminology, claiming to use historical materialism
as its theoretical foundation has made some references to the nece¬
ssity of such an approach. However, rather than it being a signifi¬
cant criticism of existing criminological approaches, radical crim¬
inology does not provide us with any substantially different explan¬
ation of its own. In the final analysis, radical criminology ex¬
plains crime in a manner that reveals a tacit interest in the classic
criminological question of why people commit crimes, thereby restrict¬
ing itself to being a shift of interest within existing criminology
rather than a total break from it.
For example, the New Crimonology^^, purporting to draw its
92
See generally I. Taylor, P. Walton and J. Young. The New Crimin¬
ology. op.cit.
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argument mainly from the marxist materialistic interpretation of law
has argued that the processes involved in crime creation are "bound
up with the material basis of contemporary society (capitalist
society in particular) and its structures of law. In this context,
the New Criminology maintains that it is possible via social trans¬
formation to create social and productive arrangements that would
abolish crime33. However, the New Criminology does not provide us
with any analytical explanation of contemporary structures nor does
it tell us how these affect crime and how they can be transformed
with the view to abolishing crime. Instead the New Criminology
leaves us with a formal model which is so general as to fit any
situation without necessarily being specific3^*". The New Criminol¬
ogy's model speaks more of a perspective in search of why certain
people commit crimes, i.e. its declaration that
"an adequate social theory of deviance would need to be
able to explain the relationship between beliefs and action,
between the optimum "rationality" that men have and the
dd
behaviours that they actually carry through" .
rather than a perspective that is
"concerned with the social arrangements that have obstructed
and the social contradictions that enhance man's chances of
achieving full sociality - a state of freedom from material
necessity, and (therefore) of material incentive, a release
from the constraints of forced production, an abolition of
33Ibid. p. 282.
3^Tbid. Chapter 9- pp. 268-282
33Ibid. p. 271.
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the forced division of labour and a set of social arrange¬
ments, therefore, in which there would be no politically,
economically and socially-induced need to criminalise
deviance""^.
Thus radical criminology i.e. Quinney, Hindess, Althusserand others
like Taylor, Walton and Young, fails to provide us with a radical
brand of criminology that locates the study of crime and/or devi¬
ance in the wider social structure, in particular the prevailing
social arrangements within the context of their historical speci¬
ficity. Radical criminology needs to shift its emphasis from simply
advocating for such an approach to the provision of one. In this
sense, radical criminology needs to transcend its theoretical debate
and shift from being merely an assertion of radical diversity to
what Taylor, Walton and Young (1975) refer to as the study of the
specificity of legal relations (and hence of crime) in the wider
context of social organisation and social change. This would
inevitably involve an analysis of what radical criminologists such
as Taylor, Walton and Young consider as crucial to a criminology
founded on marxist materialist radicalism; namely the establishment
of the "role of law in affecting production and via production, the
57whole life-style and culture of a given society" .
NON-CRIMIWOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME AMI) SOCIAL CONTROL
In the following discussion, we shall review a small body of
work which deals mainly with social control, social organisation
^6Ibid. p. 270.
57I. Taylor, P. Walton and J. Young; Critical Criminology. Routledge
and Kegan Paul, London, 1975> p. 52.
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and punishment as the centre of their analyses. This body of work
has not come out of any particular reaction against traditional
criminology, but is a direct result of a genuine interest in the
changing patterns of the systems of social control, punishment in
particular.
We would like to note at this point that the body of work we
shall review here has quite considerably influenced our work. The
way this body of work deals with social control in the wider con¬
text of social organisation and social change has been of great
significance to us. It is mainly this aspect of the work that we
shall seek to draw out.
First we shall examine the work of EUsche and Kercheimer (1939)
who drawing mainly from a marxist analysis of western economic
arrangements adopt an economist interpretation of social control,
in particular the system of punishment in western society. Rusche
and Kercheimer's analysis, as we show later, is rather reductionist
in the sense that it is preoccupied with economic power and does
not consider in any depth the power of political and social forms
of institutional arrangements and their consequences for crime and
social control.
Secondly we shall look at two slightly different versions of
an analysis that adopts the autonomy of political power systems as
the main emphasis in their respective explanations of social control
and crime. Smith and Fried (197U) deal mainly with ideological
aspects of political power while Makela (197^4-) attempts to offer a
similar, but slightly different view of the State as a relatively
autonomous institution in spite of its ideological links with certain
33-
social classes. Finally we shall examine the work of Kennedy
(1976) which adopts a marxist view of the State's emergence, "but
endeavours to combine it with Weber's analysis of political power
in his analysis of social control and crime.
1. Economism and Control
Rusche and Kercheimer (1939)» in their attempt to locate the
analysis of punishment within the social structure start with the
premise that
"punishment is neither a simple consequence of crime, nor
the reverse side of crime, nor a mere means which is deter-
mined by the end to be achieved" .
In their awareness of the implications of the above assertion,
Rusche and Kercheimer touch on two aspects of social organisation,
the political and the economic (as it is implied in class distinc¬
tions) that are crucial to any structurally based analysis of punish¬
ment. However, Rusche and Kercheimer, influenced more by the marx¬
ist economic analysis of law, adopt an analysis of social control
which emphasises the changes in economic arrangements and their
consequences for punishment and ignore (deliberately or otherwise)
the political and social arrangements as distinct institutions
(rather than mere responses to economic arrangements) capable of
affecting the system of punishment.
According to Rusche and Kercheimer, every system of production
tends to create punishments which correspond to their relationships.
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In this sense, as' they say, "punishment as such does not exist;
only concrete systems of punishment and specific criminal pract-
39
ices exist" , which in themselves are meaningless unless examined
in their specific, and historical manifestations. Thus they bring
in the historical e.g. the development of the capitalist market
system, as a crucial factor in the explanation of punishment. In
this sense they maintain that the investigation of the origin and
fate of penal practices as they are determined by existing social
forces, in particular the economic ones is of crucial importance
to the explanation of punishment and by implication of crime. Hence
their emphasis on the relationship between different penal systems
and their variations and phases in economic development. This
position is defended by a historical, but basically economist re¬
view of social events in the European middle ages.
For example, to Rusche and Kercheimer (1939) the development
go
from private criminal law to public law did not occur as a result
of crime, but was rather influenced by changes in economic circum¬
stances. The chief economic characteristic of this period was the
transition from traditional agrarian production to capitalist forms
of production. The accumulation of wealth (associated with power)
became the main social feature which inevitably brought about changes
61
in criminal law . Private criminal law became undesirable since
the social relations which it mirrored were no longer desirable so







Throughout their analysis of punishment in specific historical
periods in Europe, Rusche and Kercheimer demonstrate a direct re¬
lationship between changes in criminal law and punishment and the
socio-economic arrangements of those periods in particular the
Labour Market. The historical changes, from the feudal middle ages,
through the capitalist development of the latter middle ages right
up to the capitalist industrial period are accompanied by significant
changes in the system of social control, criminal law in particular,
with a strong bias in the law in favour of changes in the mode of
62
production
For example Rusche and Kercheimer trace the rise of imprison¬
ment as a system of punishment to the capitalist institutions of the
mercantile period . They argue that it was not until this period
when the economic links between the State as a constituted central
administration and certain economic classes, in particular the
Merchants, began to be reflected in law, in particular criminal law.
The prevailing economic conditions i.e. shortage of labour, high
labour costs and the demand on the central administration (by the
dominant economic classes) to intervene in the market and regulate
wages and provide working capital for the propertied class, resulted
in changes in the law, especially the criminal law, characterised
by restrictions on individual liberty. This revealed the potential
value (economic of course) of a mass of human material at the dis¬
posal of the administration - hence the emergence of imprisonment^,




which marked the "beginnings of criminal law as public law and its
implied notion of the State as a separated legal authority.
However, although Rusche and Kercheimer show in subsequent
historical periods how further changes in the capitalist economic
relations lead to changes in the fiscal forces of the State, es-
gq
pecially in the way law was used , they remain preoccupied with
material changes and fail to consider the consequences of changes
in the emergent political and social institutions, especially the
State as an institution, on social control, punishment in particular.
Although the emergence of the State is directly associated with
the development of the capitalist economic institutions, as a
legally constituted separated authority, its impact on social con¬
trol cannot be adequately dealt with by implication as Rusche and
Kercheimer tends to do. Since criminal law (as public law) implies
the State, the role of the State, in particular its power as a
political entity needs to be made specific. Without this, Rusche
and Kercheimer's analysis becomes somewhat reductionist and their
conclusion that the penal system of any given society as it is
represented in law is not an isolated phenomenon subject only to its
own laws, but rather it is an integral part of the whole social sy¬
stem and shares its aspirations and defects is somewhat weakened.
2. The State, Politics and Punishment
Smith and Fried (197^) in their analysis of the uses of the
American Prison adopt an analysis of punishment which singles out
the autonomy of political power systems for emphasis. According to
Smith and Fried, the notion of crime makes reference to certain
6^Ibid. pp. 206-207.
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behaviour; the proscribed and prescribed, and at the same time
makes reference to claims of State authority. This implies that
the absence of the State as it is implied in criminal law would
66
render that behaviour non-criminal . To Smith and Pried, it is
not the "wrongness" of any behaviour that makes it criminal, but
the notions of what kind of' wrongness the State should and can act
upon. Hence, the State as an ideological power system is crucial
to their analysis of punishment since, according to Smith and Pried,
what constitutes crime cannot be separated from the State's notion
of criminality
Citing the historical development of criminal law and penal
68
sanctions and their relationships with the formally "rational-
69
state" Smith and Pried argue that crime as an offence against the
State involves a definite conception of the State and its legiti¬
mate role. However, in the way they go about interpreting the uses
70
of the American Prison , in the above context, Smith and Pried fail
to demonstrate any systematic notion of historicity and instead re¬
duce politics to people thereby failing to grasp the nature of the
political as an institution. As a result, their claim that crime
should be understood as an inseparable aspect of a legal system
that is consistent with the productive organisation of the whole
71
community' finds itself wihout any strong analytical base in their
own work.
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Makela (197^+) > in an apparent reaction against the limitations
of marxist materialistic interpretations of law and the State, argues
that recognising criminality as a historical phenomenon is not in
itself sufficient unless it is accompanied by an examination of the
interplay between control machinery and criminality, the varying
forms of criminality in history, the class structure of control
policies and the tasks of penal law in the maintenance of the pre-
72
vailing mode of production . Although Makela does recognise the
immediate tasks of criminal policy in relation to crime, he argues
that in the final analysis it is its task of promoting solidarity
that possesses a more central significance. This he claims cannot
be adequately analysed if it is left unrelated to the class struct-
73
ure of capitalist society .
In his analysis, Makela (197U) informed by his awareness of
the State as an institution argues against the overpoliticisation
of the State. In this effort, although he does recognise and indeed
point out that the State does not stand above societal conflicts
and that the capitalist State is to quite a large extent a repre¬
sentation of the political interests of the dominant economic
classes, Makela argues that the modern capitalist State is not a
ready to hand instrument for the short term political and economic
interests of the dominant classes. He sees the foremost task of
the State as the guaranteeing of the continued existence of the mode
of production itself and the sorting out of disputes that arise out
72
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of the antagonistic class interests and conflicts of capitalist
society _ Thus Makela recognises the ideological as well as the
institutional character of the State which he treats as essential
to any interpretation of the societal tasks of penal law.
To Makela, the development of capitalism has changed the tasks
of the State and in view of this, he maintains that the immediate
repressive tasks of the State as a compulsive apparatus at the
service of the ruling classes has passed into obscurity and that
the State's task of regulating economic life and as an ideological
apparatus for legitimising the existing mode of production has
75
become the most dominant . This means, according to Makela, that
during relatively calm periods in the capitalist society, the
function of traditional penal law is primarily of socio-technical
76
nature . Makela is however careful to note that the socio-technical
nature of penal law is to a certain extent influenced by the class
structure of capitalist society. In this respect, he points out
that the application of penal law can discriminate against subord¬
inate classes, that legislation can adjust class relevant interests
in a discriminatory way and that it may be written with the inten¬
tion of regulating the types of conflicts within the ruling classes
7)
See the case of the Neo-colonial Capitalist State Chapter 1;..
The effort of the State to control foreign capital through
legislation demonstrates that the capitalist State is not
always a ready to hand tool of dominant classes but rather
its interest lies in regulating the mode of production itself.
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without taking into account the types of situations that normally
77
arise within subordinate classes .
The strength of Makela's analysis however is in his elevation
of the State from the purely ideological to the institutional. In
this context, he is able to argue that penal law and the principle
of guilt associated with it has, as its special task, the official
distribution of moral responsibility and guilt in Society - hence
his reference to penal law as an instrument for the optimal allo¬
cation of Society's resources. For the purposes of moral condem¬
nation, a means for distributing guilt and responsibility for what
78
occurs .
3. Politico-Economism and Control
Kennedy (1976) basing his argument on the marxist view of the
State's emergence combined with a synthesis of Weber's views on
political power and ideology adopts an ideological and economist
view of crime and social control, in particular the historical
specificity of criminal law. Kennedy's central theme is that crime's
general characteristics are derived from the emergence and contin¬
uation of the State as a separate legal authority, whereas its
special characteristics (with reference to what specific acts are
proscribed and prescribed) derive directly from the kind of instit¬
utions i.e. socialist or capitalist, which the State supports.
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To support his position, Kennedy singles out for special
emphasis, his concept of criminal law as a norm recognised by its
peculiar characteristics of uniformity, specificity, politicality
and penal sanction by maintaining that these characteristics form
the basic criteria for the legal classification of an act as
79
criminal versus not criminal . With this at the centre of his
analysis, Kennedy attempts to locate the study of crime and social
control in the wider context of the social structure including
social change through a review of the historical emergence and
development of capitalist law, criminal law in particular and its
implied notion of the State.
Kennedy's analysis of social control has two basic strengths;
(a) it recognises the importance of the State as a legally con¬
stituted authority implying abstract institutional power and its
80
consequences for social control : (b) it recognises the influence
of changes in economic arrangements i.e. the institutionalisation
of private property, entrepreneurship and the market on the State as
an ideological apparatus of capitalist institutions and its conse¬
quences for social control, law in particular and by extension its
consequences for crime^. Kennedy combines the two in his analysis
of social control and thereby endeavours through a synthesis of
Weber's views on ideology, authority and economic arrangements to
marry economism and ideology in a structural analysis of crime and
82
social control . Within this context, Kennedy is then able to
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See generally M. Kennedy; "Beyond Incrimination", op.cit.
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describe crime as a historically specific and political pheno¬
menon since what is defined as criminal is a result of a political
and historical process within which laws (rules) are formed which
require people to behave in certain ways. He thus tries to locate
the study of crime within the social structure, especially within
the political, social and economic environment in which the
doctrines of crime and punishment are expounded and within which
penal practices evolve.
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we have taken as our primary task, an attempt
to look at crime and social control in its historical specificity
with special reference to Kenya. In this chapter, we have attempted
as our central issue, an analysis of the historical specificity of
social control and its relationship with crime in the wider context
of social organisation. Through a synthesis of the criminological
perspectives adopted by traditional criminology, Durkheim, the
interactionist perspective and the non-criminological perspectives
of Rusche and Kercheimer, Smith and Fried, Makela and Kennedy, we
have attempted to demonstrate the historicity and specificity of
social control and its consequences for crime. In this sense, we
have attempted to examine the relationship between crime and social
control within the social structure. Our aim here was to draw out
the significance of social control in any meaningful and structur¬
ally based analysis of crime.
Looking first at the criminological perspectives we have in
our discussion tried to identify their respective limitations.
However, taken as a whole and we may also argue individually, their
k3.
most significant limitation is that they do not expound an ade¬
quate analysis of control and its consequences for crime in the
wider context of social organisation and social change. In this
sense, they are limited in their analysis of the link: between
crime and social control and its historical specificity. Conse¬
quently, they have failed to grasp the significance of the evo¬
lution and development of particular social institutions, for
instance, the State, to social control and hence to crime. This
limitation in turn limits the applicability of these perspectives,
especially in cross-cultural situations.
Turning now to the non-criminological perspectives of Rusche
and Kercheimer, Smith and Pried, Makela^and Kennedy, their signi¬
ficance and therefore their basic contribution to our work is
found first in their focus on control and secondly in their notion
of historical specificity. It is these aspects of their work that
have influenced quite considerably the way we go about explaining
crime and social control in Kenya.
In their analysis of crime, these perspectives start on the
premise that crime is dependent on social control which in turn is
dependent on contingency political and economic processes. In
their analysis of social control and its consequences for crime,
these perspectives, bring in the notion of historical specificity -
hence their argument that crime is a historically specific pheno¬
menon.
However, with reference to Kenya, these perspectives do have
their own limitations the most basic being their lack of compara¬
tive analysis. These perspectives deal mainly with social control
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in Western capitalist society and bear little if any reference to
non-Western, Stateless societies or non-Western 'developing" capi¬
talist States. This in itself is not significant, but what makes
it significant is the underlying assumption about the evolvement
and development of the capitalist State and its system of social
control. They all tend to imply that capitalist structures evolve
and develop in the same way as they did in Western society and
that control would necessarily take similar forms. This entails
the assumption that capitalist States replicate themselves, hence
the tendency to generalise Western capitalist control systems to
all capitalist structures. As we shall show in the Kenyan case,
this is not simply the case. For example, Kenya did not become a
capitalist State structure through the evolution of the indigenous
traditional society like feudalistic Stateless societies in Europe
did. On the contrary, capitalism was imposed through the use of
force - colonial conquest. Under such circumstances the form and
nature of control could not possibly have replicated that which
transpired in fuedal Europe. Hence to imply that social control in
capitalist States takes the same form is simplistic and entails an
understatement of capitalist development in the colonial and neo-
colonial world.
In our analysis of crime and social control in Kenya, we shall
attempt to transcend this limitation through an application of the
notion of the historical specificity of social control in the wider
context of social organisation and social change. We shall in this
respect, adopt some of the notions found in the reviewed work,
especially Kennedy's notion of criminal law with its peculiar
characteristics of specificity, politicality and penal sanction
hB'
and Makela* s notion of the State as a social institution in spite
of its ideological leanings as our organising theme. In this
sense, we shall attempt to demonstrate a perspective that recog¬
nises the institutional as well as the historical significance of
economism and ideology to a structurally based analysis of crime.
CHAPTER TWO
TRADITIONAL SOCIETY, CRIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL
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INTRODUCTION
In our previous discussion (Chapter One), we argued that an act
is criminal only if it is a violation by act or omission of any
criminal law. That it is a "harm" construed as a "harm" against
the State which is punishable by the State. This being the case,
we concur with Kennedy (1976) that the law involved here is unique
in that it must in the first place be specific. Secondly, it must
be a law, created and recognised by the State as a bonafide part of
its legal order and must define the conduct proscribed as a "harm"
against the State (implying politicalitj). Finally, it must pre¬
scribe a punishment for the act (penal sanction). Thus for an act
to be criminal, it must violate a law that has as its chief charact¬
eristics: specificity, politicality and penal sanction.
With the above type of law, it follows that we have a specific
and unique form of "punishment". Like the behaviour proscribed,
Hart (1970) argues that the punishment (or sanction) is unique in
that it must be for an offence against legal rules, imposed on an
actual or supposed offender for his offence and administered by an
authority constituted by a legal system. Punishment of this nature,
as Makela (197U) points out is a ramification of the State. From
this then we can infer that any society, which has no such unique
law and punishment has no crime. This being the case, we cannot
accept Durkheim's contention that:
"crime is present, not only in the majority of societies
of one particular species, but in all societies of all
types. There is no society that is not confronted with
the problem of criminality a society
1+8.
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exempt from it is utterly impossible" .
In our view, as long as Durkeim's contention is restricted to
breaches of regularised norms and values of social behaviour (legal
or otherwise) in all societies, we have no disagreement with him.
However, immediately his proposition is applied to criminal be¬
haviour as it is defined in this thesis, then our disagreement with
him begins. What we mean here is that breaches of norms and values
of social behaviour (deviance) are found in all societies of all
types. However, in the strict sense, "crime" as we know it today
is meaningless without the concept of criminal law as we find it in
the "rational" state. This makes crime a historically specific
phenomenon irredeemably dependent on social control, especially
criminal law whose emergence and development is intricately linked
with the evolvement and development of the "rational" state and its
laws. To substantiate this, we shall in this chapter look at crime
and social control in a "traditional" social structure or within
what we here refer to as a society without the State. By a society
without the State (Stateless) we mean a society which Fortes and
Evans-Pritchard (19i+0) describe as having no separated, continuous
political community having any judicial, law making or executive
capacity either to govern the members of the society as citizens
or to be solely in charge of relations with outside societies in
peace or war. This means that stateless societies have no "govern¬
ment" implying a centralised authority, administrative machinery and
constituted^ judicial institutions. In Stateless society, the lineage
1
E. Durkheim: The Rules of Sociological Method. Free Press, New
York, 196iia pp. 65 and 67.
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and/or the age-set structure is the framework of the political
system, there being a precise co-ordination between the two so that
they are consistent with each other, although each may remain
2
distinct and autonomous .
Furthermore, in Stateless society there are no territorial
units defined by an administrative system. The territorial units
are local communities the extent of which corresponds to the range
of a particular set of lineage ties and the bonds of direct co-oper-
3
ation . Hence political office does not carry with it judicial
rights over a particular defined stretch of territory and its
inhabitants^. Through genealogical ties (real or fictional), in¬
dividuals acquire membership of the local community and the rights
and duties that go with it. In practical terms, the lineage prin¬
ciple takes the place of political allegience and the interrelations
of territorial segments are directly co-ordinated with the inter¬
relations of lineage segments and/or age-sets"'. Political relations
therefore are not simply a reflection of territorial relations,
rather the lineage and/or age-set structure as a political system
in its own right incorporates territorial relations and invests them
with the particular kind of political significance that they have.
This in turn influences the culture and economic activity of the
people involved and leads to a situation where there are no marked
^T/l. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (ed.); African Political






cultural and economic divergencies as we shall show later.
In relation to power, in Stateless society, we find no
association, class or segment which has a dominant place in the
political structure through the command of greater organised force
than is at the disposal of any of its congeners. In such a sit¬
uation, force from one segment is met with equal force from another
segment and this leads to a condition where there is no group or
individual in which sovereignity can be said to rest . Thus stab¬
ility is maintained by an equilibrium at every point of divergent
interests in the social structure, while balance is sustained by a
distribution of like, but competitive interests amongst the homolog¬
ous segments of the society. Therefore, social control exercised
through a constituted judicial machinery dependent on the use of
organised force or state coercion is unnecessary. Jural institutions
instead rest on the right of "self-help"; a procedure whereby the
injured party takes the initiative in seeking redress whenever
breaches of customary law occur. Stated initially, and therefore
rather simply, we seek to show in this chapter how in cases of a
more or less serious breach of the norms of social behaviour in a
Stateless society the people involved attempt to solve and control
that behaviour. In other words we seek to demonstrate how disruptive
behaviour (deviance) is perceived and how law and order is maintained
in situations where there is no constituted authority for such a
g
See generally Mr. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (ed.); African
Political Systems op.cit., P. Bohannan; Law and Warfare. Studies
in the Anthropology of Conflict, Natural History Press, New York,
1967 and J. Maquet; Power and Society in Africa, Weidenfield and
Nicolson, London, 1971•
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purpose and its consequences for the general social fabric.
In any society, as Gulliver (1963) argues, there must of
necessity be a means or procedure for dealing with deviant behav¬
iour and the injuries that it causes. There must be by definition
a regularised means establishing that a breach of norm (values)
has actually occurred. There also must be a means for assessing
the damage and for dealing with the breach including a procedure
for implementing the decision taken in relation to the offence.
In present day society, as we shall show in later chapters,
the principle means to this end is contained in the complex of
political institutions established in law and exercised through
State government. In a Stateless society, both the State and "law"
are absent. Therefore deviance and social control, as part of the
wider social structure is to be found only through an examination
of more general roles, relationships and group activites. In
other words
"when one person is alleged to have committed an injury
against another - when therefore, the two persons come
into dispute - the significant jural factors are not only
the kind of injury involved, but the social relationship
between the two persons and the position of each in the
structure of his society. By position here I mean prim¬
arily the social status of each person and the various
7
groups to which he belongs" .
7
P.H. Gulliver; Social Control in an African Society - A Study of
the Arusha agricultural Masai of Northern Tanganyika. Routledge
and Kegan Paul, London, 1963, p. 1.
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In order to understand social control in the above context; that is
in a social structure where offences are harms against persons rather
than "harms" construed as harms against a legally constituted auth¬
ority i.e. the State, it is necessary to understand the more general
structure and processes which comprise such social structures.
Taking traditional societies of Africa as specific examples, we
shall try to demonstrate that "crime" and social control as it is
defined in this thesis is only found in particular social structures,
especially those where law (criminal law in particular) and its
implied notion of the State as a legally constituted authority is
in evidence. However we commence with a brief discussion on what is
meant by authority.
AUTHORITY, CRIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL
"Crime is not simply the disruption of serious interests; it
Q
is an offence against authority" declared Durkheim (l961|.b) . Kennedy
(1976) in a more specific form argues that crime is a "harm" con¬
strued as a harm against a definite form of authority - that of the
State. Implied here is the contention that where the State and its
laws are absent in a specific form crime is absent since any other
law lacks politicality and penal sanction and hence becomes in¬
sufficient criteria for identifying crime. This being the case, it
follows that we cannot meaningfully talk about crime and social
control in any society without some specific reference to authority
and its consequences for both crime and social control.
g
E. Durkheim; The Division of Labour in Society. Free Press,
New York, 196i+b p. 85-
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1. Authority
In his theory of social and. economic organisation, Weber (1962+)
distinguishes (among others), two basic types of authority; rational-
legal and traditional authority. According to Weber (1968), rational-
legal authority rests on a belief in the legality of normative rules
and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to
issue commands. Under this type of authority we have law in the
strict sense. Consequently, we find ourselves with a unique form of
control that can be recognised by its special kind of punishment or
rather penal sanction. This penal sanction, Kennedy (1976) describes
as a "State-specified punishment fixed in law to a conduct specifi-
9
cally proscribed by any law which has politicality" . Under this
type of punishment, we get the unique behaviour we refer to as crime.
However, since politicality and penal sanction imply the State which
in turn is the most obvious symbol of rational-legal authority, we
concur with Kennedy (1976) that penal sanction is a rule of State
law.
Traditional authority according to Weber (1968) rests on an
established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the
legitimacy of the status (not right) of those exercising authority
under them. Implied here, as Bohannan (1967) contends, is the
absence of a unicentric power system constituted in law. This in
relation to crime means that there are no offences against legal
rules since such rules themselves do not exist. This in turn means
that penal sanction as a punishment does not exist - hence crime
9
M. Kennedy; "Beyond Incrimination", in W.J. Chambliss and M.
Mankoff; Whose law, What Order. Wiley, New York, 1976, p.1+9*
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as the specific conduct to which penal sanction is fixed is also
absent. We find instead what Malinowski (1926) refers to as law
and custom under which breaches of customary law are not "crime",
but mainly deviance. Thus "punishment without penal sanction is
a rule of custom".''0
2. Social Control
Durkheim (I961;b) talks about social control in terms of social
solidarity based on the division of labour. In his analysis, he
identifies two types of laws; repressive law and restitutive law.
Repressive law consists essentially in suffering or at least some
kind of harm inflicted on the offender. Repressive law is then
divided into two parts - diffuse, refering to rules which are
purely morals or those based on common morality without judicial
sanctions and organised, refering to rules which have judicial
sanctions i.e. penal sanction.
Restitutive law as Durkheim (I961*b) sees it, is that law which
does not necessarily imply suffering for the offender but consists
mainly of the return of things as they were. This refers to the
establishment of troubled relations to their normal state irrespect¬
ive of the method used to restore the balance.
In relation to society, Durkheim (19611b) claims that in "prlmi-
11
tive" society we mainly find repressive law. To support this
view he maintains that crime in "primitive" society consists mostly
10TV,Ibid.
11
"Primitive" here is used to refer to archaic or acepholous
societies - Stateless societies.
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of not performing cult practices and violation of ritual prohibitions
which inadvertently result in repressive sanctions due to the
religious nature of the law they violate. To support his applic¬
ation of repressive law in the above manner he makes some rather
blatant claims that "primitive" people punish for the sake of
punishing and that the chief purpose of punishment is to make the
culprit suffer for the sake of suffering. In the belief that his
ideas are conclusive, Durkheim (1973) goes on to generalise the
application of "punishment" on the basis that "punishment" is the
greater the more society approximates to a less developed type.
Durkheim's argument inevitably tends to lead to one basic
conclusion, that "primitive" society has no notion of restitutive
law and that "punishment" is not only repressive and severe, but
that it is haphazardly applied by a religious authority that must be
unquestionably obeyed. In other words what Durkheim has done is
to equate "primitive" society with primitive and blatant social
control. However, as we shall show in the following discussion, the
opposite seems to be the case.
Under "traditional" authority, we find what Bohannan (19^7)
refers to as primitive law - meaning a systematise! way of dealing
with disputes and retaliative sanctions backed by authority based
12
on tradition and custom . Hence deviance is not an offence ("harm")
against authority in the sense that "crime" is construed as a harm
against the State. Deviance is more or^less seen as bringing ritual
12
See generally S. Wagner; The Political Organisation of the Bantu
of Kavirondo, in M. Portes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, African
Political Systems op.cit.
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uncleanliness to both the offender and his group. This does not
call for a repressive law as Durkheim (1961+b) maintains, but instead
calls for lustration or expiation rather than punishment or even
compensation for the injured party. Wagner (19I+O) and Calston
(1968) point out that contrary to Durkheim's view, the chief aim
of the restoration of law and order is the settlement of claims
and the reparation of damages rather than "punishment". Consequent¬
ly, whatever compensation is paid and the collective responsibility
involved in the payment is not intended as a fine in the sense of
a penal sanction, but rather as a restoration of a broken relation¬
ship. However it is important to note here that in some cases, the
way the compensation is imposed may give the impression of a fine
as a penal sanction. For example, among the Swun and Kgalagari some
fines are set aside as punishment especially in relation to the
jural consequences of marriage. For example, Bisana - which is a
"fine" which may be imposed for unsatisfactory conduct on the part
11
of a husband towards his wife . Nevertheless, even under these
circumstances the aim is to restore a troubled relationship rather
than to punish in the penal law sense. This method of handling dis¬
putes tends to negate Durkheim's application of repressive law to
"primitive" society. Instead it denotes a situation which speaks
more of restitutive law and lenient rather than severe and repress¬
ive social control. In the following discussion we shall examine
the implications of this by looking at the way disruptive behaviour
is perceived and dealt with in a "traditional" stateless situation
1 3
A. Kuper; The Kgalagari and the jural consequences of marriage.
Man Vol. 5 No. 3 September 1970* pp. 1+7—1+71 •
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in the wider context of traditional social organisation. In this
section, although we may use examples from other African societies,
we shall focus our attention mainly on Kenyan pre-colonial social
organisation. We shall however not engage ourselves with a de¬
tailed historical and anthropological exposition of each tribal
organisation, but shall restrict ourselves to the general and broad
issues of tribal organisation or rather "traditional government".
KENYA - GENERAL BACKGROUND
Geographically, Kenya lies in the eastern part of Africa,
bordering the Indian Ocean. The country covers an approximate
area of 250,000 square miles. Kenya lies within the equatorial
belt, but due to her altitude, the climate varies quite consider¬
ably. It ranges from hot and wet at the coastal and lake regions,
cool and wet in the highlands and rather dry in the remaining
parts of the country. According to the 1979 Population Census,
the population was put at 15,000,000 (million) with 20% of this
population concentrated in the major towns and cities while the
remaining 80% lives in the rural areas. Kenya is a multi-racial
society with people of the African origin forming the bulk of the
population. The main occupation is agriculture.
The history of Kenya, like that of the rest of Africa can be
broken up into three distinct sections; the traditional (pre-
colonial), the colonial and the independent. As Maquet (1971 )
points out the traditional period can be said to have begun when
agricultural techniques of production became widespread. The colo¬
nial period dates from mid 19th century when the conquest and
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partition of Africa among European powers began and the independent
can be dated from ^60, when the first sizeable number of African
States became independent.
According to Munro (1975)> looking at Kenya from the eye of
the conventional historian, her history begins from the early 19th
century when European influence on the eastern coast of Africa
began. Prom this level historical accounts of Kenya deal mainly
with European exploration, settlement and colonial rule. References
to the pre-colonial era are scant if ever available and as Muriuki
(197U) argues, these tend to portray the foreigner as a catalyst
in a sea of hitherto docile and dormant recipient communities.
However, there is another history of Kenya which emerges from the
level of the anthropologist. Prom this level, we come into contact
with historical and anthropological accounts of indigenous Kenyan
societies, with their own distinct economic and social organisation
which thrived prior to and later side by side with the so called
European exploration and discovery. We shall focus our attention
on this traditional society, especially its social structure with
reference to crime and social control. It is however important to
note here that the material we shall use is based on fieldwork done
in the 1930's. This may bear some reference to colonial influence
on the traditional structures. This is mainly so due to the method
of writing used in anthropological studies. Anthropologists tend
to write in the present tense while referring to early periods -
a method usefully referred to as the "ethnographic" present. This
includes what is there at that moment and more often than not, it
is not considered necessary to update everything which results in
59-
the kind of influence we have referred to above.
TRADITIONAL SOCIAL ORGANISATION
Kenya's traditional society is made up of different units of
people, often referred to as tribes who are linked together (loos-
ly or otherwise) by a common language and territorial habitation.
The 1969 Kenya population census identified four major groups among
Kenyan tribes; the Bantu, the Nilotic, the Nilo-hamitic and the
Hamitic. Before colonialism, the main occupation was determined by
ecological conditions which led to some being either agriculturists,
pastoralists or both.
According to Service (1962), Stateless<societies fall into
two main groupings; bands and tribes. Bands are those simply organ¬
ised societies whose lifestyle is centred on hunting and the
collection of wild products whereas tribes are of the order of a
large collection of bands with a more settled existence and more
i )
systematic social organisation . What differentiates bands from
tribes is the nature of authority. In bands authority is very
limited and often rests on the senior members of the groups. Among
tribes the social structure is much more complex and is organised
either in Kinship terms or in an age-set system. Kinship organ¬
isation is found in those societies which are made up of separate
village communities or what Maquet (1971) refers to as global
societies. These communities are related to one another by various
''^E. Service; Primitive Social Organisation - An Evolutionary
Perspective. Random House, New York, 1962. pp. 59-11+2.
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economic and kinship ties with internal administration exercised
through elders' councils. Societies organised by the age-set
system are those in which political control and general control is
conceived in terms of an age-set. This type of social organisation
is in most cases found together with kinship organisation. The
basis for organisation by age is the division of the population in
groups depending on tasks to be performed. Hence age-sets serve
more as a means for the division of labour in the whole tribe
whereas kinship ties are limited to organisation within clans (or
smaller groupings). Organisation by kinship and age-set was quite
predominant among Kenyan pre-colonial tribes and it is these we
shall examine here.
1. Kinship Organisation
In all societies there is some kind of kinship bond based
either on blood relations or on marriage. This implies that all
those men and women who can trace their ancestry back to the same
ancestor by either male or female ties are considered to be kin.
This aspect of kinship is recognised in all societies. However,
in tribal society, kinship terminology and usage goes much deeper
than the above. In the absence of a political authority for main¬
taining social order, kinship ties shed off their nominal value
and acquire political values that are absent in a state set up.
In other words:
"The kinship bond is not as it has become in contemporary
Europe, largely nominal. It creates a network of relation¬
ships in which the actors have very well defined roles.
There is firstly the common role of kinsmen towards all
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others, then there are specific roles according to the
place one occupies in the network (older brother vis-a-
» 15
vis young brother, grandson vis-a-vis grandfather etc.)"
In practice, the whole society is divided up in lineage net¬
works made up of all those who can trace their descent to a common
ancestor. Through these lineages, as Mair (1962) argues, descent
becomes the functional means for providing the basis of social
groupings and for maintaining effective relationships. Where this
is the case as among the Luhya of Western Kenya, the lineage organ¬
isation is co-existent with the whole society and almost all
inter-group and intra-group relationships (economic and social)
are conceived in terms of it. The lineage then provides the prin¬
ciple upon which corporate property owning local groups are esta¬
blished. It also provides the idiom through which inter-tribal
16
relations and intergroup relations operate . Within such an inter¬
dependent system of relationships (corporate as opposed to individ¬
ualistic) solidarity and collective responsibility becomes the
common role of kinsmen while mutual obligations and reciprocity
17becomes an important aspect of their lifestyle . Hence kinship
networks fulfil those functions which in the "rational" State are
a function of political institutions i.e. the resolution of conflicts
internal to society, control of land (economic) rights and making
16
J. Maquet; Power and Society in Africa, op.cit. p. 1+2.
16
See generally J. Beattie; Other Cultures. Cohen and West,
London, 196i+.
17See generally J. Maquet; Power and Society in Africa, op.cit.
and B. Malinowski; Crime and Custom in Savage Society.
Routledge and Kegan Paul. London, 1926.
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decisions in matters concerning the society as a whole. Thus
kinship organisation is crucial to the structure of tribal state¬
less society, without which "traditional" social control cannot
be effected.
2. The Age-Set System
Among a large number of Kenyan tribes, particularly among
the Hamitic tribes i.e. the Masai and their Bantu-speaking neigh¬
bours for example, the Kikuyu, social organisation based on kinship
was in most cases augmented by organisation through the age-set
system. Whenever this occurred, the age-set system transcended
the kinship ties and covered a much wider area bringing together
the clans organised in kinship terms into one tribal unit. Muriuki
(197^) points out that the age-set system provided a principle for
social organisation that could exist side by side with ties based on
kinship solidarity but which nevertheless cut across kinship ties
and embraced the whole tribe.
In the age-set structure, Kenyatta (1963) and- Muriuki (197U)
contend that men (and in most cases women) born within a certain
set of years are accepted in one set. Once individuals are accepted
18
in the set through the ceremony of initiation they become perman¬
ent members of their set. They now become subject to the rules,
regulations and responsibilities of their particular set. At this
point individuals cease to act as individuals and instead begin to
19
act as members of a particular group . Muriuki (197U) underlines
18
See later discussion
19See generally J. Kenyatta; Pacing Mount Kenya. Seeker and Wormburg,
London, 1938 and S. Sabarwal; The Traditional Political System of
the finbu of Central Kenya. East African Publishing House (EAPH)
Kampala, 1970.
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the importance of these coeval institutions by noting that it is
this aspect of the society that contributed most to the bond that
linked up all the members of the society and made them feel like
a single people which further underlines the corporate nature of
tribal society.
The importance of the age-set system, like that of kinship
was not in the principles on which it was based, for example, age,
but on its social functions. First it provided a means for social
organisation which brings together different clans. Secondly it
provided a criteria for the division of labour and responsibility
by providing groups which performed certain jobs at particular
grades. In this respect, as Kenyatta (1963) and Muriuki (197^4-)
point out among the Kikuyu, the system provides a much superior
method for the division of labour than that offered by kinship since
it allows participation on a tribal basis and is not limited by
lineage segmentation. Thirdly, by guaranteeing permanent groups
via age-set membership, the system acts as a sustainer of the coll¬
ective way of life. Age-sets move through the various grades as
complete units implying that groups of people rather than individ¬
uals change their social status and hence their roles and responsi¬
bilities at the same time. This provides a means for the exercise
of some form of political authority which is done through the senior
age-sets whose members constitute more or less a council of elders
who play a vital role in decision making in matters concerning the
whole tribe and who as a collective body act as overseers for the
maintenance of law and custom^.
20
J. Beattie; Other Cultures op.cit.
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3- The Economic Structure
In present day urban and industrialised societies, all goods
circulate and nearly all circulate through formally institutionalised
economic networks. In tribal society however, goods did not cir¬
culate in the above sense but were in most cases consumed by the
unit that produced them - "auto-consumption" as Maquet ('1971)
describes it. This implies a subsistence economy characterised
by a rudimentary differentiation of productive labour- with no
machinery for the accumulation of wealth in the form of commercial
21
or industrial capital . Under these circumstances, as Gluckman
(1968) argues, it was impossible for anyone to use property to en¬
hance his status or social influence, implying the absence of
economically differentiated classes. Thus in tribal or Stateless
society, the significance of property is determined by the role it
plays in a nexus of specific relationships. Hence property law
defines not so much rights of persons over things, but obligations
owed between persons in respect of things. There is a parallel
22
here with the "jus in personam" and the "jus in rem" of Roman Law
As long as the emphasis is on obligation rather than rights (in
the strict legal sense), this sets limits on the economic diverg¬
encies which can be established between "classes" (social groups)
and between "ruler" and "subjects". Hence ownership is not absolute
as in the rational-legal sense and therefore cannot be said to rest
on any particular individual. This leads to collective ownership
21
M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard; African Political Systems
op.cit. p. 8.
22
A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society.
Free Press, New York, 1965 (1st Hardcover Production 1952) pp.32-33-
65.
augmented by widespread sharing and reciprocity.
Thus the economic structure in traditional society is solidly
integrated into the social organisation and cannot be discussed as
though it were tied, by separate law to a state structure. Where
organisation was by kinship and/or age-set system, lineages had
corporate rights in property which made nonsense of ownership in
the rational-legal concept. Therefore like the rest of the social
organisation, economic rights found their legitimacy not in law
but in collectivism and reciprocity with a patrilineal and/or matri-
23
lineal succession .
1+. Law and Custom
In lineage and/or kinship based societies, as we have already
seen there is no structure as distinct from the kinship and/or age-
set system. This means that there is nc constituted authority that
wields legislative powers in the society. Customary law therefore,
although it makes tribal culture is not an inventory of rules of
conduct as criminal law implies. It is rather a coherent system
0)
of relationships between individuals and groups . This implies
that traditional customary law is a ramification of the existing
socio-economic relationships in the sense that law in the "rational-
25
legal" sense is a ramification of the State . Like the relation¬
ships, at least in theory, customary law is unchangable. This
^Ibid Chapter 2.
^
G. Wagner; The Political Organisation of the Bantu of Kavirondo
op.cit.
25
See generally K. Makela; The Societal Tasks of the System of
Penal Law. Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, Vol. 5 1971+
pp. 1+7-65.
66.
means that the degree to which an action or claim or obligation is
in line with age-honoured tradition is the only criteria of its
26
merits . This implies that customary law is not created through
administrative action, but rather comes about with the evolvement
of corporate relationships within the society. Its legitimacy
therefore rests not so much on an absolute authority, but on the
collective and reciprocal structure of the society. This means
that the authority of elders in the maintenance of customary law
27
is not structured . Bather their authority is diffuse and mainly
dependent on corporate consensus. Hence the only sanction avail-
28
able to them through tradition is that of collective reprobation
This stands in sharp contrast to the specificity of state authority.
In the absence of such specific powers, the maintenance of custo¬
mary law becomes equivalent to the maintenance of effective re¬
lationships. Consequently it is these relationships that serve to
maintain law and order. This entails the argument that customary
law is part and parcel of integrated social action and that its
legitimacy is found in the collective and reciprocal institutions
that form the basis on which all social relationships are held to-
29
gether in a meaningful whole . Within such a situation, in order
to meaningfully understand social control in stateless society,
26
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especially how customary law is maintained, it becomes necessary
for one to understand first how social relationships are maintained.
This is crucial to the explanation of deviance and social control
in tribal structures.
5. Reciprocity
In tribal society, due to the corporate nature of the social
organisation, mutual co-operation is an essential condition for
survival. Therefore, mutual obligation (involving both a right
and a duty) is an essential aspect of all social and economic
relationships. This means that every transaction, be it social,
economic or political is linked into a chain of mutual services,
every one of them having to be repaid at some later time. This
embodies the principle of give and take or what social anthropology
describes as reciprocity.
The first classic article on reciprocity is found in Mauss'
30
"The Gift" . Informed mainly by his awareness of the totality of
social phenomenon, Mauss attempted a comparative study of the forms
and functions of exchange in "primitive" societies. Drawing mainly
from North American and Melanesian societies, he in "The Gift"
engages in a historically specific analysis of reciprocity. He
argues that underlying the principle of "gift" exchange (reciprocity)
are presentations which in theory are voluntary, but which in
practice are obligatory. Mauss influenced by Durkheim's concept
of social solidarity contends that in "primitive" society recipro¬
city is the basis for social contract and the division of labour.
-^M. Mauss; The Gift - Forms and Functions of exchange in archaic
societies. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1970. (Translated
from the French version "Essai sur le don" 1925).
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In this sense, he maintains that reciprocity (the gift) stands
for something more than a utility for the circulation of goods.
To him, it was central to the whole social structure in the sense
that
"Class, age-groups and sexes, in view of the many relation¬
ships ensuing from contacts between them, are in a state
of perpetual economic effervescence which has little about
31
it that is materialistic" . .
Hence he recognised reciprocity as the social force that "binds"
clans together and keeps them separate, which divides their labour
32
and constrains them to exchange .
33
In economic anthropology, Sahlins in Stone Age Economics
distinguishes three types of reciprocity: generalised, balanced
and negative. Generalised reciprocity refers to transactions that
are putatively altruistic touching on areas of assistance among
close kinsmen. What Malinowski (1926) refers to as the "pure gift".
Obligation in relation to generalised reciprocity is very weak and
in most cases no returns are made or expected. Balanced recipro¬
city refers mainly to simultaneous exchange and is applied to all
forms of "Gift-exchange", payments and to what is ethnographically
referred to as "trade". Negative reciprocity refers to the attempt
to get something for nothing. In ethnographic terms this covers
areas like "haggling" and "barter".
31Ibid p. 70
32Ibid p. 71
33M. Sahlins; Stone Age Economics. Tavistock Publications Ltd.,
London, 1972. pp. 191-220.
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In application to tribal society, generalised reciprocity is
limited to close family circles, e.g. close kinsmen. Negative
reciprocity is found mainly outside tribal boundaries and is usually
associated with inter-tribal transaction. However it is balanced
reciprocity that is important and crucial to the whole social organ¬
isation. It cuts across the whole tribal structure forming the
mainstay of the social organisation. Through reciprocal gifts,
visits and services each area of life is made more binding since
reciprocal exchange makes it part and parcel of the whole system
of mutualities. Non-compliance in a situation where inter-depend¬
ence is the normal lifestyle places the offender outside the social
and economic system of his group and tribe, making survival diffi¬
cult. As Wagner (19U0) and Kenyatta (1963) observe among the Luhya
and Kikuyu respectively, in Kenyan tribal societies and by extension
stateless society in general, reciprocity (balanced) acts as a
safeguard for the continuity of mutual obligations and services.
In this sense, it underlies all social interaction and forms the
basis for both economic and socio-political co-operation. Thus it
acts as the principle through which social solidarity including the
division of labour is realised.
With reference to customary law, it follows that it (customary
law) as an integrated social action cannot be maintained by a
psychological motive or through force sanctioned by an abstract
authority. On the contrary, it is maintained by a definite social
machinery of binding force, based on mutual dependence and realised
in equivalent arrangements of reciprocal services. The public nature
of these reciprocal services, serves to maintain the feeling of
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solidarity within the tribe and this helps to cement the bonds that
*5 1
exist within it1. This makes reciprocity, rather than authority
the chief backbone and sustainer of customary law. The signific¬
ance of this is clearly demonstrated by the way in which order and
dispute settlement is handled. We shall however leave that for a
later discussion while we examine first how law and custom is
transmitted in a stateless situation where there are no legally
constituted institutions for that purpose.
6. Initiation
In every society, some degree of order and regularity must be
assured if social life in any community is to be sustained. At
the same time, in order to ensure continuity of the society, there
must be a system for the transmission of the basic principles of
social life. In our previous discussion in this chapter, we have
attempted to explain how order and regularity is maintained. In
this section, we shall consider what kind of institutional arrange¬
ment is responsible for the transmission of tribal laws and customs.
In tribal society, with specific reference to Kenyan tribes,
the most important institution for the transmission of law and
custom was that of Initiation. Initiation e.g. "Nzaiko" among the
Kamba, "Irua" among the Kikuyu generally means circumcision. The
significance of the custom however is not found in the physical
operation of circumcision, but is found in the role it plays in the
nexus of social relationships. The ceremony of circumcision, for
ol
See J. Wagner; The Political Organisation of the Bantu of Kavirondo
op.cit. and J. Kenyatta; Facing Mount Kenya op.cit. For an example
of Luhya and Kikuyu gift exchanges respectively.
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instance the dances, the rituals and the gifts exchanged are mainly-
used as a platform for restating tribal moral and political values
and very often mark the beginning of the participation of the new
initiates in the various governing groups in the tribal organis-
35
ation. In fact in almost all the recorded cases in Kenya , the
real age-sets usually began on the initiation day. Muriuki (197-U)
points out that initiation is organised in a tribal basis and in
most cases is organised on an age-grading system even among those
societies whose basic organisation is kinship rather than age-sets,
for example, the Luhya. Taken on its face value, the initiation
ceremony appears as though its main social purpose is to mark the
beginning of adulthood. However, a closer look at the process of
initiation, especially the "rites de passage" reveals that it
serves to accept the individual into an existing group or relation¬
ship pattern and to bind him to the obligations and standards of
behaviour which membership of the group or participation in the
group entail^. This is true for both sexes and the ceremony was
always held in public.
The Ceremony
Initiation ceremonies among Kenyan tribes were elaborate and
complex. Here we shall outline the broad features of the ceremony
and concentrate more on their social significance.
35
See generally Lucy Mair; Primitive Government. Hazell Watson
and Tiney Ltd., London, 1962.
See for example Luhya initiation in G. Wagner; The Political
Organisation of the Bantu of North Kavirondo op.cit. and Kikuyu
initiation in J. Kenyatta; Pacing Mount Kenya, op.cit.
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Usually and in most cases, several days "before the actual
circumcision a lot of preparations were made. These involved
preparation of food and drink for the ceremonial dance and the
preparation of the initiates. This involved moral and social
education, about the significance of the initiation and its con-
37
sequences for the traditional social fabric . Then comes the
actual ceremony and the order of events generally involved the
following stages (a) a mutual ceremonial utterance which signified
that a particular relationship or membership of a group has been
established, (b) in a pantomimic performance, the behaviour which
characterises the new status in the group or the nature of the
relationship is acted out, (c) gifts are exchanged among those who
have entered a mutual relationship, (d) commandments which involve
instructions in the standards of conduct are given, usually by a
paternal or maternal relative to each initiate (this may at times
involve definite rules of ritual, such as the spitting of beer on
the face of the initiate) and (e) in relation to the gift exchange,
there is a general religious performance which may take the form of
offerings to ancestors for goodwill.
Thus through initiation rites, customary law is re-stated and
transmitted to the next generation. Hence initiation provides a
means through which different social groups and relationship patterns
continue themselves by handing down their own system of values and
37
See for example the Kikuyu initiation ceremony. J. Kenyatta;
Facing Mounty Kenya, op.cit. Chapter 6.
See for example Luhya "rites de passage" in J. Wagner; The
Political Organisation of the Bantu of Kavirondo. op.cit. pp. 2*13—
215.
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standards through the formal initiation of members into them.
However, the different social groups do not exist in isolation.
On the contrary, these groups overlap at various respects, criss¬
crossing through the whole society via kinship, age-sets and marriage.
This overlapping, especially in personnel acts as a force that
maintains and promotes the homogeneity of law and custom. On the
surface this tends to give the impression of absolute harmony, but
on closer examination, this is not so. Contrary to Durkheim's
conclusion about "primitive" Society, there is no blind observance
of law and custom. Malinowski (1926) and Beattie (I96J4) both argue
that customary laws are broken and that there is a regularised
method for handling disputes. This is what Bohannan (1967) refers
to as a primitive anticipation of legal procedure - meaning that
there is a conventionalised way in which an injured party may
strike back to the injurer or claim compensation for the injury.
In the following discussion, we shall examine how tribal conflicts
are perceived and dealt with.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
39
Roberts, in Order and Dispute distinguishes three types of
disputes in tribal society; inter-group disputes, intra-group
disputes and general disputes; those involving constant law break¬
ing by a member of a particular group which once they pass the
initial stage become general disputes involving the whole clan or
tribe. In relation to dispute settlement, Bahannan (1967) maintains
39
S. Roberts; Order and Dispute. An introduction to legal anthro¬
pology. Penguin Books. London. Chapter 1+.
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that there are basically two forms of conflict resolution in tribal
society; administering rules or open fighting or warfare. In the
following discussion, we shall examine the dispute settlement
system with reference to the above distinctions.
Procedure
(a) Inter-group disputes
Kenyatta (1963) argues that when a breach of law occurs in
tribal society, the initial step is for the injured party to take
the matter in their own hands and go to the offender's party to
seek redress. Por example, if a murder occurred, the first step
was that the family group of the murdered man took up arms and
invaded the murderer's homestead with the object of killing him
or one of his close relatives. This act or "self-help"^ was a
notice to the murderer's group that the dead man had a group that
could inflict retribution on behalf of its members. This act of
"self-help" was allowed under custom and was usually the first step
taken towards the resolution of the problem between the two parties
concerned. This was possible because offences were harms against
persons rather than acts construed as harms against a legally con¬
stituted authority such as the State. However, due to the corpor¬
ate nature of the Society, where mutual alliance and interdepend¬
ence was a necessary condition for survival, the use of "self-help"
was rather inhibited. As a result "self-help" functioned not so
^See generally J. Kenyatta; Pacing Mount Kenya, op.cit. and
K.S. Carlston; Social Theory and African Tribal Organisation -
The Development of socio-legal theory. University of Illinois
Press, Urbana, 1968.
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much as a method for solving disputes, "but rather as a means for
identifying that a breach of law has actually occurred and hence
served to bring the formal machinery of dispute settlement into
action.
Immediately after the initial step was taken, attempts are
then made through the elders' council to intervene in the dispute
in order to halt widespread feuding and social disruption^. In
relation to the elders' functions, it is important to note that
those elders who sat to arbitrate in disputes were not permanent
J ^
members of the elders' council . In each case, the composition
of the judicial body and to a large extent the outcome of its
deliberations was determined by the nature of the offence rather
than the authority structure of the elders' council, in particular,
the extent and nature of common interests which are affected by
the dispute or the damage done^. After hearing the pros and cons
of the case, the elders would then refer to other previous disputes
that bore relevance to the present dispute and restate the decisions
given in respect of those previous disputes. They would then ann¬
ounce their judgement and state the amount of compensation to be
paid while at the same time giving reasons for their decisions.
I A
See generally J. Middleton and D. Tait; Tribes without Rulers,
op.cit.
^See generally L. Mair; Primitive Government op.cit. and
J. Kenyatta; Pacing Mount Kenya, op.cit.
) ^
See for example the Luhya - J. Wagner; The Political Organ¬
isation of the Bantu of Kavirondo. op.cit.
^Ibid.
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In traditional society, the above procedure has some signifi¬
cant implications. Although dealing with a present breach of norm,
it serves as an occasion for recalling the judicial traditions of
UK
the tribe and thus makes known the body of traditional law .
Secondly, it serves to uphold the aim of the elder's court which
is to get compensation for the injured party rather than to punish
L6
the offender in the "rational-legal" sense . This negates
Durkheim's (1961ft) claim that "primitive" people punish for the
sake of punishing. It in fact attributes to "primitive" social
control, aspects of deviance handling which are found in the resti-
tutive law which Durkheim so readily denies them. Dispute settle¬
ment was thus by compromise and the elders did not consider their
role as that of imposing "punishment" in the penal sense. They
rather saw their role as that of ending strife and restoring social
harmony without which the collective and reciprocal life of the
) 7
community would not continue .
Once the decisions of the elders' council were made known,
their function had more or less come to an end since they could not
use force to enforce their decisions. As Schapera (1956) points out,
the use of organised force to enforce any decision was not the
monopoly of any particular person, class or group. Unlike in the
^Ibid.
ii6
See J. Kenyatta; Pacing Mount Kenya, op.cit.
) 7
See generally, L. Mair; Primitive Government, op.cit.,
P. Bohannan; Law and Warfare, op.cit. and K.S. Carlston;
Social Theory and African Tribal Organisation, op.cit.
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"rational" state, where the courts can rely in the legitimate
coercion of the State to enforce their decisions, the elders, al¬
though their role in settling disputes was vital, they did not have
any "power", inherent in their council as a judicial body to enforce
their decisions. As a result, the enforcement of their decisions
was left to the parties involved in the dispute. Here the elders'
authority seems only to have gone as far as drawing a framework
) R
for co-operation which depended on the goodwill of those involved
In this case we concur with Bohannan (1967) that systematic and
explicitly formulated rules of conduct and a formal procedure for
the enforcement of these rules by an impersonal authority play a
relatively minor part in traditional society. The prototype of law
(in the strict sense) is only to be found in large part in the pro¬
cedures and standards by which custom regulates disputes between
groups and assures the composition of these disputes in the inter¬
ests of public peace. Instead of implementing decisions or impos¬
ing punishment, the parties in dispute are made to accept the
principle of compromise, a procedure that is made possible by the
collective nature of responsibility in tribal society.
(b) Responsibility
According to Kennedy (1976), in modern day society, the concept
of law and its machinery for dispute settlement presumes an ethic
that we have so far failed to find in tribal society; that the
individual is responsible for his own conduct. Individual respons¬
ibility as this implies means that there must be an economic and
) R
See generally M. Gluckman; Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal
Society. Oxford University Press. London. 1965.
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k9
socio-political structure based, on the same principle . However
as we have already noted, in traditional society, all social and
economic institutions are based on the principle of collectivism
and reciprocity. What does this entail for dispute settlement?
Earlier in this chapter, we established that each individual
in traditional society is a member of a corporate group. As a
member of such a group, each individual ceases to function as an
individual as regards his social rights and duties. Since dispute
settlement is part and parcel of the whole network of social re¬
lationships, the same principle also holds. As Mair (1962) points
out, lineage (corporate) groups consider themselves injured as a
body if one of their members is injured and they support him on his
search for redress. On the other side, the injurer relies on his
group for support, implying collective responsibility.
In this respect, collective responsibility in dispute processing
implies a certain view of breaches of law which is absent where
authority is absolute and specific as we find it in the "rational"
state. This is that all breaches of law or offences are conceived
as harms against a particular person or group and not as offences
50
conceived as harms against the State . This significantly in¬
fluences the way breaches of law are dealt with. TJnlike in the
"rational-legal" situation, it is not the question of the individual
against an impersonal authority, but rather, a question of two
groups of more or less equal status against each other"'''. This
ii9
M. Kennedy; "Beyond Incrimination", op.cit.
50
See G. Wagner; The Political Organisation of the Bantu of
Kavirondo. op.cit.
51 See P. Bohannan; Law and Warfare, op.cit.
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abrogates the need for a judicial authority in the rational-legal
sense. Justice and not penal sanction is administered by and
between those groups affected by the offence. In addition to this
as Wagner (19i+0) contends, property is not individually owned,
hence the question of the individual paying compensation on his
own behalf becomes meaningless. Since most property is owned and
inherited by virtue of membership to a group, it is the group that
becomes responsible. By accepting responsibility for a member's
behaviour, the group in effect stands ready to defend its members
against any outside attempt to "punish". Under such circumstances,
no authority can impose "punishment" on an individual without be-
92
coming under custom the object of collective vendetta . Thus the
creation and maintenance of common or mutual interests within groups
is the most important factor to any individual immediately affected
by a breach of the law since it is through these, and not through
a legally constituted institution, where support to meet his claims
and reparations for damages can be found.
(c) Intra-group disputes
As we have already seen, where breaches of law and custom in¬
volve two different groups, the injured party and not an instituted
legal authority takes the initiative to bring the matter to public
notice. If no such steps are taken the matter is left to rest.
This kind of dispute settlement is however only possible where
deviant acts are offences against groups and not against legally
constituted laws. What happens then when breaches of customary
. Kennedy, "Beyond Incrimination" op.cit. p. 1+1.
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law are within the same corporate group where the dispute affects
those interests that are specific to the group? Does collective
responsibility still hold?
In intra-group disputes, settlement by paying compensation or
even "self-help" within the same group would inevitably involve a
split up and hence a dissolution of the social relationships in-
83
volved . Since the indivisibility of the common bonds and inter¬
ests of the group makes dispute settlement within the group through
the payment of compensation undesirable, a ritual ceremony is pre¬
ferred. As Beattie (1962+) and Carlston (1968) argue, purification
through ritual frees the offender from his ritual impurities (brought
about by his deviance) and makes it safe for the group members to
resume social relationships with him . This procedure is applied
to all intra-group disputes and offences and is not limited to
offences against ritual practices.
This stands out in great contrast to the "rational-legal"
situation, where the concept of individual responsibility for ones
offences and the concept that offences are harms against the State,
makes it possible for a constituted authority to intervene and im¬
pose sanctions irrespective of the social relationships involved.
Again we note here that "punishment" in the sense that Durkheim's
application implies is non-existent. The chief aim of social con¬
trol here is to restore a broken relationship which cannot be done
53
G. Wagner; The Political Organisation of the Bantu of Kaairondo
op.cit.
See generally both, J. Kenyatta; Pacing Mount Kenya, op.cit. and
P. Bohannan; Law and Warfare, op.cit.
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either "by imposing repressive law or the severity of punishment,
since these would, lead to further broken relationships as their
application by any particular group would be interpreted as a harm
by opposing groups. Moreoever, this would lead to constant feuding
which would eventually destroy the principles of collectivism and
reciprocity upon which the society is based.
(d) General disputes - Habitual offences
According to Kenyatta's (1963) observations among the Kikuyu,
habitual offenders, for example if a person is a constant thief or
is constantly involved in witchcraft or black magic^^, the offender
was dealt with by being expelled from the group . At this juncture,
the offender's actions were perceived as a threat to the whole group
or society and collective action, in most cases banishment, was used
in order to protect the society from social disruption. This was
done through institutions provided for such purposes e.g. the
57
"Kingole" among the Kamba. Sanctions imposed on any offender
through the "Kingole" were usually a last resort when all other
means of dissuading the offender from his actions had failed. In
such a situation, responsibility for the sanction was shared by the
whole tribe and not by any one group. It is important to note here
that the purpose of such sanction as Kenyatta (1963) points out was
not intended as a "punishment" as is implied in penal sanction.
55Black magic was considered harmful to the collective nature of
the society while white magic was not.
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See generally K.S. Carlston; Social Theory and African Tribal
Organisation, op.cit.
57
"Kingole" was a general council of the whole tribe which only met
to deal with those breaches of law and custom that were perceived
as dangerous to the whole tribal structure which could.not respond
to ordinary councils "nzama sya atumia".
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The aim was to restore communal harmony or rather community "balance
58
without which social communitarianism would not take place
In societies where sanctions against breaches of law are not
intended as a "punishment", but are seen as attempts to restore
broken relationships, we come to the conclusion that social con¬
trol, or in the most general sense law can only be understood with¬
in an analysis of the relationships under sanction. In the absence
of the State in a specific legal form, the specificity, politically
and penal sanction of law59 is absent and so is crime. In this
sense, traditional customary law possesses no norms which bear any
similarity to civil and criminal law of "rational-legal" states.
Hence crime, as an act or omission of any criminal law, and as a
harm construed as a harm against the State is meaningless in a
situation where offences are against particular persons or groups.
Therefore, crime as we know it today is not a factor uniform
to all societies at all times; neither is it a universal phenomenon
comparable to "primitive" and "civilised" societies.
As societies move from "traditional" and Stateless where author¬
ity is not specific to "rational-legal" States where the specificity
of State authority is evidenced in law, the type of behaviour
sanctioned may remain the same, but the nature of the sanction and
the way law is used to distribute responsibility for the behaviour
drastically alters the implications involved. Whereas under trad¬
itional society that behaviour is simply deviance, under the
I^O
See generally J. Beattie; Other Cultures, op.cit.
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See generally M. Kennedy; "Beyond Incrimination", op.cit.
83.
"rational-legal" authority of the State, that same behaviour be¬
comes specific and hence criminal - meaning that crime is a
historically specific phenomenon. Crime therefore cannot be
found in all social structures, but is found in those societies
where law plays a crucial role in consolidating the social struc¬
ture itself - implying that crime is a product of particular social
structures.
In the following chapters, taking Kenya's colonial and neo-
colonial capitalist structures as specific examples, we shall look
at crime and social control, especially the general as well as the
particular uses of law in an attempt to demonstrate that "crime"
exists only under certain historical situations, especially in
those situations where the State's authority is made specific in
law.
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INTRODUCTION
In Chapter Two, through a synthesis of crime and social control
in a "Stateless" society, we argued that prior to the advent of the
modern State and its criminal law, there were no offences against
legal rules. Harms were visited against persons and not against a
superior outside authority to which agrieved parties could appeal
for justice. Compensation, realised through collective responsi¬
bility, for such harms rather than "punishment" was exercised.
Criminal law which defines crime and prescribes "punishment" for it
was absent and with it the abstract State as a supposedly neutral
agent whose role is to enforce the presumed morality of the people.
However, as we have argued elsewhere, as society began to shift
from a"traditional"one to a complex market system, the growth of
the "rational-legal" State became the main focus point. Instead of
the traditional machinery for dispute settlement, the scene became
dominated by the legal machinery of the State. Instead of resolving
conflict, the focus shifted to "punishment" and the stage was thus
set for a "punishment" oriented system of social control.
This shift brought about various views concerning the role of
the State vis-a-vis crime. On the one hand, the State was portrayed
as a neutral force whose chief purpose was to arbitrate between the
various groups in society. According to this view, acts became
criminal because they were offensive to the moral standards of the
vast majority of the people (Durkheim 1961+b). On the other hand,
the State was seen as not at any one time standing as a truly neu¬
tral force, but was seen as an expression of the powerful interest
groups in society. From this standpoint, crime was perceived as
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those acts that run counter to the interests of the powerful groups
within the society. This implied that criminal law (which defines
crime) is an expression of these same interests (Chambliss and
Mankoff 1976). Kennedy (1976), follows this argument further and
notes that criminal law emerged at the same time with the modern
State's institutions of the capitalist mode of production. In
Kennedy's (1976) treatment of the division of criminal and civil
law and the use of the legal system to ensure the division of
labour between entrepreneurs and property-less labourers, he argues
that the State in capitalist society has tended to represent the
interests of the politically and economically powerful as opposed
to the majority in society. By implication, penal law becomes a
reflection of the basic socio-political and economic relationships
inherent in a capitalist social structure. This further implies
two basic factors; (a) that crime is those acts which run counter
to those relationships and (b) that criminal law as well as being
a response to already existing behaviour is also a basic tool in
the creation and development of the capitalist mode of production
and a major factor in social stratification. Since the existence
of criminal law logically entails that of the State, the above im¬
plication is carried even further and demonstrates that the State,
as represented in the legal system cannot be neutral. Moreover,
this means that what constitutes criminal behaviour is determined
by the way law in general and criminal law in particular is used to
create and maintain a particular social structure, making crime as
defined here, a historically specific phenomenon. In the following
discussion we shall expand the above view by examining how law is
utilised in this manner in the creation of a specific form of social
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structure - the creation of a colonial, agrarian, capitalist
structure in Kenya. We shall pay special attention to how law
was used to create a colonial agrarian, capitalist administrative
State. In this context we shall examine how law was used to (a)
obtain land for a settler capitalist class and (b) obtain and
structure labour for such a class. We shall then examine the con¬
sequences of such a particularistic use of law on the indigenous
social fabric with special reference to crime and social control.
However, as a precursor to this discussion, it is necessary first
to examine briefly what is meant by colonialism.
COLONIALISM
In the recent past, and particularly at the beginning of the
era of formal independence in colonial Africa, a lot of attention
has been directed to the subject of colonialism. In this thesis,
however we do not intend to go into a detailed analysis of this
debate but shall restrict ourselves to a brief look at the general
tenents of colonialism in East Africa and Kenya in particular.
Following Brett (1973)» we shall define colonialism as a system of
rule which assumes the right of one people to impose their will
upon another, resulting in a situation of dominance and dependence
which systematically subordinates those governed by it to the
imported culture in social, economic and political life. Necessarily
included in this definition is a basic assumption of colonialism;
namely that colonised peoples were not capable of governing them¬
selves under the strenuous conditions of the "imported" world and
that the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised was
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essentially reciprocal and creative rather than exploitative .
Brett (1973) and. Zwanenberg (1975) both argue that the above ass¬
umption was used in the case of Kenya, to provide the basis under
which the conditions for the exercise of political, economic and
social domination and control were set.
In most debates on colonialism in Kenya, the main focus of
discussion tends to be the historical analysis of the basic econ¬
omic and political factors within colonialism. In spite of the
attention paid to colonial socio-economic and political structures,
there seems to be a notable absence of any meaningful discussion
on the centrality of law in the various aspects of colonialism that
are discussed. Emphasis is placed on the historical development of
colonialism, while law, as the variable that legitimates the very
existence of the colonial social structure gets very little atten¬
tion if any. While not ignoring the contribution already made, we
shall here look at colonialism in relation to the role law plays in
its creation, development and maintenance. In Kenya, law served to
legitimise several basic structures; (a) a political system in which
authority was monopolised by the coloniser, (b) an economic system
which confined the colonised people's participation to a limited
range of subordinate tasks and (c) a social system, stratified by
race which assumed the inherent superiority of the imported culture
over all indigenous forms. Brett (1973) notes that this was the
rule structure that formed the backbone of colonialism in Kenya.
Furthermore, to put such a colonial structure into operation, it
was imperative for the coloniser to create institutions necessary
for the maintenance of his authority in both the socio-economic and
political areas of life in the colony. It was in this process of
89.
consolidating and maintaining colonial rule that law played a
crucial role.
For example, in the political field, the coloniser had the
task of setting up an administrative structure which could maintain
law and order, collect taxes and service the economy. As we shall
see below, law was used to create such a colonial administrative
State. In the economic field, the coloniser needed to construct
an economic system that was able both to generate a productive
capacity sufficient to maintain a minimal administrative and mili¬
tary presence and foreign control, while at the same time encourag¬
ing the growth of those forms of local economic activity which were
most likely to make the most direct contribution to the dominant
economy. As we shall see later, law was used in these processes.
Finally, the coloniser needed new social institutions for regulating
interaction between the expatriates and the indigenous communities,
but which could also equip the indigenous communities with selected
skills required for the honest and efficient performance of the
subordinate tasks which the colonial system created. In this area
too the coloniser again utilised law.
In view of our observations in Chapter 2, on the existing
socio-economic and political conditions found in the colonial world,
it was obvious that the basic tenent of colonialism was the creation
of a new social order, which would take priority in terms of
legitimacy and power over the existing traditional one. Therefore,
colonial dominance needed the continued use of law (criminal law
in particular) for the maintenance and development of the colonial
State. Implied here is a particularistic use of law for the creation
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and development of a particular mode of production (capitalism in
Kenya) and the development of the socio-political and economic
structures that go with it and the consequences that those entail
for the indigenous social fabric - crime and social control in
particular.
In East Africa, Brett (1973) distinguishes two basic types of
colonial social structures. First there is the type where agri¬
culture (land being the basic unit of production) came to be based
on an expatriate (settler, capitalist) class. Secondly, there was
the type where agriculture was left in the hands of the indigenous
people. In the first case, the system required access to a cheap
labour force which could only be supplied by the indigenous people,
meaning that unlike the second case, the colonised could only enter
into the colonial system as labourers rather than producers; an
aspect that led to fundamental differences in the two types of
colonial social structrues. Both structures were agrarian capital¬
ist and yet in Kenya colonial dominance leaned towards settler pro¬
duction while in Tanzania and Uganda it leaned towards peasant pro¬
duction. What accounts for such fundamental differences lies mainly
in the way law was used during the colonising process. A particul¬
aristic use of law in Kenya led to the development of an agrarian
capitalist structure characterised by a settler class. In this
case, law was used to obtain land for a capitalistic class and also
to obtain and structure labour for this class. In Tanzania and
Uganda, a particularistic use of law led to the development of a
colonial agrarian capitalist structure, characterised by peasant
production. This implies that a particularistic use of law is not
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only necessary, but crucial to the formation of particular social
structures. In the following discussion, we shall try to substan¬
tiate the above propositions by looking at colonial agrarian capi¬
talism in Kenya. We shall examine how the use of law led to the
development of an agrarian capitalist social structure. We shall
also examine the consequences of such a particularistic use of law
on the indigenous social fabric plus its consequences for crime.
STATE LAW AND COLONIAL AGRARIAN CAPITALIST SOCIAL CONTROL
1. Economic Base
At the very beginning of European rule in Kenya, European
immigration was favoured as the best method for economic development.
The basic assumption at this point was that the prosperity and
development of the area lay in the extension of British capitalism
into an area hitherto characterised by little if any economic differ¬
entiation. As Brett (1973) argues, there was no accumulated capital
to take over and there were no extensive markets and institutions
necessary for capitalist development. The existing African agri¬
culture was pre-capitalist in the sense that the bulk of production
was mainly for subsistence rather than for the market, and that
the means of production, especially land and labour were not ex¬
changed in the market for sale. In spite of this however, the
colonial and imperial authorities had by 1919 decided to develop
export crops (implying agricultural capitalist development) through
European owned farms and plantations rather than through African
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1
production. This decision implied economic dualism involving a
money economy organised and financed by Europeans and dependent on
external trade and investment and an African subsistence economy,
all operating side by side - an aspect that was bound to cause con¬
flict since the two economies depended on the same resources i.e.
land and labour.
Initially and according to colonial reasoning it did not re¬
quire the total transformation of the African environment in order
to bring him into the money economy since it was only necessary to
integrate a sufficient portion of his production into the new system
while leaving the rest to cater for African subsistence needs. This
implied that the African would still own his land and produce for
his needs without necessarily having to purchase or sell in the newly
formed market. This reasoning however came into direct conflict
with the needs of the new capitalist economy for one basic reason;
if the African was to be allowed to keep his own land and produce
for himself, it meant that he was entering the new economic relation¬
ship as an independent producer rather than a labourer - an aspect
that negated the development of an immigrant based capitalist economy.
As long as the African had an independence over his own land and
labour, he would not have to work for the settler, but would continue
to produce on his own account and on his own terms. According to
1
See generally W.J. Barber; The Economy of British Central Africa:
A case study of Economic Development in a Dualistic society.
Oxford University Press, London, 1961 for a discussion on the social
structures of dual societies in Africa. For an analysis of dual
power and dual legal structures, see generally B. De Souza Santos;
The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction and Reproduction of
Legality in Parsargada. Law and Society Review, Yol. 12, Number 1,
Pall 1977, 6-126.
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Brett (1973) in order for colonial (settler) agrarian capitalism to
succeed, the African had to he made to enter the world of money as
a labourer rather than an independent producer. This simply meant
that independent African production and capitalistic settler pro¬
duction existed as sharply antagonistic modes and that an effective
development of one necessarily precluded an equivalent development
of the other. As Zwanenberg (1975) points out, an export settler
controlled productive system required that some substantial part
of the old African production had to be diverted to the world mar¬
ket. This meant that it was not sufficient to leave the African to
2
control resources which had sufficed during the pre-colonial period .
Hence the colonial State's decision to encourage European settle¬
ment and agriculture. This implied a State commitment to favoured
treatment for the European managed economy which entailed that the
African peasant economy would take secondary position. Ghai and
Mcauslan (1970) point out that law was used to subordinate African
production to settler production.
Through the use of law, for example, the 1897 Land regulations,
the 1901 East African Lands Order, the 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance
and the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance^ which legally set aside large
areas of African land for European use as private property, the
legal basis and the initial conditions for the pre-industrial capi¬
talist mode of production was thus set. Eor the purposes of what
Zwanenberg (1975) refers to as "primitive colonial accumulation",
2
See generally R.M.A. van Zwanenberg; Colonial Capitalism and Labour
in Kenya 1919-1939. East African Literature Bureau, Nairobi, 1975*
3See later discussion. See also M.P.K. Sorrenson; Origins of
European Settlement in Kenya. Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1958.
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a large proportion of the existing resources; land and labour in
particular, were to be extracted from the indigenous community and
transferred to the immigrant Europeans. The State as Munro (1975)
argues would use its mobilising agencies (especially law) in the
African areas as a vehicle for such re-allocation of resources.
In the following discussion, we shall examine how, through
direct State action, a Stateless society was transformed into a
colonial capitalist structure where reciprocal relationships be¬
tween groups^ were surplanted by individual market relationships
within a colonial agrarian capitalist framework. We shall examine
especially how State law made it impossible for the Africans to
participate in government and how the State systematically organised
the economy favourably to settler interests by assuming direct con¬
trol of the basic means of production e.g. land and labour. In
other words we shall examine how Kenya became a settler country,
especially how the State organised a command economy"' and its
consequences for crime and social control.
2. The State and Administrative Control
In Kenya, colonialism found a traditional system of control
operating through the kinship and/or age-grade system backed by
an economic system based on collectivism^. Traditional social
control could not however meet colonial requirements for the follow¬
ing reasons: (a) it was essentially an equilibrating mechanism -
^See discussion in Chapter 2
"*R.B. Seidman; The State Law and Development. Groom Helm, London
1978 Chapter 5> PP« 80-95.
£
See discussion in Chapter 2
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resolving conflict rather than initiating change and furthermore
the system was not meant to transmit and effect change or initiat¬
ives from outside the traditional network; (b) the colonial agrarian,
capitalist economy chosen for Kenya implied the problem of diffezv
ent races and the existence of conflicting ideas and policies that
would need to be applied in the colonial state. A system based on
reciprocity and economic communitarianism was therefore not well
prepared to deal with the above problem. Out of necessity, the
colonialists needed a system of social control that would be able
to meet their requirements. A colonial authority, implying an ad¬
ministrative structure and a government was hence created for that
purpose. Law was involved in its creation as the British followed
the usual colonial practice of establishing a centralised admini¬
strative machinery which owed its legitimacy to imperial law and
authority rather than to pre-existing traditional structures. Thus
law was not only used to create an administrative structure, but
also to subordinate the traditional system to State control.
For example, in 1897 and. 1899 Orders (laws)^ were passed in the
British Parliament specifically bringing the local inhabitants under
g
the Queen's jurisdiction. In 1902, another Order with much more
significant implications for the independence of the local indigen¬
ous structure was enacted. By this Act, legal authority was trans¬
ferred to the protectorate authorities empowering the commissioner
to make laws (ordinances) for the peace and good government of all
7
See for example the East African Order in Council, 1899» No. 757*
g
East African Order in Council 1902 - (Letters in Council, Letters
and Patent and Royal Instruction 1/9/1927).
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persons in the protectorate. This, as Ghai and Mcauslan (1970)
contend, marked the establishment of English constitutional law in
East Africa implying that law was crucial to the very establish¬
ment of the colonial state. Following the establishment of the
State with full legal authority, its machinery of government - a
centralised administrative structure constituted in law and the
judicial machinery of courts were established with full civil and
9
criminal jurisdiction over all matters and persons in the area .
Central government control was then consolidated by legislation.
10
For example, the 1902 village headmen legislation provided for the
establishment of local government through the appointment of chiefs and
headmen (in a hitherto chiefless society). These chiefe and head¬
men did not owe their legitimacy to the traditional system, but in¬
stead owed it to the impersonal authority of the State. This led
to the subordination of the traditional system to the central poli¬
tical control of the State. This is obvious when we examine the
legislation which was aimed at subordinating the traditional struc¬
ture to State control, for instance, Public order legislation.
For example, the 1900 Vagrancy Regulations empowered the police
11
to arrest without warrant any "Vagrant" . The 1900 Native Passes
Regulations introduced a "pass system" basically for the control of
12
native (African) movement . The 1900 Preservation of Order
9
See the East African Order in Council 1899. op.cit.
10
Regulations No. 22 of 1902 on Village Headmen.
11
"Vagrant" was a term generally used to define Africans found in
areas designated for European use unless of course they were under
European employment. See Vagrancy Regulations No. 3 of 1900.
12
Native Passes Regulations No. 12 of 1900
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Regulations forbade communal activities such as dances and ceremonies
1 3
without special licence from administrative officers . The 1900
Native Liquor Regulations forbade the sale of local liquor without
i )
licence and the 1900 Order in council provided the commissioner
with power to declare any part of any district "a closed district"
1$
thereby making movement by Africans to and from illegal . Thus
the consolidation and extension of State control by legislation
effectively weakened the traditional structure and made it sub¬
ordinate to the colonial one. This juxtaposition of a political
structure of a modern "rational State" on a stateless system was
facilitated by the legitimising role of law in the colonising pro¬
cess.
After the period 1897-1920, the colonial authority in Kenya
came under increasing pressure to finance itself. Imperial aid to
Kenya was being curtailed due to one basic reason: the end of the
war and the post war economic depression in Europe. The strains
created by the reconstruction of the imperial economy after the war
and the socio-economic problems brought about by this such as un¬
employment, meant that funds formerly available for aid to the col¬
onies was diverted to meet the more urgent problems at home. At
the same time the depression meant that private funds for invest¬
ment in the colonies could not be raised since these required a
government guarantee which the imperial government was unwilling to
11
•uThe Preservation of Order by Night Regulations. No. 32 of 1900.
^Sale of Native (African) Liquor Regulations No. 32 of 1900
1 5
The 1899 Order in Council had given the Commissioner power to
divide the country into administrative areas (later districts).
By 1902 these powers were usually applied to African districts
and were almost always aimed at controlling the movement of Africans
especially in relation to labour control. See generally the "Out¬
lying Districts" Regulations No. 31 1900 (later 2$ of 1902).
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16
provide at that time . This, coupled with an active European
settlement policy initiated in 1903 meant that the colonial auth¬
ority had to find the necessary resources within the colony. Law
was used to satisfy those conditions. As we shall show later in
the case of land and tax legislation, law seriously undermined the
legitimacy of the traditional network. It made the colonial admin¬
istrative infrastructure and its rational-legal authority too power¬
ful for the traditional network. Except for political developments
in the settler sector which endeavoured to establish legislation
in favour of the subordination of the system to colonial rule, the
traditional system had no alternative other than wait for its own
demise.
3. Settlership and Administrative Control
In the early 1900's the most significant political activity in
colonial Kenya was the campaign by settlers for responsible govern¬
ment under white rule(implying a politically serious break with
imperial colonial control). Although this idea was rejected by
the imperial authority it did not fully constitute a political set¬
back for the settlers. On the contrary it gave them an opportunity
to manipulate the colonial authority (especially the legislative
process) to their advantage.
For example the 1905 Order set up two councils in Kenya; one
legislative and the other executive. Ghai and Mcauslan (1970) see
the establishment of these two councils as an important constitut¬
ional development in that they took over the legislative and executive
16
See E.A. Brett; Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa,
op.cit. Chapter ij..
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functions formerly enjoyed by the Commissioner and later Governor
of the colony and protectorate. This transfer of power and functions
marked a move away from dictatorship by the Governor to unofficial
representation. The most significant feature of the change was that
the indigenous people were not represented in the councils meaning
that they were not in a position to influence let alone determine
legislation. By 1920 (when Kenya was declared a colony and prot¬
ectorate), the settlers were (by virtue of their representation in
the two councils) in a superior position in relation to the Africans
and were hence able to influence the way legislation was used in the
colony. For example their influence won them some significant
legal rights for example, European elective representation with the
17
franchise not extended to Africans and Asians . The result was the
development of a dual policy concerned with the maintenance of
separate and unequal systems of administration - the African exist¬
ing to serve in subordinate capacity the European one. Thus a
state of unequals, as Munro (1975) and Seidman (1978) see it, was
established by legislation.
In political terms, this established the settlers in a position
of immense political power giving them direct and unparallel in¬
fluence on the institutions of government and socio-policial control.
They could therefore influence all forms of civil and criminal
legislation and by extension the form and direction of colonial
capitalist development and control. This is evidenced by the way
17
European elective representation was sanctioned by the East
African Order in Council 1919 and later provided for by the
Legislative Council Ordinance No. 22 of 1919.
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the settler class influenced, and manoeuvered their way into economic
dominance through legislation. In this sense, as we shall demon¬
strate later, State law made institutionalised inequality and the
domination of the African by the settler in economic and political
terms possible. This entails the assumption that in the colonial
capitalist environment (and in capitalistic structures in general),
those classes which are able to exert the greatest influence in the
institutions of government and socio-political control will by so
doing increase their ability to influence the structure of product¬
ion and vice versa, while those who cannot find their influence
progressively reduced. This implies that there is a definite corr¬
elation between the form of law and its administration and both
wilders of political power and the politics that they adopt in the
law. This in turn implies that law has no inherent values, but
reflects both in value and form the predilections of the dominant
political and economic groups in society. In colonial Kenya, as
we shall try to demonstrate, settler economic dominance tends to
confirm this view.
STATE LAV AMD SETTLER CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT
1. The Law of Land
After the declaration of a protectorate and the extension of
British legal authority in Kenya, the 189U Indian Land Acquisition
Act was extended to the area. This Act empowered the colonial
authority to acquire land compulsorily for public works. A few
18
years later, through the 1897 Land Regulations , the powers of
18
See generally Land Regulations No. 26 of 1897 Vol. I p.85. Those
regulations were repeated by the Crown Lands Ordinance. No. 21 of
1902, which increased the Commissioner's powers.
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the colonial authority in relation to land were broadened and the
colonial State could now acquire land for European settlement. The
19
1901 East African Lands Order increased these powers "by giving
all rights of land in Kenya to the Grown. Immediately afterwards,
20
the 1902 Crown Lands Ordinance provided for outright sales of
the so called Crown Land to the settlers.
Initially, the acquisition and sale of land was limited to
where there was no physical occupation by the indigenous people.
21
However, the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance changed that policy and
all land owned under custom by the indigenous people was effectively
taken over by the colonial State - thus seriously undermining African
land rights. For example under the 1915 Ordinance, African rights
to alienate any land ceased to exist resulting in the disinheritance
of the African from his land. Besides, the same Ordinance (1915)
gave the colonial authority power to create African reserves, where
the African was to be contained while his acquisitioned land was
22
turned over to settler use. For instance, the 1939 Highlands Order
consolidated settler ownership of Kenya by reserving the Kenyan
Highlands exclusively for white immigrants. African land rights
in those areas thus became extinct making law the main tool in Kenya
for legitimising colonial settler economic dominance. The legi¬
slation denying the African any legal rights over land set the
pattern for colonial agrarian capitalist development. As Seidman
19
See letters in Council, Letters and Patent and Royal Instruction
1/9/1927.
20
Ordinances and Regulations Yol. 17 1902. (No- 21 of 1902).
21
East African Protectorate Ordinances and Regulations Yol. XYII
1915 (No. 12 of 1915).
22
Kenya (Highlands) Order in Council 1939
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(1978) points out. The State, by intervention through law and not
23
market forces turned Kenya into a settler country . The whites
(settlers) dominated the economy by taking land in the so called
"White Highlands" for commercial farming while the government (as
we shall discuss here below) coerced Africans to work for white
employers.
Land Legislation and the Labour Market
Given the conditions of the times, i.e. the absence of an
accumulated financial capital to back the newly established settler
capitalist economy and the inadequacy of banking facilities as
credit institutions for capitalist development^, the settlers
needed plenty of cheap labour to maintain a viable agricultural
production. Since they did not hold a monopoly on African labour,
they had to use their privileged political position to get the State
to transform the African into a labour force. As Zwanenberg (1975)
argues, this made the relations of capital and labour the central
characteristic of Kenyan colonial agrarian capitalism. Since the
basic settler need, after land, was cheap and accessible labour,
the driving force behind all major colonial legislation affecting
the African (his land or his labour) was the need to supply such
cheap labour to the settler controlled capitalist economy. Colonial
23̂See generally Y.P. Ghai and J.P.W.B. Mcauslan; Public Law and
Political Change in Kenya. Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1970,
S. and K. Aaranovitch; Crisis in Kenya. Lawrence and Wishart,
London, 19^-4-7> Lord Hailey; African Survey Revised 1950. Oxford
University Press, London 1957 and E. Huxley and M. Perham; Race
and Politics in Kenya, Faber and Faber. London, 19^.
^See generally "Van Zwanenberg; Colonial Capitalism and Labour in
Kenya, op.cit.
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land, legislation or any other legislation was thus meant to
structure choice for the African away from subsistence agriculture
into wage labour.
Moreover, the herding of the African people into African re¬
serves made conditions for surviving through subsistence farming
extremely difficult. For example in South Nyeri and Butere in 19Uh,
the African population density stood at 5^2 and 1,200 persons per
square mile respectively as compared to 16 persons per square mile
26
in the settler areas . Taking domestic animals into account,
there was hardly any land to live in leave alone to cultivate in the
African reserves. Land legislations' aim was to offer the African
an alternative for earning his living - wage employment in the
settler agricultural sector.
For example, shortage of land in the African reserves and the
settler demand for cheap labour led to a situation whereby a labourer
was permitted to use land belonging to his settler employer in
return for his labour. This capitalistic relationship or "squatter-
26
ing" as it was known in Kenya, was given the force of law under
27
the 1918 Resident Natives Ordinance . However, by 1937» the sett¬
lers needed their land for mixed farming which resulted in the
amendment of the 1918 Ordinance to allow for forceful movement of
26
R.B. Seidman; The State Law and Development, op.cit. p. 86.
26
See generally Ross Macgregor; Kenya from Within. George Allen and
Unwin Ltd. London 1927 and C.C. Wrigley, "Kenya: The Patterns of
Economic Life" in V.T. Harlow and E.M. Chiver (eds.) History of
East Africa. Vol. II Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965. p. 2I4.3-
27
Resident Natives Ordinance No. 33 o£ 1918.
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"squatters" out of settler land . The basic conflict here was that
between African stock and settler stock. The State by amending the
1918 Ordinance, thus making "squattering" penally sanctionable
simply re-stated in law the supremacy of the settler class regard¬
ing the control of the basic means of production. In this sense
the racial bias involved in the law and its administration becomes
more than obvious.
However, it is important to note here that racial bias was not
restricted to Africans only, but included all non-white residents
e.g. the Indians. Ghai andMcauslan (1970) argue that colonial
administrative restrictions in relation to the granting of land to
Indians were introduced as early as 1902. However, it was not until
1908 when discrimination against Indians in matters of land was
29
included in land legislation . This provision prohibited the
acquisition of land in the "White Highlands" by Indians. It also
prohibited the transfer of land leases by Europeans (whites) to non-
whites without the consent of the governor in council and also pro¬
hibited Europeans from allowing non-white managers to occupy or be
in control of the land. The excuse given for such blatant racial
bias was administrative convenience. In reality however, this was
28
See Resident Labourers Ordinance No. 30 of 1937• Under this
Ordinance, the criminal law application of the Master and Ser¬
vants (amendment) Ordinance, 192l+, especially on desertion could
be applied on resident labourers or squatters - this was absent
in the 1918 Resident Natives Ordinance.
29
See Colonial 1*117 (1908). Correspondence relating to the Tenure
of land in the East African Protectorate p. 33
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just another example of the use of colonial agricultural law and
its administration primarily for the protection of settler inter¬
ests.
30
The 1901; Coffee Ordinance had already paved the way for
this particularistic use of law by prohibiting the importation of
certain coffee plantings. The aim was supposedly to prevent coffee
leaf disease, but the real reason was the restriction of Africans
and Asians from having any access to the coffee industry. The 1901;
Coffee Ordinanace brought the coffee industry under public control
(colonial state control). This was supplemented by the 1918 Coffee
31
Plantations and Coffee Dealers Ordinance which restricted coffee
growing to Europeans through licensing. Under this Ordinance,
coffee growers and dealers were registered and issued with certi¬
ficates and licences with none issued to Africans or Indians (Asians).
The end result of such biased legislation was the creation of a
racially segregated society and a dual system of law and admini¬
stration that helped to sustain it.
2. The Law of Labour
(a) Taxation
During the colonial period, the very mention of taxation was
often accompanied by conflicting but heated arguments all attempting
to answer the question of African taxation in Kenya. According to
the colonial authority, the system was necessary since, as we have
already noted imperial, aid to the colony had been curtailed despite
^Coffee Leaf Disease Ordinance 1901;.
31
The Registration of Coffee Plantations and Coffee Dealers
Ordinance No. 10 of 1918.
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the colony's financial requirements. However, this official view
is plausible only to a certain point. A closer examination of the
taxation system in its historical specificity, especially an exam¬
ination of who paid the taxes, how much and how the tax revenue was
used, reveals that African taxation, as well as raising revenue for
the colonial administration was like land legislation, another step
in the process of the re-allocation of resources from the African
to the settler. In this sense, the system of colonial taxation in
Kenya can only be meaningfully understood in the context of colon¬
ial settler agrarian capitalist production.
32
Direct African taxation was first imposed in 1901 . The
taxes were raised on each African hut hence the name - Hut Tax. By
1910, a Poll Tax on all African males over the age of sixteen was
added. Leys (1931) argues that the total African burden - both
the Hut and Poll Tax was approximately 30s. (K. sh.) per person per
33
year . In relation to the Hut Tax, both men and women can be said
to have paid the tax since it was levied on each hut irrespective
of the occupant. In addition to the Hut and Poll Tax, a cess or
rate was also levied by the tribal councils on the same Africans
who paid the Hut and Poll taxes. This was meant for use by the
tribal councils for the maintenance of public works e.g. roads in
the African reserves. Although no figures are available for
individual rates the total sum collected appears quite substantial.
For example, in 1930, the average cess collected from Africans
amounted to £l|.2,000^.
3^Hut Tax Regulations No. 18 of 1901.
33-^N. Leys; A Last Chance in Kenya. Hogarth Press, London, 1931, pp2l±-
3i+Ibid. p. 32.
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According to Ross Macgregor (1927 ), Indian and Arab taxation
was introduced by the 1912 Non-Native Poll Tax Ordinance. The rate
39
was £1 per year. It was not until 1920 , when European direct taxation
was introduced. This was soon to be abolished by the 1922 Income
Tax Ordinance which also introduced indirect taxation such as import
duty with 30% of this attached to basic goods consumed by Africans,
e.g. hoes and blankets. According to Leys (1931) the indirect tax
paid by Europeans was approximately £3 per head. The Africans paid
an indirect tax of approximately 11s. per head, and this in addition
to Hut tax, Poll tax and cess which the non-Africans did not pay.
With reference to income distribution, the distribution of
taxation becomes rather interesting. The 1929 Labour commission
estimated African income in the reserves at £3 10s. per year and
that in the wage earning sector at £10 15s. The estimate for Euro-
pean earnings was £600 per year . An examination of the various
income levels and the distribution of taxation reveals that there
was no correlation between the income earned and the tax paid. For
example during the period 1920-21, out of the total tax revenue of
£1,018,320, the Africans paid £656,070 in direct taxation and
£31+1,250 in indirect taxation, whereas non-Africans paid only
£21,000 (total taxation)^. Macgregor Ross (1927) citing the above
figures argues that the tax burden fell most heavily on the Africans.
35
Income Tax Ordinance. No. 23 of 1920.
N. Leys; A Last Chance in Kenya, op.cit. p.20. See also Ghai, P.;
Some aspects of Income Distribution in East Africa. Nairobi:
Makerere University (cyclostyle) 1962.
37
Ross Macgregor; Kenya from Within, op.cit. p. 151+
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Moreover, the "bulk of the revenue collected from African taxation,
amounting to for example half of total government revenue in 1923»
was as Zwanenberg (1975) points out, diverted to shore up the
settler economy. For example, among the Kamba of Kitui between
the years 1923 and. 1935> "the total agregate revenue collected by
the Administration amounted to K sh. 9>561,611. Ironically, the
total expenditure by the administration in the district for the
same period wa3 K shillings 991,333; approximately 10% of the total
revenue collected. According to Zwanenberg (1975) the 10% expendi¬
ture was not spent on development in the area, but on salaries for
white colonial personnel and their subordinates; who according to
Leys (1931) spent most of their time collecting taxes. Thus the
way tax revenue was used and the fact that the highest beneficiaries
were barely taxed raises doubts about official proclamations that
taxation was solely for the purpose of raising revenue.
It points to the contention that besides raising revenue, tax
legislation, like land legislation was aimed at pressurising the
African to move out of subsistence into wage-employment. Since in¬
come from the wages offered by the settlers e.g. an average of 15s.
per month in 19i+U"^ (30 day month and often 180 days per year) were
39too low to induce a massive African migration into the European
S. and K. Aaranovitch; Crisis in Kenya; op.cit. p. 112
39
For a discussion on the effects of taxation and Pass laws on
African response and attitude to settler wage employment see
N. Leys; A Last Chance in Kenya, op.cit., M.R. Dilley; British
Policy in Kenya Colony. Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., London, 1966,
V. Ross Macgregor; Kenya from Within, op.cit.
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wage sector, taxation was used as a lever for achieving the same
purpose. The amendment of tax legislation to provide for capitalist
penal sanctions for tax evasion^0 lends some weight to this view.
In the wider context of colonial agrarian settler capitalism, the
criminalisation of tax evasion was no more than a link in a wider
movement, away from general legislation to specific criminal legi¬
slation as a means of State intervention in the market, especially
in structuring labour relations with a bias in favour of the settlers.
(b) Criminal and/or Contract Law
In colonial Kenya, almost all labour relations were governed
by contract law introduced in 1918. In theory, contract law as
Seidman (1978) argues, does not prescribe any behaviour although it requ¬
ires the State machinery of courts to levy a sanction if a party
breaks an agreement - hence the view that contract law operates only
in a facilitative form implying that the role occupant is free from
the coercion of State power.
However, in practice, contract law (as facilitative law) per¬
mits the parties to a transaction to determine their interchange
and provides State machinery to enforce them. This as Cohen (1961+)
argues makes contract law a body of rules, according to which the
sovereign power of the State is exercised in accordance to norms
agreed upon between the parties to a more or less voluntary trans¬
action. This implies the ideal that all parties involved in the
transaction have equal rights before the law. However, in a society
of unequals as Seidman (1978) points out, facilitative law transfers
sovereign power to make and enforce law to the economically powerful.
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To give unequals equal rights against each other ensures domination
by the stronger. Colonial Kenya was a society of unequals. So
long as the settlers and the Africans were differently placed, any
law must advantage one more than the other. Contract law was there¬
fore bound to advantage the settlers against the Africans implying
that contract law is an instrument for facilitating State inter¬
vention in the market through criminal law.
For example, in 1919* "the Native Registration Ordinance (later
to be known as the Registration of Persons Act)^ was enacted.
This legislation, enforced through pass law became the keystone
for the status of the African in relation to the colonial labour
control system^. The basic aim of registration was to ensure that
contract labourers (notwithstanding that there was no other type
of employment in the country), were brought under criminal law
legislation by making breaches of labour contracts enforceable under
criminal law^. Registration (enforced through pass law which
empowered the colonial administration to make rules for controlling
the movement of "natives" (Africans), travelling into, out of and/or
within the limits of the protectorate) individualised the process
of dealing with the African which made possible the legitimate use
of capitalist penal sanctions in labour control. The shift in
favour of penal sanctions did not only strengthen the settlers'
bargaining position over labour, but also served to demonstrate
) -j
Kenya: The Native Registration Ordinance, 1919
L.2
See generally Ross Macgregor; Kenya from Within, op.cit.
I
Through an amendment of the Master and Servants Ordinance 1906,
a direct use of criminal law to control and regulate labour be¬
came more open, e.g. under this Ordinance (as amended) it became
a criminal offence for a servant to leave his master.
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the legal status of the labourer in relation to his employer. In
colonial Kenyan terms, it served to identify who was at the receiv¬
ing end of the colonial social control system.
In order to ensure that Africans worked for settlers, the
State went beyond ordinary contract remedies and enacted various
criminal ordinances that helped consolidate the African's sub¬
ordinate position. For example, leaving employment without the
permission of the employer became a crime, being intoxicated during
working hours became a crime, neglecting to perform any work, which
was the duty of a servant to have performed or "carelessly" or
"improperly" performing any work which from its nature was the duty
of the servant to have performed became a crime^. Criminal law
legislation was extended to cover almost all employer/employee day
to day interactions. For example, using abusive or insulting
language, refusing to obey any command of his employer or of any
person lawfully placed by his employer in authority over him, which
command it was his duty to obey became a crime^.
In practice almost all African social and economic behaviour
became subject to criminal law regulation. Thus African traditional
behaviour became subject to proscription. For example, the 1930
I16
rules made under the Native Authority A cfc made formerly acceptable
behaviour such as asking a relative for financial support to help
enya: Employment of Servants Ordinance 1937* See also Employment
of Natives Ordinance. Cap. 139 (1926 ed)
Kenya: Employment of Servants Ordinance 1939- See also Native Passes
Regulations No. 12 of 1900. It is important to note here that all
registration certificates carried by Africans had an endorsement
concerning past and present employment which helped the authorities
to keep track of the African population in relation to labour
distribution.
The Native Authority Act 1930
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with payment (exchange) of dowry for a wife, raising legal fees,
building schools collectively illegal and penally sanctionable.
In effect, under colonial capitalist criminal law, all forms of
traditional reciprocity which formed the basis of socio-economic
) 7
and political relationships were proscribed and became penally
sanctionable. The State was thus engaged in the process of re¬
ducing all institutions in the indigenous community based on
collective responsibility to those based on the ethic of individual
responsibility. This, as Kennedy (1976) argues, allows for the
legitimate use of capitalist penal sanctions.
Under the colonial economic order dominated by the settlers
through the State's use of criminal law, it becomes apparent that
the use of law is both repressive and more open than is found in
already "developed" capitalist situations. Makela (197U) points
out that in "developed" capitalist situations law is used in a more
technical manner. Colonial capitalist use of law also demonstrates
that the. stark and repressive use of law, especially criminal law,
is more likely to occur in those areas where there is rapid social
change. This is much more so in those areas where economic conflict
forms a substantial part of the social change.
For example, in Kenya, in order to effectively shut out the
Africans from the market economy in all aspects except as labourers
the State organised every branch of the capitalist economy through
an industry board. Essential commodities such as tea, coffee, sisal,
pyrethrum, pigs, maize and cotton were all organised through an
industry board. These boards, with exclusive settler representation,
) 7
See discussion on reciprocity in Chapter 2
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were given broad powers to determine how and by whom agricultural
industries should operate. Law was then used to enforce the man¬
date of the boards.
For example, the Tea Board was granted power to licence tea
growers, factories and to regulate the control and improvement of
tea cultivation and export. Following the general colonial pattern
) ft
the 1960 Tea Acts Licensing powers made it an offence for any
person to grow or manufacture tea without a licence. Since only the
settlers were represented in the Boards it was not surprising that
the Boards restricted all agricultural licences (including grow¬
ing, manufacturing and marketing) to the settlers, effectively
shutting out the Africans from the new socio-economic order except
in a subordinate capacity. Law was openly used to consolidate the
system. For instance, it became an offence for any person (mean¬
ing African) to be found in the possession of meat, hide, skin or
any part of any stock, milk, eggs, fruit, tea, maize, coffee beans,
coffee berries and any other article (described as produce) in any
form or within the vicinity of any farm (notwithstanding that all
farms were settler controlled) . As Leys (1931) argues, it was
only necessary to be in possession for the offence to have occurred
unless one could prove that the possession was lawful. This meant
that even the burden of proof was an African problem.
J ft
See Tea Board of Kenya: Tea Act, Cap 3^-3 Laws of Kenya. See
also the Kenya Tea Ordinance 1960.
UQ
See for example Ordinance No. 10 of 1928 under the Employment
of Natives' Ordinance Cap 139 (1926 ed.)
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Since State law created this situation, Seidman's (1978)
argument that the law (in colonial Kenya) delegated to various
government officials and industry hoards power to structure choice
for Africans in ways favourable to settler economic interests is
validated. By implication, the law delegated power to the economi¬
cally powerful who exercised it by limiting the choices of the
weak. In Kenya, the State evoked the legal order to lodge control
with the settlers. This particularistic use of law, as Kennedy
(1976) contends, implies that law (especially criminal law) was
estsblished primarily for the protection and development of the
institutions of capitalism meaning that penal sanctions directly
control the manner in which the capitalist social structure develops.
As the Kenyan case demonstrates, it is penal sanctions which had
direct bearing in determining the organisation and division of
labour and the structure of its control.- Thus criminal law strangled
the ability of the lower classes (in this case the Africans) to
possess tools, capital goods or raw materials and on pain of heavy
penal sanction forbade any other association (other than that stip¬
ulated in law) between the higher and lower classes^. Penal
sanctions guaranteed by the State ensured a continuous labour force
and created two classes of people one (the African) bound by crim¬
inal law and the other (the settler) by non-punitive civil law^.
Thus criminal law became an instrument for the optimal allocation
See M. Kennedy; "Beyond Incrimination" - some neglected facets
in the theory of Punishment in W.J. Chambliss and M. Mankoff;
Whose Law, What Order? A conflict approach to criminology.
Wiley. New York, 1976 pp. I4.5-I4.6.
^1Ibid.
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of the colony's resources for the purpose of moral condemnation -
a means for distributing guilt and responsibility for what occurred.
Through the direct act of the State, a Stateless society was
transformed into a colonial agrarian capitalist structure where
social relations based on reciprocity and mutual interdependence
were surplanted by capitalist market relations based on law. State
law made it impossible for the Africans to participate in govern¬
ment and the State systematically organised the economy favourably
to settler interests. Thus by State intervention, through the use o
law, Kenya became a settler country. The settlers dominated the
economy by taking up land for commercial farming while the Africans
were herded into reserves from where they played a vital, but
subordinate role as a cheap source of labour. In short, as Seidman
(1978) maintains, a host of State laws organised a command economy
- an aspect that is bound to have significant implications for
crime and social control.
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing discussion, we have been looking at a social
situation where social change was imposed from outside the indigo
enous social fabric. We have examined how, through a particular¬
istic use of law (imperial law), a colonial agrarian capitalist
social structure was juxtaposed upon a traditional Stateless social
structure, creating a situation of dominance and dependence in all
aspects of social life with the colonial structure assuming the
dominant role. In this context, we examined how law in general and
criminal law in particular was used in a particularistic manner to
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obtain land and to obtain and structure labour for a colonial
agrarian capitalist class and its consequences for the indigenous
social fabric. In other words, we attempted to demonstrate how
on the one hand law, especially criminal law, was influenced by
the conditions prevailing under the colonial agrarian capitalist
mode of production and how on the other hand law, especially crim¬
inal law, contributed towards the maintenance of the colonial
agrarian capitalist mode of production. In relation to crime and
social control, what does this imply?
Starting from the most general, colonial agrarian capitalist
control demonstrates that customs, as they are represented in the
system of social control, are not necessarily a reflection of the
collective conscience and neither is the power of reaction that is
given to "constituted" authority the same as that which is diffuse
throughout the society. Eather, customs are a reflection of the
existing socio-economic and political realities in existence. Hence
it is these realities that are mirrored in the system of social
control, especially in law.
Colonial Kenya was an evolving capitalist society that was
characterised by fundamental divisions based on class (racial), the
most basic being that between the economically powerful settlers
who ruled and the economically weak Africans who were ruled. It
was a society divided into those who owned the means of production
and a subordinate group that was expected to work for wages. In
such a situation, conflict was inevitable, the most prominent con¬
flict being the competition for control of the means of production.
As the conflict developed and became manifest, the State, acting
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in the interests of the dominant mode of production and by ex¬
tension in the interests of those who controlled the means of
production, passed laws that were designed to control through the
application of State sanctioned force those acts of the subordin¬
ated African group that ran counter to the interests of the power¬
ful settlers. As colonial agrarian capitalism developed and the
conflicts between the Africans and settlers intensified, it followed
that more acts of the less privileged African group began to be
defined as criminal. In this sense, the function of social control
was to define those acts that ran counter to the established social,
political and economic order as criminal in order to maintain and
protect the colonial agrarian capitalist mode of production. Crime
was therefore a product of the existing economic and socio-political
system.
For example, in the context of colonial agrarian capitalist
production, labour was the most crucial factor. Since this could
only be obtained from the subordinated African class, the exploit¬
ation of labour power became the most decisive factor as far as
*
social control was concerned. Consequently, the division of labour
in this case became directly associated with the rise and develop¬
ment of penal sanctions. Since as we observed in Chapter 2 penal
sanctions did not exist, prior to the evolvement of the colonial
agrarian capitalist structure, their emergence could only have come
about as the colonial agrarian capitalist mode of production chose
the type of control system that was suitable for its development.
In this sense, penal sanctions, as they were represented by colonial
criminal law could not have been a reflection of the agreed upon
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values and customs of the whole society. Rather, they were a set
of rules, laid down by the State primarily to protect and regulate
economic behaviour. By extension, these rules tended to reflect
the interests of those who controlled and owned the means of pro¬
duction. Consequently, criminal behaviour was no more than the
behaviour of those groups who were exploited by the existing
economic relations. This behaviour may not have been essentially
criminal, for instance, "squattering" but was made criminal by the
coercive power of the State in enforcing the dominant colonial
capitalist interests. In terms of the colonial "rational-legal"
system, legitimate coercion was thus justified and the coerced
Africans became criminals.
In this sense, crime cannot be explained by psychological moti¬
vations of individual offenders, but can only be explained in terms
of a particular socio-political and economic system seeking to
extract obedience to itself. Thus what constitutes an offence and
the person who would indulge in it becomes the function of the
existing conceptions of legitimate authority. Moreover, as the
colonial agrarian capitalist situation demonstrates, penal sanctions
are linked to the formal laws of the capitalist State and to the
civil institutions supported by it. In this sense the meaning of
crime cannot be found outside these same institutional patterns,
especially the economic ones. Thus the State's social control
system and its chief function of maintaining the dominant capital¬
ist mode of production through the use of law features rather
prominently in the creation of crime. In this context, crime is
bound up with the fundamental conditions of capitalistic social life
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because those conditions of which it is a part are themselves
indispensable to the normal evolution of the capitalist State's
morality and law.
In the next Chapter, we shall attempt an application of the
observations we have made here by looking at crime and social
control in a neo-colonial capitalist social structure.
CHAPTER POUR
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INTRODUCTION
In Chapter Three, we examined how, "by means of a particularistic
use of law, a colonial administrative state, characterised by an
agrarian capitalist mode of production and a government dominated
by an immigrant settler capitalist class was set up and maintained.
In this context we examined how the colonial state, through the
use of law made it impossible for the Africans to participate in
government. We also examined how through the same means the state
organised the economy favourably to settler interests. Here we
specifically paid attention to how, by the means of a law, the
state did not only obtain land and labour for the settler capital¬
ist class but also structured labour for such a class with signi¬
ficant implications for what constituted criminal behaviour.
Makela (197^4-) argues that the foremost task of the state is
to guarantee the continued existence of the mode of production
itself and to try and settle the disputes that arise from the
antagonistic class conflicts of capitalistic society. Implied
here is the view that the state is both a regulator of economic
life as well as an ideological apparatus intended to legitimise
the prevailing mode of production. Viewed in the context of a
•developed® capitalist society, where social change is less rapid
and where law is used in amore or less technical manner as Makela
argues, the State's role does appear to represent a neutral force.
However, viewed in the context of a 'developing' capitalist society
where social change is rapid and continuous, the neutrality of the
state begins to disappear and the state no longer appears to stand
above societal conflicts.
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For example, in the context of colonial agrarian capitalist
development as the Kenyan case demonstrates, the state cannot he
said to have represented a fully neutral force which made decisions
and judgements in accordance with the public interest as a whole.
On the contrary, the way the state used the legal system to obtain
and structure labour for the capitalist settlers shows a specific
bias in favour of the capitalist class. The colonial state used
criminal sanctions to force compliance with colonial (settler)
economic interests. This illustrates how dominant groups can
institute and shape laws to coincide with their changing needs.
The way law was used in colonial Kenya and the State's role in
its use tends to support Kennedy's (1976) view that the state in
capitalistic society has represented the interests of the capital¬
ist class as opposed to the needs of the vast majority of citizens.
This implies that law (criminal law in particular) is not merely
a response to already existing behaviour, but is also a basic tool
in the development of the capitalist mode of production and a major
factor in social stratification. Moreover this entails that crime,
as a violation by act or omission of any criminal law and as a harm
against the State cannot be a universal phenomenon comparable to
'primitive' and 'civilised' societies as Durkheim (1973) maintains.
Bather crime has unique characteristics depending on its historical
period - meaning that crime is functionally dependent on a given
social order.
In this chapter, taking post-colonial Kenya as a specific
example, we shall continue the above discussion by looking at the
way law is used in the establishment of a neo-colonial capitalist
social structure, characterised by foreign and indigenous capitalism.
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In this context, we shall on the one hand examine how law is used
to protect foreign capitalism and develop indigenous capitalism
characterised by two basic classes - the peasantry and the emergent
indigenous capitalist class. On the other hand, we shall examine
how law is used to criminalise political activity especially
labour agitation and socialist politics in the process of consoli¬
dating neo-colonial capitalism. We shall then examine the conse¬
quences of such a particularistic use of law on crime and social
control. However, we commence with an examination of what is meant
by neo-colonialism.
NEO-COLONIALISM
To Nkrumah (1965), neo-colonialism was the last stage of
imperialism. Before him however, Lenin (19^0) contended that
imperialism (the basic tenant of neo-colonialism) was the highest
form of capitalism. According to Lenin (19I4O) "Finance Capital"
is such a great and decisive force in all economic and international
relations that it is capable of subordinating to itself even states
enjoying complete political independence. The all Africa confer
ence held in Cairo in i960 defined neo-colonialism as the survival
of the colonial system in spite of the formal recognition of politi¬
cal independence in emerging countries which become victims of an
indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic,
social, military and/or technical means . Neo-colonialism as
Woddis (1967) argues has become the dominant form of exploitation
since the retreat of direct colonial rule after 19^-5.
1
See generally Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, the last stage
of Imperialism. Nelson, London, 1965-
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According to Woddis (1961), the essential feature of neo¬
colonialism is to keep new states from going socialist, by pushing
them along a capitalist path and to openly encourage and foster new
capitalist forces which would assist imperialism, but which would
not be too powerful to end their dependence on it. Therefore, the
central core of neo-colonialism is primarily the formation of
classes and strata within a colony, which are closely allied to
and dependent on foreign capital and which form the real basis of
support for the regime which succeeds the colonial administration.
Implied here is what Woddis (1967) sees as the development of an
indigenous capitalist class, involving the accummulation of suffi¬
cient local capital for use by such a class resulting in an alli¬
ance between external and indigenous capitalism. Neo-colonialism
then becomes a characteristic form of political, economic and
social life in certain ex-colonies or rather what Leys (1975) and
Sandbrook (1975) refer to as "dependent capitalism". Thus neo¬
colonialism consists of two basic aims: (a) to serve the economic,
political and social interests of external powers and (b) to create
internal conditions in the "developing" world which would assist
the retention of power in the hands of those social strata which
are prepared to co-operate with imperialism and which are best
suited to carry through this collaboration. Thus the "grand
strategy" of neo-colonialism is to help retain the neo-colonial
countries as producers of raw materials; providing minerals,
industrial crops, and foodstuffs for imperialist industry and to
serve as markets for neo-colonialist manufactured goods - a
strategy that keeps the neo-colony economically weak and dependent.
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According to Hkrumah (1965) > neo-colonialism was given its
base by the principle of breaking up former colonial territories
into small non-viable States which are incapable of independent
development without socio-economic and political support from
former colonial or new imperialist powers. Leys (1975) and Woddis
(1967) argue that constitutionalism (a process that involved the
former colonialists in the drawing up of constitutions (involving
economic commitments) for independence) was the major factor in
the legitimisation of neo-colonial capitalist development. This
implies the possible uses of law in cementing the neo-colonial
process. However, neither Leys nor Woddis goes into any detailed
discussion on how law in general was used to consolidate neo¬
colonialism. This follows the general trend found in most theories
on neo-colonialism. These theories, either underrate or ignore
altogether the way law is used in consolidating neo-colonial
development.
With reference to neo-colonial capitalist development in
Kenya, we shall (while taking into account the contributions made
by general theories on neo-colonialism) attempt an examination of
the way law is used in legitimising and consolidating neo-colonial
capitalist development. In this context, we shall try to demon¬
strate how law, taken in the constitutional sense, was used not
only to maintain and protect neo-colonial capitalist development,
but also to determine the nature and extent of its consolidation.
In this sense we shall pay special attention to (a) how constitut¬
ionalism was used to establish licensing with penal sanctions, not
just for economic control and regulation as it is often the case in
developed capitalist systems, but also for political and trade
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union control; (b) how constitutionalism is used to structure the
economy for indigenous capitalist development i.e. in creating
parastatals for that purpose and (c) how administrative law is
used to establish easy access to capitalist production for the
indigenous capitalist class. We shall then examine the conse¬
quences of such a particularistic use of law on crime and social
control. However, we begin with an examination of Kenya's post-
independence social structure, in particular the economy, the
politics and social stratification. In view of our observations
in Chapter Three, we consider this necessary and useful to a
meaningful explanation of crime and social control in its historical
specificity.
THE NEO-COLONIAL CAPITALIST ECONOMY
1. Economic Base
In December, 1963, Kenya attained her formal independence
from Britain. In December 1961+, a republic with an executive
president was established in the belief that the monarchial arrange¬
ment inherited from Britain at independence was insufficient and
out of touch with the political needs of the new independent state.
The move to republicanism was viewed as the first step towards
complete political and economic independence. However, Kenya had
inherited at independence a capitalistic economy characterised by
a unique monopoly which Leys (1975) describes as having a signifi¬
cant degree of control over economic resources i.e. land and labour.
This, as Gertzel (1970), Ghai and Mcauslan (1970) and Odinga (1967)
argue was to influence greatly the manner in which Kenya was to
handle her post-independence problems, especially the way she set
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about creating a new economic order.
Following the trend in most post-colonial Africa, Kenya adopted
a public commitment to socialism as her economic base. However,
2
Kenyan socialism as expressed in Sessional Paper No. 10 (1965)
on "African Socialism and its application to planning in Kenya",
turned out to be essentially capitalistic. The paper conceived
development as maximising production with social equality and
justice a necessary corollary. Sandbrook (1975) points out that
such a conception of development is based on the premise that .
development can be best achieved through the profit motive and
the associated institution of private property, a considerable
reliance on foreign capital and an official encouragement of
indigenous entrepreneurship, both urban and rural. This basically
explains why "African Socialism" in Kenya as defined in Sessional
Paper No. 10 (1965) does not describe a socialist mode of pro¬
duction.
On the contrary, the paper concerns itself mainly with the
profit motive - involving a substantial input of foreign capital -
although social welfare and justice are mentioned. The paper
gives priority to production in the belief that social justice can
only be achieved by sharing wealth and not poverty. The central-
ity of the goals of equality and justice, although re-affirmed^,
is nevertheless overshadowed by the precedence given to maximis¬
ation of growth regardless of its consequences to social equality.
2
Sessional Paper No. 10 (1965) has since its inception become the
basic "blue-print" for Kenya's socio-political and economic
development policy.
See Chapters 1, 2 and 5 of Sessional Paper No. 10 (1965)
Government Printer, Nairobi.
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For example the paper commits the State to uphold the right of
individuals to accumulate property and wealth in the name of
human dignity and freedom^, hut the same statement declares growth
as the first concern of development, hence the declaration that
the hulk of government expenditure and planning would he channelled
into directly productive activites in order to establish a found-
5
ation for increased and extended welfare services in the future .
As Marris (1967) argues, Kenyan African socialism becomes economic
growth in spite of social justice and human dignity.
2. Foreign Capital
Given the prevailing socio-economic conditions at independence,
it was perhaps inevitable for Kenya to rely so heavily on foreign
capital since growth would have been inconceivable without it.
The decision to rely on foreign capital thus marked the initial
step towards neo-colonial capitalist development. Colonial settler
economic dominance was thus replaced by neo-colonial capitalism
with foreign investors and aid-donors taking over from the settlers,
but continuing the same process of "dependent" capitalism.
For example, in agriculture, foreign control of the big tea,
coffee, sisal and fruit estates continued despite the settlement of
"some" Africans in former European land. In the non-agricultural
sector, foreign dominance became pronounced in the modern capital
intensive and technologically sophisticated industrial sector.
The National Christian Council of Churches (1968), the International




dominance became very pronounced in industry mainly devoted to the
processing of local raw materials i.e. coffee, tea, sisal and
fruits for export. For example Brooke Bond Liebeg Ltd. had until
1980, a monopoly on tea processing . In the import-substitute
manufacturers e.g. textiles, footwear, clothing, paper products
and pharmaceuticals, most of which depend on the import of parts
7
and materials, foreign control has a near monopoly . The Inter¬
national Labour Organisation (1972) points out that the 1967* 1968
development estimates show that projects involving foreign invest¬
ment accounted for 60% of total manufacturing investment. In 1967>
enterprise with foreign equity accounted for 57% of gross production
of manufacturing firms (employing fifty workers) and accounted for
60% of total profits. The 1970-7i+ Development Plan projected in¬
flow of foreign capital was put at K£1l+0 million for the plan period,
far ahead of the actual 1969 foreign investment of £13 million
indicating that foreign capital investment was on the increase.
Foreign capital in aid form i.e. grants, loans and technical
assistance accounted for just over half of total aid in 1970. Aid
percentage of government expenditure was relatively high and con¬
stant after the 1961+-65 peak period (mainly due to British govern¬
ment aid for the buying out of settler fanners). For example, aid
percentage of total expenditure stood at 39% in 1969-70, and 37%
g
See Nicola Swainson, The Development of Corporate Capitalism in
Kenya 1918—1977> Heineman, London 1978, pp. 250-26i|., for a
detailed analysis of the extent of collaboration and competition
between local and foreign capital e.g. Brooke BondLiebig and the
tea industry in Kenya.
7
See "Who Controls Industry in Kenya", Report of a Working Party,
National Christian Council of Churches, East African Publishing
House (EAPH), Nairobi, 1968, for a breakdown of industrial develop¬
ment including a breakdown of industry and ownership i.e. foreign,
indigenous or both.
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in 1971-72 (international Labour Organisation, 1972). The reliance
on aid and the degree of such reliance is manifested in the 1970-
71+ Development Plan projections which put development aid projected
inflow at £95 million, equal to over half of projected official
Q
development expenditure .
Kenya's dependence on foreign investment and aid was not
made any better by her manpower requirements. As Gavin (1967)
argues, the colonial legacy, mainly the colonial practice of
keeping Africans at the bottom of the scale while reserving skilled
jobs for Europeans and/or Asians had left a vacuum as far as
African expertise was concerned. Therefore, although Sessional
Paper No. 10 (1965) bad advocated Africanisation of personnel and
ownership throughout the economy, the government set on negotiating
with various capitalist governments, individuals and institutions
for technical assistance. The result was an increase of "expatriate"
personnel, for example from 2,700 advisory, operational and vol¬
untary in mid 1968 to 3>700 in mid 1971. In African terms, this
dependence was rather unusual, since by 1970? as Nellis (1973)
points out Kenya depended on expatriate labour more than eight
African countries including Nigeria for which information is avail¬
able. In fact in 1969? Nellis (1973) bad already noted that 20%
of high level posts i.e. economically significant posts in relation
to policy formulation, were manned by expatriates. For example,
in 1971? of the 2,800 expatriates employed by the central government,
a significant 78 were employed in key industries; 33 in finance
and planning; 2J+ in legal and judicial posts, 15 in commerce and
Q
See Table I for a more detailed view of foreign capital inflow
for the first seven years of independence.
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industry and 6 in the office of the President. Their influence,
both in key policy decisions and perhaps more so in the shaping
of attitudes (towards a capitalist rather than socialist outlook)
is relatively substantial. Technical assistance of this magnitude
thus becomes "functional" to the maintenance of the neo-colonial
capitalist political and socio-economic system since their presence
undermines Kenya's confidence and perpetrates dependence. Leys
(1975) argues that their presence is significant in that they help
harmonise foreign capitalist interests with local capitalist
interests.
Thus Kenya was significantly dependent on foreign capital
(investment, aid and technical assistance) to a setting where the
government was more or less dependent on the willingness of the
foreign capitalists to invest in development. Under such conditions
the superiority of the foreign capitalists, both in capital and
expertise and the manner in which it was deployed was much more
likely to influence the state's decision either for or against
capitalist control. Kenya's dependence on foreign capital was
such that the state decided in favour of protection rather than
control of foreign capital investment.
For example, the Foreign Investment Act more or less
constitutes a Bill of Rights for foreign investors. Act. No. 35
of (196L1.) guarantees (a) freedom of repatriation of profits in
proportion to the foreign equity, (b) interest and repayments on
foreign loan capital, (c) abjurring of expropriation without cause
(after all Sessional Paper No. 10 (1965) argues against exprop¬
riation of foreign concerns as foolhardy - hence the promise to
nationalise assets only with full compensation) and (d) tax
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allowance of 20% based on depreciation, market protection in the
form of tariffs and quotes on imports and special permission for
9
duty free capital goods and materials unavailable in Kenya . The
International Labour Organisation (1972) commented that foreign
capital protection of the above magnitude goes a long way in
serving the economic and political interests of external powers -
hence fulfilling one of the basic aims of neo-colonialism. Odinga,
then vice-president of Kenya observed that such legitimisation of
foreign capital made a mockery of "African Socialism" and was based
on the false assumption that there can be a harmony of interests
between private capital and the government as the representative
of the people.
The State's use of law to consolidate foreign capitalist
investment echoes similar measures undertaken by the colonial State
(Chapter Three). In the latter case, the State through the use
of law intervened to create certain economic conditions favourable
to colonial settler economic dominance rather than allow the market
to create conditions for her intervention. A similar use of law
by the neo-colonial State to consolidate foreign capitalist invest¬
ment strengthens Kennedy's (1976) view that in capitalistic soc¬
ieties law is mainly used in the protection of the dominant cap¬
italist interests. In Kenya this general use of capitalist law
becomes much more evident in the development of indigenous capital¬
ism.
9
See Act No. 35 of 1961+, Government Printer, Nairobi 1-1+. See
also discussion by Cherry Gertzel, Maurice Goldschmidt and




At independence, Kenya had an option either to model her
economy on traditional African collectivism or to pursue the
capitalistic model already laid down by the colonialists, "but
as we have already seen, Kenya chose to pursue a capitalistic
mode of development. However, Sessional Paper No. 10 (1965) did
not commit the government to rely solely on foreign capital. It
committed the government to establish Africans in the monetary
sector (previously a European and Asian enclave), by ensuring that
a share of the planned expansion was African owned and managed.
African collectivism was thus discarded while a vital element -
the development of an indigenous capitalist class, was added to the
neo-colonial capitalist strategy. The problem was how to develop
African capitalism in an area already dominated by foreign capital,
which by 1970» through the re-investment of profits and fresh
inflow of capital had achieved a growth rate (in real terms) of
approximately 66%, accounting for lfl% of the monetary economy as
is noted by the Kenya Statistical Abstract (1971)•
In order to develop a viable indigenous capitalist structure,
Kenya had to penetrate the monopolistic infrastructure of the post-
colonial capitalist economy. To do so she had two options (a) dis¬
mantle the monopolistic infrastructure altogether or (b) extend it
to the Africans. To dismantle the post-colonial infrastructure
proved impossible due to Kenya's dependence on foreign capital.
Moreover, it was the State which had intervened through the use of
law to legitimise and consolidate foreign capital. The only option
the State could take without appearing to contradict her intentions
13b.
was to establish and develop African capitalism via an extension
of the existing monopoly infrastructure. To do so, the government
undertook to (a) provide aspirant African businessmen with various
technical training schemes, (b) provide technical advice once
commercial or industrial activities were started and (c) make
capital available through the Commercial Development Corporation
established in 1965 and (d) provide other inducements e.g. the
restriction of trading licences for certain types of trade with a
10
bias in favour of African applicants . This amounted to an ex¬
tension of quasi-monopolies to African businessmen which in turn
implied the use of law and general administrative action for the
purpose of creating and fostering an indigenous capitalist class.
You will recall how the colonial state used law and general admini¬
strative action to consolidate settler economic dominance. The
neo-colonial State took its cues from that to create what Fanon
(1967) refers to as a floating bourgeoisie which owes its legiti¬
macy and survival to state protection in the form of monopolies.
Thus through direct State action, rather than market conditions,
an indigenous capitalist class became part and parcel of official
economic policy including its extension to the Q0% of the population
still in the rural areas where African collectivism, although
seriously undermined was still in practice.
10
See C. Gertzel, M. Goldschmidt and D. Rothchild; Government and
Politics in Kenya, EAPH, Nairobi, 1972, pp. 522-521+, for a




According to Sessional Paper No. 10 (1965) rural development
on a communitarian (traditional) basis had been rejected on the
grounds that it could not be carried over "indiscriminately" to a
modern monetary economy. Rural development was thus not to be
based on communal land ownership and production, but was to be
based on individual enterprise with the co-operative element
mainly for marketing. Therefore, peasant participation on the
previously settler controlled agricultural exports, e.g. tea, sisal
and coffee growing was established on an individual basis. As
Sandbrook (1975) points out, land registration and consolidation
was introduced (or rather carried over from the colonial system)
and land ownership was made definite and explicit in order to bring
it into line with capitalist thinking and development.
11
For example, the "Swynerton Plan" was extended to the whole
country. The consequences of this capitalistic land reform was
twofold: (a) it served to validate the larger African landholders
while leaving scores of peasants landless, as Sorrenson (19^7)
argues and (b) it helped defuse rural unrest, while creating con¬
ditions by which a "middle class" of Africans would obtain rights
and interests in the large farm sector to politically and economi¬
cally ensure its continued functioning as Wasserman (1973) contends.
11
The Swynerton Plan was instituted in Central Province at the
height of the "Mau Mau" rebellion with the aim of creating a
conservative African landed middle class. See M.P.K. Sorrenson
"Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country" Oxford University Press,
Nairobi, 1967•
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To ensure the success of capitalist rural development, the State
as Leys (1975)> Sandhrook (1975) and. Seidman (1978) argue, inter-
12
vened and created Industrial Parastatals , e.g. the Kenya Tea
Development authority and the Agricultural Development Corpor¬
ation to help foster rural capitalism by encouraging African
involvement in export crop growing. The basic aim of the Para¬
statals was to provide credit at low interest rates and expand
extension services to provide advice to African farmers. This
brought together the interests of the State and those of the social
strata she was trying to develop creating what Leys (1975) refers
to as economic nationalism. In both economic and political nation¬
alism, neo-colonial capitalism found its base and legitimacy.
For example, the government, in its bid to facilitate the
growth of indigenous capitalism began strigent Africanisation
measures (including the Africanisation of personnel in foreign
1 "3
companies ) in order to establish Africans in the commercial
sector of the economy. Large scale extension of state credit
facilities (the Parastatals) i.e. the Agricultural Finance Cor-
A J
poration formed in 1963 was undertaken in order to provide credit
and the necessary capital for African involvement in business and
industry. Of all the measures undertaken to develop indigenous
12
Parastatals are quasi-government institutions implying a large
measure of government control.
1 3
See the Republic of Kenya, "Kenyanisation of Personnel in the
Private Sector", Government Printer, Nairobi, 1967- PP« 1-1+.
^See the Agricultural Credit Act 1963) Chapter 323 of the Laws of
Kenya, Government Printer, Nairobi. The Government also initiated
controls on land - see the Land Control Act. Republic of Kenya
Gazette Supplement No. 103 (Acts No. 11+) Act No. 3k of 1967.
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capitalism, State coercion through Licensing was the most widely
15
used. The 1967 Trade Licensing Act, enforceable under criminal
16
law forbade trading by non-citizens in rural areas and the non-
central areas in cities and towns. Under this Act, all business
conduct could only take place under a Current Licence terms, which
made it possible for the government to establish African capitalists
in certain areas of the economy i.e. trade, transport and the manu¬
facturers.
For example, in 1975» Swainson (1980) recorded that the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued I+63 quit notices to non-
citizen businesses in Nairobi. Protective legislation as both
Swainson (1980) and Leys (1980) argue strengthened the foothold
of the indigenous capitalist class to such an extent that it
accummulated sufficient capital to enable it to stand as a distinct
class independent of foreign capital. However, the dependence of
this class on State protection, and the State's dependence on
foreign capital as we have already noted, makes indigenous capital¬
ism more of a part of the neo-colonial capitalist strategy rather
than a complete independent variable.
Kenya therefore pursued a neo-capitalist mode of development
with emphasis placed on the Africanisation of the existing re¬
sources rather than their transformation. Foreign capital helped
to expand production at the impressive rate of 6.3% up to the mid
70's. However, as the International Labour Organisation (1972)
noted, economic growth continued on the same lines as those set by
1 £
Republic of Kenya, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 103 (Acts No. 1[|.)
Act No. 33 of 1967.
16
See C. Gertzel, M. Goldschmidt and L. Rothchild; Government and
Politics in Kenya, EAPH, Nairobi 1972, p. 53^-.
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the colonialists. This meant that the colonial capitalist structures
that hah. led to and had sustained inequality still remained, implying
that the "benefits of economic growth were still unequitably distri¬
buted - further implying that independent Kenya is a neo-colonial
capitalist society characterised by economic classes and class
conflict the most basic being the struggles within the indigenous
capitalist class to take control of the political machinery of the
neo-colonial structure.
In Chapter Three, through our examination of how the State used
law to establish the settler capitalist class, and how this class
manoeuvred and took control of the political machinery of the col¬
onial state, we came to the proposition that in capitalist society,
dominant groups can institute and shape laws to coincide with their
economic needs. In the foregoing discussion, we have already noted
how the neo-colonial State used law to set up an indigenous capital¬
ist system. However, in order to understand how the indigenous
capitalist class uses law in its struggle to control the political
machinery of the neo-colonial capitalist structure, it is necessary
to understand the indigenous social structure as this is crucial to
the way the indigenous capitalist class uses law. Of special signi¬
ficance is an understanding of how the indigenous society was
stratified, especially how political parties evolved. TJntil we
understand this, we cannot adequately understand the uses of law,
both the general and the specific.
In the following discussion, we shall examine the pattern of
neo-colonial social stratification and political organisation -
mainly the way political parties evolved. We shall then examine
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how the government consolidated its position, especially how law
was used to sustain the neo-colonial capitalist mode of development
and to prevent any settled opposition to it.
NEO-COLONIAL SOCIAL ORGANISATION
1. Social Stratification
Taking into account Kenya's neo-colonial capitalist develop¬
ment and considering the effects of the colonial policy on African
Reserves, the 19&9 population census shows that 80% of the popul¬
ation still lives in the rural areas. This'means that the economy,
in spite of developments in the monetary sector and rural capital¬
ist development, is still essentially peasant. Sandbrook (1975)
argues that nine out of ten of the population is in the rural
areas. The bulk of this population is still composed of peasants
i.e. smallholders who rely primarily on family labour and simple
technology to produce goods mainly for their own consumption, but
also for the market. As Leys (1975) contends, irrespective of the
replacement of foreign controlled farms by medium to high density
African settlement, and irrespective of the legal defination of
ownership, a typical pattern of a peasant economy emerges with some
differentiation ranging from the landless or nearly landless
agricultural labourers at the bottom to emergent capitalist farmers
at the top. This implies a neo-colonial capitalist society char¬
acterised by two basic classes; the peasantry and the indigenous
capitalist class.
In Kenyan terms, the peasantry includes the unemployed and
unproductively employed urban poor who can usefully be considered
11+0.
as an extension of peasant society since there is an extensive
interchange of goods and personnel between the urban immigrants
and the rural dwellers. As Leys (1975) contends, the peasants
and urban poor (i.e. the 12 to 13% potential workforce in Nairobi)
are like in colonial times still subjected to the power of capital
(both foreign and indigenous). Hence the prospect of hard unpro¬
ductive labour coupled with growing inequality.
At the top of the social scale is the indigenous capitalist
class. According to Leys (1975)> this class is composed of the
"ruling group" whose major activity is to use the benefits of
political power to redress their insecure position vis-a-vis
foreign capital. For example, wealth and business contracts
acquired through political office are used to acquire property in
the form of land, houses, shares and interests in business enter¬
prise which in turn enhance their political power and social status.
Also found among the capitalist class are the urban bourgeoisie,
the petty bourgeoisie and the capitalist farmers.
Since independence, the capitalist class, probably taking
the cues from the activities of the colonial settler capitalist class,
has tended to work for the accumulation of resources and functions
by the State bureaucracy at the expense of all other systems i.e.
the Party. As Odinga (19&7) points out, the party in neo-colonial
Kenya has not emerged as a sufficient counterweight, resulting in
the absolute power of the State central bureaucracy as it is syrm-
bolised in the person of the President (as we shall show later).
The most significant aspect of this power structure is the indig¬
enous capitalists' control of the political apparatus of the State
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and the way they have used it to consolidate their economic domin¬
ance in particular and neo-colonial capitalism in general.
In the following discussion, we shall try to demonstrate how
the capitalist class, through the use of the political machinery of
the State (Law in particular), makes it impossible for the peasants
to participate in government by subordinating political activity i.e.
party political activity to the State bureaucracy. We shall then
examine the consequences of such uses of law on crime and social
control.
2. Party Politics and Administrative Control
During the colonial period, the existence of an immigrant,
economically differentiated settler capitalist class to whom the
government alienated land resulted in a situation whereby racial
categories provided the most decisive political divisions in the
colony. As we noted in Chapter Three, the settler capitalist class
enjoyed the dominant political position. Government policies on
land, labour and the distribution of general services favoured the
settlers against the majority Africans. As Gertzel (1970) noted,
this created acute social and economic grievances which led Africans
as early as the 1920's to demand a share in political power as the
only means of redressing these grievances. This led to the form-
ation of an African Nationalist movement which since its inception
had a strong economic base which eventually led to the "Mau Mau"
movement, the outbreak of violence and the declaration of "Emergency"
in 195217.
17
See generally Carl Rosberg and John Nottingham, "The Myth of Mau
Mau", Rapp Mall, London 1966 for a comprehensive analysis of the
pre-independence African politics.
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The African nationalist movement was up to 1952 rather frag¬
mented and was characterised "by party political organisation e.g.
the Kenya African IJnion (KAU), formed in 191+1+ and spearheaded by
the Kikuyu, which tended not to cross tribal lines. This was
mainly so due to official discouragement and partly so because of
the African Reserves policy which had grouped people of the same
tribe or group of tribes together. After the "emergency" (during
which KAU and other African political organisations were pro¬
scribed), African political activity emerged with a national out¬
look. This led to the formation of political parties, for example,
the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African
Democratic Union (KADU), both formed in 1960, which cut across
tribal lines and brought together different tribes. However, like
the "pre-emergency" parties, KANU and KADU came about because of
tribal economic interests. KANU was composed mainly of the larger
tribes, for instance, the Kikuyu, the Luo and the Kamba, whereas
KADU came into being as a result of the fears prevailing among the
smaller tribes concerning land. This led KADU to demand for a quasi-
federal division of power which would leave a central African
majority government omnipotent than its colonial predecessor.
Thus Kenya began her independence with a multi-party structure
and a system of government considerably more decentralised than the
18
colonial one. The 1963 independence constitution provided for a
considerable devolution of power from the centre under a quasi-
federal structure. Within a year after independence however, KANU
18
The Independence Constitution, The Kenya Independence Order in
Council (L.N. 718 of 1963).
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and KADIJ merged into KANU bringing to a temporary end the multi¬
party system. The ^^6k Republican Constitution abolished regional¬
ism and established the post of executive president, both as head
of state and head of government with constitutionally guaranteed
19
powers . Kenya therefore entered her republican period, a defacto
one party state and a constitution that almost amounted to a
resurrection of the colonial administrative structure. This however
did not mean an end to party political activity.
Earlier on in this discussion, we mentioned that the African
nationalist movement had a very strong economic base. The achieve¬
ment of independence did not, as we have already noted, mean the
immediate end of the social and economic grievances which spearhead
the nationalist movement. These had been carried over into inde¬
pendence and had been briefly identified with KADIJ. The KANU, KADU
merger did not dissolve these differences and in view of the strong
economic base of Kenyan political activity, intra-party conflict
was therefore inevitable.
Initially, party disagreement was mainly on allocation of
resources within districts. Since the various districts represented
20
people of different tribes, this disagreement had tribal overtones
However, underlying this, were differences of opinion on the basic
assumptions of government policy on the economy, such as land,
19See generally the Constitution of Kenya, Republic of Kenya, Kenya
Gazette Supplement No. 27 (Acts No. 3) 18th April, 1969.
20 d
See G. Bennet "Tribalism and Politics in East Africa" in
P.H. Gulliver (ed.) Tradition and Transition in East Africa,
University of California Press, Los Angelos, 1969.
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nationalisation and foreign policy. This implied a difference of
opinion on the government's economic strategy which was later to
appear in Sessional Paper No. 10 (1965)* This split KANU into two
factions; (a) the conservative element in favour of government
policy and (b) the radical element in favour of a structural change.
The radicals rejected the government's major economic policy
on the grounds that it was aimed at assisting the outgoing settlers
rather than a meaningful effort to redress the underprivileged and
underdeveloped position of the poor and unemployed. For example,
the spending of £26 million, as Gertzel (1970) notes, to settle only
30,000 families was seen by the radicals as an inducement to the
settlers rather than a meaningful assistance of new African farmers
and an alleviation of landlessness and unemployment. The radicals
advocated for a co-operative farming approach rather than individual
ownership which implied a basic structural change. In short they
called for state and co-operative participation in order to ensure
an egalitarian rather than a class society.
Briefly then, the KANU conflict boiled down to two development
approaches, (a) a "Socialist" approach which saw the nationalisation
of the means of production as the most viable method of ensuring the
country's economic independence and the transfer of the economy to
Africans and (b) a capitalist approach which advocated private
enterprise and the stimulation of individual effort rather than
public co-operative effort and enterprise. As Odinga (1967) points
out, the KANTJ radicals were for the socialist approach while the
conservatives favoured the capitalist approach advocated in Session¬
al Paper No. 10 of (1965). Predictably, the government response
11*5.
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to the KAMI radical approach was in defence of capitalism
Initially, the aim of the government was to use the organis¬
ational structure of the party to root out the radicals and minimise
their influence in the party and in parliament. To do so, first
the government needed an ideological foothold to counter the
radicals' growing socialist appeal. Sessional Paper No. 10 (1965)
on "African Socialism" and its application to planning in Kenya,
was basically a response to this need. While the "African Social¬
ism" debate was on, Mr. Pio-Pinto, a specially elected M.P. and a
close associate of the KANU radicals was murdered. His murder
brought into sharp focus the struggles within the ruling elite to
take control of the machinery of government. Pio-Pinto's murder
led to one significant development in this struggle - on February
1966, Mr. Tom Mboya (Cabinet Minister, General Secretary of KANU
and acknowledged spokesman of the Conservatives), tabled a motion in
Parliament calling for loyalty to the President (then Mr. Kenyatta).
This move added a new dimension to the conflict and as Leys (1975)
argues, the government and the person of the president merged into
one making it possible to interpret any criticism of government
policy as a direct challenge to the person of the president. The
move which had been calculated to squeeze out the radicals was augu-
mented by the 1966 KANU delegates conference whose chief function
21
See Sessional Paper No. 10 (1965) for a summary of the Government
Policy response to KANU radicalism. See also C. Gertzel,
M. Goldschmidt ana D. Rothchild "Government and Politics in Kenya"
EAPH 1972, for a detailed analysis and review of government
response to the KANU Radical Element. Special comment on pp. 138-
139. C. Leys "Underdevelopment in Kenya - The Political Economy
of Neo-colonialism", Heinamann, London 1975; bas some interesting
comments on the subject.
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was to remove the radicals from any positions of influence within
the party. This conference adopted a new KANU constitution which
abolished the post of National Vice-President of KANU (a post
which was up to that time occupied by Mr. Odinga, the national vice-
president). Mr. Odinga had compromised his position by siding with
the radical group. As Odinga (1967) points out, the government had
hoped to use the structural changes to manipulate and control the
22
party . Immediately after the Limuru conference, Mr. Odinga re-
23
signed from both KANU and the government . He joined and took
over the leadership of the newly formed Kenya People's Union (KPU)
which had adopted a "socialist" approach to development similar to
that advocated by the KANU radicals2^. Thus Kenya reverted back to
the multi-party system giving the ongoing struggle within the ruling
class to control the political machinery of the State an ideological
base. The defection of key KANU leadership like Mr. Odinga, Mr.
29
Kaggia and Mr. Oneko to the newly formed KPU frustrated the capit¬
alist government's efforts to control opposition through the mani¬
pulation of the party. This resulted in a change of emphasis from
party political control to administrative control with KANU actively
encouraging the government to subordinate political activity such as
22
For a discussion on the KANU delegates conference at Limuru and
its implications for political control see C. Gertzel, M. Gold-
schmidt and D. Rothchild, Government and Politics in Kenya, EAPH
Nairobi 1972 pp. 11+2-11+8.
23JIbid. pp. 1143-11+9. For Mr. Odinga's resignation statement and
formation of the KPU.
2^Tbid. pp. 11+9-155. For the KPU Mainifesto and its implications
for government policy and control.
2^Ibid. pp. 11+3-11+6
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the party to the central state "bureaucracy. To do so however, the
government needed a strong central administrative structure (in¬
cluding a powerful executive). Law was unfortunately used to
create one.
Por example, the merger of KANU and KADU and the introduction
of the republican constitution in 1961+ had began the move towards
a more centralised government structure. However, it took several
amendments to the 1961+ constitution. Por instance, the 1965 and. 1966
26
amendments to eliminate any counterweights to central government
control and establish a centralised administrative structure domin¬
ated by the executive arm of government (implying absolute author-
27
ity) '. Por example Act No. 11+ of 1965 amended the constitution and
provided for a two thirds majority in Parliament as the only require-
28
ment to amendments to the constitution , which made it possible
for the government to manipulate the constitution in order to create
laws specifically suitable for the protection of its capitalist
interests. Por example, Act. No. 17 of 1966 (enacted at the inception
of the KPTJ) required members of parliament (M.P.s) to resign from
26
The Independence Constitution - Schedule 2 of the Kenya Independ¬
ence Order in Council (L.N. 718 of 1963) had been amended ten times
by mid 1969- For details of the amendments see Acts 28 of 1961+;
38 of 1961+; 11+ of 1965; 16 of 1966; 17 of 1966; 18 of 1966; 1+0 of
1966; 1+ of 1967; 16 of 1968 and 3 of 1969• Any reference to the
above amendments will be made by direct reference to the relevant
Act.
27
See parallel in Durkheim's analysis of Absolute Authority in
Emile Durkheim, "Two Laws of Penal Evolution", Economy and
Society 1973-
See provision in the current constitution; Republic of Kenya,
Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 27 (Acts No. 3) 18th April, 1969-
Section 1+7 p. 2i+.
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parliament if they resigned from the party that supported them at
elections - aimed at discouraging any defections to the KPU Social¬
ist camp. This meant that the government took the socialist
29
threat to its capitalistic policy seriously
The constitutional changes more or less secured the government
parliamentary position. With this secured, the Kenyatta govern¬
ment proceeded to extend her newly acquired legitimacy and authority
to the provinces and districts. As Gertzel (1970) argues,
Kenyatta moved to deliberately re-establish the colonial admini¬
strative structure by restoring to the provincial administration
her former colonial role as agent of the executive which effectively
replaced the party which had up to independence acted as the major
tool for mobilizing peasant political participation. A mass party
however requires a programme for the masses and mass participation.
Since the government wanted neither, the party was discorded imply¬
ing direct opposition to any other party or organisation that called
for mass participation in development.
In order to strengthen the provincial administration, the
government restored to the provincial commissioners and district
commissioners their former colonial role as chairmen of provincial
and district intelligence committees thereby making them ultimately
responsible for law and order. For example, the power to control
and licence public meetings (including those held by M.P.s) was
29
See government response to the KPU threat in "Where the Truth
Lies - The dissidents have no mandate from the voters" (Author-
less) The Printing and Packaging Corporation Limited, Nairobi,
1966 (The government emblem on its cover implies a government
source).
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transferred to the provincial administration^. This consolidated
the government administrative position by putting it in a more
favourable position in relation to the control of political organ¬
isation and activity. It also marked a more popular move towards
the use of general law and criminal law as the main tool in consoli¬
dating neo-colonial capitalist development. In the following dis¬
cussion, we shall examine how the indigenous capitalist class used
the state political machinery, law in particular to consolidate
their dominant capitalist position and to prevent any settled
opposition to neo-colonial capitalism either through organized
political activity or worker protest action. We shall then examine
itsimplications for crime and social control. We shall specific¬
ally look at general and criminal law in relation to the funda¬
mental rights and freedoms guaranteed in the constitution. In our
analysis we shall try to demonstrate our contention that capitalist
law is used much more for the protection of the capitalist classes
rather than in the public interest. This implies that the capitalist
state as it is represented in law does not stand above societal con¬
flicts but more than not intervenes in favour of the capitalist
class interests.
30
Republic of Kenya, Revised Development Plan, 1966-1967 >
Government Printer, Nairobi, 1966. See also C. Gertzel, "The
Provincial Administration in Kenya" Journal of Commonwealth
Studies, Vol. TV, No. 3> November, 1966, for an account of the
development of the Provincial Administration since independence.
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NE0-C0L0NIAL CAPITALIST LAW AND SOCIAL CONTROL
1. Fundamental Rights, Freedoms and Lav
"31
The constitution of Kenya guarantees (irrespective of ones
race, tribe, place of origin or residence or other local connection,
political opinions, colour, creed or sex) three fundamental rights
and freedoms; (a) freedom to life, security of the person and the
protection of the law, (b) freedom of conscience, of expression and
assembly and association and (c) protection of the privacy of his
home and other property and from deprivation of property without
32
compensation . In relation to general social control, all three
are important, but for the purposes of this thesis, we shall restrict
ourselves to an examination of the provisions of the right and free¬
dom of conscience, of expression and assembly and association in
law with special reference to socio-political control.
Implied in the right and freedom of conscience, expression,
assembly and association are three basic factors; (a) the freedom
to hold opinions, receive ideas and information, communicate ideas
and information (whether the communication be to the public gener¬
ally or to any person or class of persons) and the freedom to
correspondence without interference33, (b) the freedom of assembly
and association; meaning the right to assemble and associate with
other persons freely i.e. form or belonging to trade unions or other
31
The Constitution of Kenya, Republic of Kenya, Kenya Gazette
Supplement No. 27 (Acts No. 3) 18th April, 1969-
32Ibid Section 70 p. 33
33Ibid Section 79 (1) p. 1*2
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associations^, and (c) the freedom of movement, meaning the right
35
to move freely throughout Kenya . Taken as they stand, these
rights and freedoms become meaningful only when their guarantee in
the constitution is given provision in general law and especially
in criminal law. However in neo-colonial Kenya, as we shall
demonstrate in the following discussion, the trend has been to
subordinate the above rights and freedoms to administrative control
through the use of general law and criminal law in particular,
implying their subordination to neo-colonial capitalist interests.
In order to understand the uses of law in this manner, we need not
go further than the constitution itself.
Chapter V of the Constitution, although it devotes itself to
the guarantee of the fundamental rights and freedoms, states that
"nothing contained in or done under the authority of an Act of
Parliament shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contra¬
vention of sections .... 79» 80 or 81 .... of this Constitution when
Kenya is at war and nothing contained in or done under authority
of any provision of Part III of the preservation of public security
Act shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of
those sections of this constitution when and in so far as the pro¬
vision is in operation by virtue of an order made under Section 85
of this Constitution"^. Section 85"^ of the constitution refers
to the powers of the president to bring into operation generally or
■^Tbid Section 80 (1) p. \\2
^Ibid Section 81 (1) p. I4.3
"^Ibid Section 83 (1) p. i+6
^Ibid Section 85 p. 1|8
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in any part of Kenya, Part II of the preservation of Public Security
Act or any of the provisions of that part of the Act. Part III of
the Public Security Act refers to the powers given to the executive
to detain any person for the preservation of public security
39
Thus by invoking the preservation of Public Security Act , the
constitution sets the tone for the subordination of the constitut¬
ionally guaranteed fundamental rights of freedom of conscience,
expression and association to general law. This implies that any
activity, political or otherwise that requires the exercise of the
above rights and freedoms is equally subject to control through
the use of law, for example, the KPU case.
2. The KPU Case
The government intention to use law to control the KPU was
signalled by the 1966 amendment to the constitution, in particular
Act 17 of 1966 which required M.P.s to resign their parliamentary
posts on resignation from KANU. The 1966-67 Revised Development
Plan endorsed the transfer of licensing powers to the provincial
administration which were effectively used to undermine the KPU,
especially during the 1966 Little General Election^. During this
Republic of Kenya, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 67 (Legislative
Supplement No. i+1) 25th July, 1966, pp. 33*1—333» and- Republic of
Kenya, Legal Notice No. 2l+0—£(.1, 1966.
39
The Preservation of Public Security Act (Cap 57> Laws of Kenya).
Republic of Kenya, Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 67, 25th July 1966.
^This election was a result of the implementation of Act 17 of
1966. See C. Gertzel; The Politics of Independent Kenya, 1963-
1968, EAPH, Nairobi, 1970, pp. 73~9£. See also C. Gertzel and
Okumu J. "The Little General Election in Nyanza 1966" in
C. Gertzel; The Politics of Independent Kenya op. cit. pp. 95-
12i+.
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election , as Odinga (1967) and Gertzel (1970) argue, the State,
through the provincial administration used licensing powers to
deny the KPU the right to hold political meetings in any other part
of the country other than Nyanza Province. This effectively inter¬
fered with the KPU members' right and freedom of movement, expression,
assembly and the right to communicate freely. This limited the
mobilisation activities of the KPU by interfering with its right to
communicate its point of view on a national platform. As a result,
it was only in Nyanza, where the KPU was allowed to operate, where
the Party secured some parliamentary representation. But since
Nyanza was a predominantly Luo area, the government later used this
to challenge the legitimacy of the KPU by labelling it as a tribal
party.
Following this, in August 1966, Part III of the Preservation
) "1
of Public Security Act Sections l+(l) and (2), (a) and (b) were
brought into operation. Under this section of the Act, eight people
were detained without any official explanation. Gertzel, Gold-
schmidt and Rothchild (1972) argue that all the detained persons
were engaged in activities of political or trade union nature which
was not in conformity with the official capitalist policy. For
example, Mr. P.P. Ooko was the General Secretary of the Common
Services African Civil Servants Union, Mr. 0.0. Makanyengo was
General Secretary of the Kenya Petroleum and Oil Workers' Union and
Mr. Oluande K'oduol was Mr. Odinga's private Secretary^. In 1967»
) 1
See the Preservation of Public Security Act op. cit.
^See generally C. Gertzel, M. Goldschmidt and D. Rothchild;
Government and Politics of Independent Kenya, EAPH, Nairobi 1972
p. 21+1.
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the government took extra measures to muffle and control any open
support for the KPU "by extending Act No. 17 of 1966 on party
affiliation to local government officials. Act No. 11 of 19&7
required that any official who resigned from KANU must also resign
from office. Thus by prescription and proscription, law was effect¬
ively used for the purpose of consolidating a particular political
position. This implied that the government could use law to control
any activity by an individual or group that it deemed a threat to
J
its authority. For example, Mr. Kaggia a senior member of the KPU
executive was imprisoned on the grounds of holding an illegal
meeting.
In 1969> the government finally invoked the Preservation of
Public Security Act to deal with the so called KPU menace. The KPU
was banned and all its leaders were put under indefinate detention
under Part III of the said Act. Leys (1975) argues that the ban
was a clear demonstration that the government was prepared to
tolerate a certain degree of populist rhetoric, but not a settled
opposition to neo-colonial capitalism or any determination to work
against it. This made nonsense the constitutional guarantee of the
right to security of the person and protection of the law^. A
Jj.5test case, that of Ooko v. the Republic established that his
^Kaggia vs. the Republic, Criminal Appeals Nos. 582 and 583 of
1968 (Unreported).
e Constitution of Kenya, Republic of Kenya, Kenya Gazette
Supplement No. 27 (Acts No. 3) 18th April 1969? Section 70(a)
P. 33.
it5
Mr. Ooko was detained under the Preservation of Public Security
Act 1966. He appealed against detention basing his defence on
the guarantees for fundamental rights and freedoms in the consti¬




detention was not -unlawful , thus establishing the legitimacy of
the government's particularistic use of law rather than the legiti¬
macy of the individual's protection of the law. The Court's fail¬
ure to withhold the Supremacy of a right guaranteed by the consti¬
tution to general law implies a subordination of the constitution
to general law rather than vice versa. This implies a near total
subordination of fundamental rights and freedoms to the State's
central bureaucracy. In the following discussion, we shall attempt
to demonstrate the extent of such subordination by looking at the
implications for the freedom of expression, assembly and association
) 7
of two general laws; (a) the Societies Act and (b) the Public
) ft
Order Act . We shall pay special attention to the criminal law
provisions of these Acts in our attempt to show how a particular¬
istic use of such provisions empowers the government to exercise
important powers of control over persons and their exercise of
fundamental rights and freedoms. Implied here will be a demon¬
stration of how a particularistic use of law (criminal law in
particular) is crucial to the maintenance of the Kenyan capitalist
social structure.
^For a special comment on this point, see Y.P. Ghai and J.P.W.B.
Mcauslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya - a study of
the legal framework of government from colonial times to the
present, Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1970 pp. k37-hbO.
J rj
The Societies Act, Republic of Kenya, Kenya Gazette Supplement
No. 16 (Acts No. 3) 16th February 1968, Act No. k of 1968.
J ft
The Public Order Act, Chapter 56, Laws of Kenya, Government
Printer, Nairobi, 1968.
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3* The Societies Act
As we have already noted, the constitution of Kenya guarantees
the freedom of association and expression and assembly. However,
in respect to the general law on association, assembly and expression
(implying communication), important factors which stand in direct
contradiction to the guaranteed rights and freedoms do become evi¬
dent. For example, under the Societies Act, several factors,
crucial to the exercise of the said rights and freedoms are brought
under administrative control; (a) it is provided that every society
in Kenya, before it can legally exist, must be approved by a state
official i.e. a Minister or the Registrar of Societies, (b) in order
for any society to legally exist (or be registered), it must conform
to certain stated conditions, that is, it must not be prejudicial
to or incompatible with the peace welfare or "good" government in
Kenya (meaning that it must not be prejudicial to the capitalist
order), (c) in addition, the Registrar is provided with extensive
power over societies, for instance, he has to be kept informed of
executive changes, changes or amendments of the constitution of
particular societies as well as the power to scrutinise the accounts
of registered associations/societies with authority to revoke
registration or deprive from legal exemptions and (d) a Minister
has under the same Act, power to ban any society by declaration if
ha
he thinks it is dangerous to the "good" government of the Republic .
In practice, the Act imposes great restrictions on the freedom to
form groups and associations. In particular, the wide powers given
Lq
See generally the Society's Act, 1968.
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to the Minister and Registrar tilt the balance heavily in favour of
administrative control. The failure of the Act to make provision
for appeals to the Courts against administrative action in relation
to the powers given in the Act implies a deliberate action on the
part of the State to subordinate the rights and freedoms guaranteed
in the constitution to state control - implying direct subordination
of all other political activities to state capitalist development^0,
for example the subordination of unionised labour.
1+. The Trade Union Case
During the colonial period, the traditional demands of unionised
labour, for example, higher wages and better working conditions were
in direct contradiction with the colonial capitalist strategy of
settler capital accumulation - hence the antagonism of the colonial
state and the influential settler community against the development
of unionised labour on the grounds that it would be used for poli¬
tical agitation. In spite of this however, Labour organisations did
occur with the immediate aim of getting a better deal for their
workers. The immediate response of the colonial state was to use
law to control them, for example, the 1937 Trade Unions Ordinance
which required the registration of all Unions. The basic aim of
control as Amsden (1971) and Leys (1975) angue was to prevent the
formation of a powerful Union with large funds, covering more than
one industry and inclined to political action with the ultimate aim
of subordinating the Unions to colonial capitalist policy.
^°See Ghai and Mcauslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya,
Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1970, pp. IpLpU—Lii+7•
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By independence, in spite of the colonial governments control
of workers (employed or otherwise) the Labour movement got deeply
involved in the Nationalist movement. At the eve of independence,
the Labour movement e.g. the Kenya Federation of Labour, stated
its objectives. The basic tenent of these objectives as Sandbrook
(1975) points out, was that trade unions had an important role to
play and that they would not limit themselves to the terms and
conditions of employment, but were to concern themselves with such
other matters as human rights legislation, economic policy, housing
policy, education and welfare. In other words, the Unions were to
concern themselves with socio-political and economic development.
This meant an interest in the governments socio-economic and poli¬
tical strategy.
After Independence, the Unions, mainly through the Kenya
Federation of Labour (KFL) demanded that the government declare its
plans for economic development. According to KFL as the International
Labour Organisation (1972) noted, the government package should have
included nationalisation of key industries and the creation of
collective farms. The KFL's demands came into direct contradiction
with government plans as expounded in Sessional Paper No. 10 (1965)«
In addition, and unfortunately for the trade unions, their demands
were too similar to the KFU's to avoid government scrutiny.
Urged on by the indigenous capitalist class (through the
Federation of Kenya Employers - a capitalist institution composed of
foreign firms and government corporations) whose interests were
threatened by the "socialist" demands of unionised labour, the govern¬
ment intervened to regulate the situation in favour of capitalist
159.
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demands. Through the use of law, mainly the 1965 Trade Union Act
the government began to restrict the activities of the trade unions.
For example, the government used the Act's licensing powers, in
this case the power to cancel registration of a specific union or
52
combination of unions to dissolve the Kenya Federation of Labour
and the Kenya African Workers' Congress and replace it with the
Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU). The government then
hoped to use COTU, by making provision for its activities in both
general and criminal law, not only to control the internal affairs
of unions, but also to control and regulate the whole labour move¬
ment. Por example, the 1965 trade disputes Act came into operation
mainly to provide the government with a tool for controlling the
5 3
internal affairs of unions and prohibit strikes . (After all
Sessional Paper No. 10 (1965) had advocated for legislation provid¬
ing for "Compulsory arbitration" of major issues and special legi¬
slation in sensitive industries in order to avoid worker stoppages).
The Industrial Court was made a condition for all industrial dis-
5i,
putes which led to a tight control on worker protest action. It
also became a criminal offence if COTU failed to sanction any strike
action by a national union including a condition that COTU must
51
The Trade Unions Act, Chapter 233 Laws of Kenya, 1965.
52
See generally the Trade Unions Act, op. cit.
53
See generally Livings tone,I. 'TheGovernment, the Worker and the
Law in Kenya", East African Law Journal, 3 (1967), p. 282.
^See generally the 1961;, 1965, 1969 Trade Disputes Acts and the
1971 Trade Disputes Act. Government Printer, Nairobi.
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approve any strike action for it to be legitimate. The subordin¬
ation of the Labour movement to state capitalist interests was
thus made complete in law. As Leys (1975) contends, the appli¬
cation of the Preservation of Public Security Act to union activity
and officials (as we mentioned earlier) was nothing more than a
seal to an already finished contract - the subordination of labour
to neo-colonial capitalist interests.
5. The Public Order Act
This Act, although its functions are similar to those of the
Societies Act, covers a much wider area and is especially useful
for controlling associations of a political nature which cannot be
covered in the Societies Act. The Act deals specifically with
associations aimed at usurping the functions of the police, or armed
forces for political ends, the display of force to promote political
ends and prohibits the wearing of uniforms associated with political
56
organisations or objectives . It is however, the provisions of
this Act in general and criminal law which is of significance to
this thesis.
To begin with, the Public Order Act and its provision in the
57
Police Act interferes directly with the right and freedom of
assembly and association. Under the Public Order Act, several
things crucial to the right to assemble or hold a public meeting
55
For a more detailed analysis of the relationship between the
State and Labour Unions, see generally R. Sandbrook, Proletarians
and African Capitalism, The Kenyan Case 1960-1972. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1975-
56
See generally the Public Order Act, Chapter 55, Laws of Kenya,
Government Printer, Nairobi, 1968.




are prohibited; (a) no "public meeting" can be held without the
prior permission of the district commissioner, who has authority
to withhold such permission on the grounds of "public order and
peace", (b) it is illegal to advertise any public meeting without
prior permission from the district commissioner and (c) the police
have the power to direct and control the conduct of any public
meeting for which permission has been obtained including authority
to cancel the holding of such meeting. Any meeting that does not
meet the above criteria is unlawful which makes it an offence to
hold or convene or take part in such a meeting^. This basically
directly controls through the licensing powers of the provincial
administration, any expression in public of any opinions contrary
to neo-colonial capitalism. In fact in the Kenyan case, it is a
tool that the capitalist classes use to make it impossible for the
peasants and the urban poor to take part in government and prevent
them from throwing their weight behind socialist political activity.
Secondly, the Public Order Act extends its authority and cont¬
rol to the freedom of expression including any means of communicating
any information. This is defined in general law. Por example,
£0
"Public meeting" means a public meeting, gathering, procession
or concourse of ten or more persons in any public place, held
for any purpose including any political purpose.
"^See Kaggia vs. the Republic. Criminal Appeals Nos. 582 and 583
of 1968 (Unreported). Kaggia was imprisoned for attending a
meeting which had been rendered unlawful by means of a cancell¬
ation of the permit to hold the meeting while the meeting was
actually in progress.
162.
The Books and. Newspapers Act^ and the Films and Stage Plays Act^ .
Although these laws do exercise general control, the real instru¬
ment of control is found in certain provisions of these Acts in
the penal code. For example, to print, publish, sell or offer
for sale, distribute or reproduce any seditious publication or
import such publication unless there is reason to believe that the
material is not seditious is a criminal offence punishable by
imprisonment. To possess such material is also seditious and hence
6 2
criminal . The law also provides for the banning of any publi¬
cations (local or imported). The powers of control granted by this
law and the penal sanctions provided is serious enough to inter¬
fere greatly, if not completely bring to nothing the right and
freedom of expression, particularly the expression and communication
of political ideas. As Ghai and Mcauslan (1970) point out, these
powers are too wide and can be or have been used to prevent any
expression of socialist politics.
For example in 1969? the suppression of the KPU coincided with
the nationalisation (with the co-operation of the interests involved)
of oil refining, power supply and the banks. You will recall that
^The Books and Newspapers Act, Chapter III, Laws of Kenya,
Government Printer, Nairobi, 1967 (Rev.).
61
The Films and Stage Plays Act, No. 3b of 1962, now Chapter 222,
Laws of Kenya Government Printer, Nairobi. This Act does not
allow or provide for appeals to the Courts against censorship
(1967 Rev.).
6 2
The Penal Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya, Revised Edition,
Government Printer, Nairobi, 1970. Sections 52, 53 and 5^4->
pp. 3U-56.
Ibid especially Sections 52 and 53> pp. 32+—35-
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nationalisation was one of the KFU's main planks. It was therefore
no coincidence that the banning of the KPU coincided with the
government's arranged nationalisation of some very conspicuous
capitalist interests. The KFU was a response to the power of
foreign capital and indigenous capitalist development. The govern¬
ment therefore intended to obliterate this effect and the laws
controlling expression and communication were used to overplay the
government's "stage managed" public participation while under¬
playing its deliberate ban of the KPU. State intervention here was
in defence of long term capitalist interests rather than allow the
development of a strong socialist political activity which would
in the long run stand as a meaningful alternative to the capitalist
ideology of the State.
To crown the government's reliance on the use of law to sustain
its position the law of treason and the law of sedition were enacted
to cater for any social activity that may not be fully represented
in general law. Under the law of treason, it is treasonable for
a Kenyan citizen, whether residing in Kenya or not to "compass,
imagine, invent, devise or intend" the death, wounding or imprison¬
ment of the president or the deposing of him or overthrow of the
government by unlawful means so long as the intention is expressed
in some overt manner, with a penal sanction of either death or
£>)
imprisonment for life . The aim of this law is mainly to dis¬
courage any discourse, political or otherwise which may imply an
alternative system of government, implying a new social order.
.e Penal Code, op. cit. Sections 2+0, 2+2, 2+3 pp. 31-32.
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The law on sedition, although it has less severe penal sanction
is much more widely defined and hence more useful for general control.
The law on sedition, Section 56 of the Penal Code, states that it
is seditious for any person to do any act with a seditious intention
or to print or publish or sell or offer to sell any seditious
publication unless he had reason to believe that it was not seditious.
Seditious intention is defined as any intention to (a) overthrow
the government by unlawful means (notwithstanding that the various
amendments to the constitution and the criminalisation of the funda¬
mental rights and freedoms make virtually all available means of
changing the government lawfully, unlawful), (b) bring hatred or
contempt or excite disaffection against the person of the president
or the government^, (c) excite the inhabitants of Kenya to attempt
to procure the alteration by unlawful means of any matter, or thing
established by law and (d) any intention to bring into contempt
or excite disaffection among the inhabitants or promote feelings
of ill will or hostility between different sections of the population^
The law on sedition covers the application of the Books and News¬
papers Act (Cap III laws of Kenya) and provides for strict control
67
of what can and cannot be published . In relation to the funda¬
mental rights and freedoms, the law of sedition as it now stands
covers any political activity that implies opposition to the capit¬
alist mode of development including any criticism of the government
6d
See 1981 trial of Mr. Kikuyu, M.P. for sedition under this part
of the law. Weekly Review, April 17th, 1981, Nairobi.
66
The Penal Code op.cit. Section 56 pp. 36-37
67
The Penal Code op.cit. Section 57 PP« 38-39
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(strictly seditious or not). Its provision, that it is not necessary
to prove that any intention had any incitement to violence, or any
effect at all makes it all the more interesting. It is enough if
68
the intention is "likely" to have the effect - an aspect that
implies a deliberate act on the part of the government to criminal¬
ise all forms of political activity with the exception of those in
favour of neo-colonial capitalism, which further implies the sub¬
ordination of the fundamental rights and freedoms (as guaranteed
by the constitution) to criminal law. Thus criminal law, as it is
used here, acts as a legitimate tool, used by the state to redefine
its position during changing economic and political circumstances.
It also acts as a legitimate excuse, used by the state to justify
and legitimise its use of coercion. This means that criminal law,
as well as being an instrument for the optimal allocation of the
society's resources, is also a means for distributing guilt and
responsibility for what occurs.
6. General Implications
In this Chapter, we have been looking at a society that changed
rapidly from a settler dominated colonial capitalist structure to a
neo-colonial capitalist structure characterised by foreign and
indigenous capitalism. We have in the wider context of social
organisation and social change attempted to demonstrate how on the
one hand law was influenced by the changing political and socio¬
economic circumstances. On the other hand we attempted to demonstrate
68
The Penal Code op.cit. Section 56(2) p. 37 See also Ghai and
Mcauslan; Public Law and Political Change in Kenya, Oxford
University Press, Nairobi, 1970 pp. L(.66—i+7U» for a discussion
on the uses of law for general political control.
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how law contributed to the maintenance and development of the
emergent neo-colonial capitalist mode of production. In relation
to crime and social control, what does this entail?
In relation to general social control, the State's use of
law as it is demonstrated by the way law was used in independent
Kenya to develop and maintain a capitalist social structure char¬
acterised by foreign and indigenous capitalist classes demonstrates
several basic aspects of social control in capitalistic society;
(a) that the state in capitalistic society does not and cannot stand ab¬
ove societal conflicts, (b) that the uses of law in situations of
intense and rapid social change, especially in "developing" capi¬
talistic society, cannot function in a socio-technical nature and
(c) that in capitalistic society, a particularistic use of law
can discriminate against subordinate classes by adjusting class
relevant interests in a discriminatory way, especially in situations
where legislation is written with the special intention of regul¬
ating those types of conflicts that normally arise within the ruling
classes without taking into account the types of conflicts that
£
normally arise within the subordinate classes.
Independent Kenya was an emergent neo-colonial capitalist
society characterised by rapid social change involving significant
ideological differences. It was a society which had inherited from
colonial capitalism fundamental divisions based on economic classes.
Under such conditions, conflict was inevitable, the most prominent
being the competition for the control of the means of production
between the foreign capitalists and the emergent indigenous ruling
class on the one hand and between various ideologically differing
sections of the emergent ruling class on the other hand. The State,
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acting in the interests of the dominant means of production passed
laws designed to control through the application of state sanctioned
force those acts of the conflicting groups that ran counter to the
established mode of production. Thus state protection through the
law for the various capitalist classes became a significant aspect
of neo-colonial capitalist development in Kenya.
For example the protection of foreign investment through the
1961+ Foreign Investment Act, the setting up of parastatals to
finance indigenous capitalist development and the introduction of
trade licensing were all aimed at guaranteeing the existence and
maintenance of the neo-colonial capitalist mode of development. The
role of the State not only in guaranteeing the existing mode of
production but also in serving the interests of the dominant capi¬
talist classes becomes open when we examine state intervention
through the use of law to regulate intra-ruling class conflicts.
The way the State used law to suppress the KF1J and to control
trade union activity of any political nature demonstrates the close
relationship between the State, as the most obvious ideological
symbol of the existing mode of production and the capitalist classes.
For example, the various amendments to the constitution, the
preservation of public security laws, the public order laws, laws
on treason and sedition, and the introduction of licensing for
trade union and political activity were not only aimed at guarantee¬
ing the mode of production itself, but had an additional aim of
guaranteeing the existence of the indigenous capitalist class. All
these laws and the particularistic way in which they were used
demonstrates that the State in capitalistic society does not and
cannot stand above societal conflicts. It also points to a more open
168.
and severe use of law with a significant impact on the positions
of the different social classes.
For example, in our discussion on social stratification in
neo-colonial Kenya, we noted that the society is structured into
two main classes; the peasantry and the indigenous capitalist class.
An examination of the laws we have examined here reveals that
nearly all, with the exception of those laws aimed at the establish¬
ment of rural capitalism, were aimed at controlling the types of
conflicts that occurred within the indigenous ruling class with
virtually no reference to the types of conflicts arising within
the peasant class. The use of law in this sense amounts to dis¬
crimination against the subordinated peasant class. This demon¬
strates that the seeming neutrality of the State in capitalist
society is an illusion which quickly disappears when tested against
a "developing" capitalist background.
In relation to crime, the particularistic use of law in neo-
colonial capitalist society demonstrates that the State's social
control machinery (especially in the capitalist state) and its
chief purpose of maintaining the dominant mode of production plays
a crucial role in the creation of crime. The criminalisation of
activities and acts that run counter to the interests of those who
control the political machinery of the State is a clear demonstn-
ation that crime is functionally dependent on a given social order.
In this sense crime becomes a historically specific phenomenon which
cannot be meaningfully explained outside its historical specificity.
Thus in capitalistic society, crime is a fundamental condition of
capitalistic social life since those conditions of which it is a
169.
part form the central core of capitalist society's morality and
law.
In the next chapter, we shall examine mundane criminal
control in Kenya in the context of colonial and neo-colonial
capitalist development.
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In the foregoing Chapters, we attempted an historically specific
analysis of crime and social control. Looking first at traditional
social control, we argued that crime is a historically specific
phenomenon which is inseparably dependent on social control, espec¬
ially law and its implied notion of the State - hence its absence
in "Stateless" society. In our analysis of crime and social control
in colonial and neo-colonial developing capitalist structures in
Kenya, we attempted to demonstrate how on the one hand law is
influenced by development in the prevailing mode of production and
how on the other hand law contributed to the maintenance and develop¬
ment of the capitalist mode of production. In this respect, we
argued that crime is a consequence of social control, which in turn
is subject to contingent political and socio-economic processes. In
view of the stark and repressive nature of social control in the
Kenyan situation, and by extension to "developing" capitalist
structures in general, we came to the conclusion that any meaningful
explanation cf crime must of necessity take into account the relation¬
ship between crime and social control, especially the role law in
general and criminal law in particular plays in the creation and
maintenance of specific social structures and its consequences for
the general social fabric. This, we argued, was indispensable to
any analysis of crime in the wider context of social organisation
and social change. Thus with special reference to Kenya, we attemp¬
ted to establish that there is no behaviour that is in itself
essentially criminal, but that crime is functionally dependent on a
given social order. Taking into account our previous observation
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that social control, especially law mirrors the political and socio¬
economic relationships in existence in particular social structures
and considering the historical and specific nature of socio-legal
control, we shall examine in this chapter the general rate of crime
in Kenya. In the wider context of social organisation, we shall
begin with the premise that official statistics of crime in Kenya
are the end product of the existing capitalist system of social con¬
trol and that as such, we cannot separate them from what entails
criminal behaviour as it is defined in this thesis. In this sense,
we shall examine them in terms of the conditions and instruments of
their production. We would like to note here that ours is not a
search for the amount of crime in Kenya. Our concern here is an
attempt to reveal something of the nature of the rate of those
persons who were differentiated as criminal at certain periods
during the colonial and neo-colonial capitalist system of control.
Ours, we may say, is a search for what particular systems of control
actually do i.e. record rather than what they are supposed to do
during particular historical periods.
CRIME STATISTICS
Starting from the most general, the uses of official statistics
of deviance and the controversies associated with their use have
been an ongoing debate for a relatively long time. Since Quetelet,
Guerry and others wrote about them in the early nineteenth century,
much has been written about their possible uses and the limitations
associated with their use. However, since it is not possible within
the scope of this thesis to consider in detail all the existing
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material on the subject, we shall here focus our attention to what
is central to most of them. The argument that official statistics
of crime do not and cannot reflect the "actual" or "real" rate of
criminal behaviour in any given situation and its associated assump¬
tion that official statistics of crime provide little of any
theoretical value.
Underlying the long standing debate about the limitations of
official statistics of crime are two basic arguments; an empirical
argument dealing mainly with the production of rates and an ideo¬
logical one dealing mainly with the interpretation of already exist¬
ing rates and their relevance to sociological research. According
to Hindess (1973) these arguments boil down to two concerns; the
concern with the making and recording of observations and the con¬
cern with the processing and assemblying of statistical materials
out of observer's reports. In relation to these concerns it has
been argued that official statistics of deviance "do not and cannot
correspond to the structure of "real-world" objects and events and
that they cannot be taken as a more or less reliable account of some
1
real situation" . This has led to a tendency to shy away from
official statistics of crime and its control on the grounds that
they are unscientific or simply measures of highly diverse and
2
complex social interaction . Hence the claim that official statist¬
ics of crime, as the most visible portion of the extent of crime
does not reflect the true incidence of crime and is thus of little
1
B. Hindess; The Use of Official Statistics in Sociology - A Critic
of Positivism and Ethnomethodology. The Macmillan Press Ltd.,
London, 1973» P« 1U-
2
I. Taylor, P. Walton and J. Young (ed.); Critical Criminology.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975? P-33-
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or no value to the development of criminological theory .
This basic limitation of crime statistics has been blamed on
many factors, the most basic being that the beliefs held about the
nature of deviance and its consequences for the way offences become
known limits the applicability of what is recorded as an accurate
indication of the extent of penally sanctionable behaviour^. In
this sense it has been argued that these statistics are not based on
a straight forward relationship between crime occurrence and public
knowledge of it - hence hidden crime, variously referred to as "the
Dark Figure"^ or the "iceberg phenomenon"^. Consequently, official
statistics of deviance are rejected or dismissed as unreliable
because they do not record the so called "actual" rate of deviant
behaviour. By implication, their usefulness in the examination of
what the system of criminal justice actually does in the wider con¬
text of social organisation and control is lost in the search for
"hidden" crime based more often than not on the assumption that
certain behaviour is always deviant independent of the social actions
that define it as deviant. Thus the way in which official statistics
of crime, especially in capitalist society, reveal the highly
patterned and we may also argue the class nature of society and its
law enforcement and also something of the patterned nature of the
7
crimes committed becomes obliterated .
3
T. Morris; Deviance and Control - The Secular Heresy. Hutchinson
and Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London, 1976, pp. 63, 75.
^Ibid. p. 61
%.H. McClintock (undated) Heport Presented at the Institute of
Criminology, Cambridge, IJ.E.
^T. Morris; Deviance and Control, op.cit. p. 61
n
I. Taylor, P. Walton and J. Young (eds.); Critical Criminology,
op.cit. pp. 33, 3i+.
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According to Kitsuse and Cicourel (19^3)» the "rates of deviant
behaviour are produced by the actions taken by persons in the social
system which define, classify and record certain behaviours as
Q
deviant" . This being the case, the examination of official stat¬
istics of crime cannot be separated from the question of how differ¬
ent forms of behaviour come to be defined as deviant. In this sense,
the appropriateness of the statistics i.e. whether they are approp¬
riately organised or not, does not arise since the purpose of using
them would be to explain rates of crime as they are perceived within
the social structure under investigation, rather than the forms of
deviance behaviour. In this context, criminal statistics represent
a record of the numbers of those who have been differentiated as
variously deviant at different levels of control rather than a
record of criminal behaviour per se. Hence the successive layers of
error in the rate producing process, that pre-occupy most explana¬
tions of the limitations of these statistics do not necessarily
make them unreliable, unless of course one assigns self-evident
9
status to them .
Thus crime statistics or official records of deviant behav¬
iour should be seen as the product of the socially organised acti¬
vities of particular social structures. In this sense as Kitsuse
and Gicourel (1963) point out, rates of crime become more of an
indice of organisational processes rather than an indice of the
evidence of certain forms of behaviour. In this respect, criminal
statistics cannot be examined as mere givens to be taken as they are
Q
J.I. Kitsuse and A.V. Cicourel; A Note on the Uses of Official




or else dismissed as inadequate. Instead, they should be examined
or analysed as products of particular social systems. Hence like
all social products, as Hindess (1973) points out, criminal statist¬
ics should be examined in terms of the conditions and instruments
of their production rather than a more or less accurate represent¬
ative of some "real" state of affairs. This would lead to the use
of criminal statistics as "evidence of the underlying trends occurr-
10
ing in the wider social structure" . Underlying this would be the
assumption that recorded crime patterns should be understood as a
reflection of existing society, rather than as indicators of the
amount of crime in society. Thus the question to be asked in
assessing the usefulness of criminal statistics is not to what
extent these represent the "real" or "actual" crime situation, but
rather to what extent they reveal "the class-organised practice of
criminal and legal systems - in pointing to the disjunction between
the imaginery (ideological) social order and the real social order
- in the same way that expose criminology usefully demasks the moral
11
front of the powerful controllers of such an order"
In this sense, all crime, whether reported or not, prosecuted
or not would become a real feature (rather than a limitation) of a
society involved in what Taylor, Walton and Young (1975) describe
as the struggle for property, wealth and economic aggrandisement.
This would shift the emphasis traditionally placed oh the limitations
of official criminal statistics from the "mere collection of further
empirical data to the construction of theories which make sense of
10





the (measurable or not-so-easily measurable) changes in the struct-
12
ure of social control, law and crime" . This would inevitably
involve an analysis of criminal statistics in any given situation
in the wider context of social organisation and social change.
With this in mind, we now turn to mundane criminal control in
Kenya.
GRIME CONTROL IN KENYA
The administration of criminal justice in Kenya dates back to
the introduction of colonial rule itself. It was in 1897» when the
administration criminal justice was given the force of law by the
1 31897 East African Order in Council . This marked the beginning of
a legal system based on a tripartite division of subordinate courts;
the Native (African), the Muslim and the colonial courts which were
administered by administrative officers (as far as non-whites were
concerned) and magistrates. This tripartite court system was
augmented by a dual system of Superior Courts; Her Majesty's Court
for East African (with provision for appeals to the privy council)
and a Chief Native Court (with provision for appeals in a local High
"1 )
Court) . In 1902, under the East African Regulations No. 12, the
1 ^189U Indian Penal Code became effective in East Africa . The intro¬
duction of the Indian penal code marked the beginning of custodial
12Ibid. p. 37-
1 3JSee the 1897 East African Order in Council No. 575* See also
Native Courts Regulations 1897» E.A.P.Go Orders and Regulations
Volume I p. 63.
1^For further discussion on the historical development of the Admini¬
stration of Justice in Kenya see Y. Ghai and J.P.W.B. Mcauslan,
Public Law and Political Change in Kenya - A Study of The Legal
Framework of Government from Colonial times to the present. Oxford
University Press, Nairobi, 1970, Chapter IV.
15
As far as Kenya was concerned, the I89I4 Indian Penal Code was
amended and repealed at various periods and now stands as the Penal
Code, Chapter 63, Laws of Kenya. Revised Edition 1970 (19&2).
Government Printer, Nairobi.
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treatment for offenders, thus introducing imprisonment (hitherto
1 6 1 1unknown) as a penal sanction . The Prison's Ordinance No. 13
provided for the establishment of custodial institutions and this to
a large extent made imprisonment a central trunk in the administration
of criminal justice in Kenya. Prom then on , imprisonment began to
play an almost exclusive role.
This trend tends to find its support in the penal code. A
18
general examination of the Kenyan Penal Code reveals that for
almost all the stated offences, imprisonment is almost exclusively
the prescribed punishment and that this is so despite the provision
19
of alternative punishments in the same code which do not find any
provision in the prescription of punishment. This is further suppor-
20
ted by the introduction of confinement for young offenders . The
continued use of Detention Camps, introduced in Kenya under the 1925
Detention Camps Ordinance No. XXV21 also strengthened this view.
Although detention camps were associated with colonialism, especi-
ially during the Emergency years 1952-1958, their continued use after
22
independence demonstrates the centrality of custodial treatment and
16
See A. Milner (ed.) African Penal Systems. Routledge and Kegan
Paul, London, , pp. 102-118.
^See also Prison Ordinance No. 26 of 1918 and Nos. 31 of 1921
and 15 of 1922.
18
See generally the Penal Code, op.cit.
1^See the Penal Code op.cit. Sections 2i+, 25, 26a, 27, 28-35-
20
The Borstal Institutions Act, 1963. Chapter 92, Laws of Kenya
(Revised 1967). Government Printer, Nairobi.
21
The Detention Camps Ordinance No. XXV of 1925* Chapter 80 Laws
of Kenya, 19^+8.
22
See the Detention Camps Act, Chapter 91• Laws of Kenya (Revised
1967). Government Printer, Nairobi.
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also demonstrates a reluctance on the part of the neo-colonial
administration, to break away from the colonial pattern of crimin¬
al justice administration. This is not surprising though when
viewed in the wider context of colonial and neo-colonial social
organisation. You will recall how through the use of law the colo¬
nial capitalist mode of development and control was transformed
into a neo-colonial capitalist mode of development and control. You
will also recall how Kenyatta^ (the first President of Kenya)
attempted to replicate the colonial administrative structure during
the formative years of the neo-colonial capitalist State. Viewed
in this context, the continuation of the colonial system of criminal
justice into the neo-colonial situation does fit in with the new
set of relationships found in the neo-colonial capitalist structure.
Examined in the background of capitalist development in general, it
tends to support Rusche and Kercheimer's (1939) contention that the
deprivation of liberty is the main characteristic of penal sanctions
in capitalistic society.
In the following discussion we shall attempt an examination of
crime rates in Kenya from 19^4-3-1977 • The period 19^3-19^3 was
characterised by intense colonial activity to consolidate settler
colonial agrarian capitalism. As we noted in Chapter Three, social
control, especially law was used in an open and stark manner to
achieve this purpose. At the same time, this period saw the beginn¬
ings of intense and organised African agitation against settler
economic and political dominance. However, the Africans .could not
23̂See discussion in Chapter Pour.
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express their demands and opinions openly due to State control of
African political organisation. As a result, African opinion
found its expression, not in the legislative council (Africans
were not represented here), hut in underground secret societies.
The failure of the colonial constitutional system to recognise and
accommodate African "legitimate" demands led to the outbreak of
"Mau Mau" which brought about a State of Emergency in 1952^.
The Emergency Period, which can be said to have lasted until
1960, with their consequences for the administration of criminal
justice lingering on until about 1962, was characterised by the
suspension of normal colonial constitutional activity with broad
powers of control being invested on the Commissioner. Ghai and
Mcauslan (1970) argue that this period saw the enactment of an over¬
whelming amount of repressive legislation, for instance, the setting
up of emergency camps and villages, arrest without warrants and the
suspension of the normal colonial law and procedure regulations,
most of which affect the legal system and the administration of just¬
ice. This increase in repressive legislation saw an increase in
military, police and Court activity which resulted in an increase in
the number of those being arrested and/or convicted, and committed
to prison, detention camps and Emergency camps. For example
^"Mau Mau" was a secret African organisation or movement which
advocated the use of force to achieve political and economic
aims. For an example of the way the colonial administration
dealt with Mau Mau suspects, see J.M. Kariuki; Mau Mau Detainee.
Oxford University Press, London, 1963* See also C. Rosberg and
J. Nottingham; The myth of Mau Mau. Pall Mall, London, 1966.
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during the period 1953-''957» an annual average of 105,070 persons
were committed to prisons, detention camps and emergency camps, an
increase of 69,156 over the previous five year period. In spite of
this however, African political agitation continued and led to
significant political changes which eventually led to independence
(nominal) in 1963. The period 1963-1977 mark the first fifteen
years of neo-colonial capitalist development. It is within this
context of colonial and neo-colonial capitalist development that
we shall examine the rates of crime in Kenya. We shall restrict
ourselves to an examination of existing official records of crime
rates. It is important to note here that ours is not an examin¬
ation of the amount of crime in colonial and neo-colonial Kenyan
capitalist society. Ours is an examination of the rates of crime
(official) in the wider context of colonial and neo-colonial capit¬
alist social control. In view of the centrality of custodial
treatment in the Kenyan criminal justice system, we shall in this
thesis, restrict our analysis to the rates of those persons who were
processed, convicted and sentenced to some form of custodial treat¬
ment. We shall examine these rates in the same classification as
they occur in the official records. These fall mainly into five
groupings; those dealing with general trends, those showing the age,
sex and sentencing patterns and the recidivism rates.
CRIME RATES
1• General Trends
During the period 191+3-1977, a total of 2,1+97,358 persons were
arrested, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for various
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offences under the penal code and under city and municipal bye-laws.
Out of this number, 5b% were sentenced to detention camps and extra¬
mural penal employment and the remaining 1+6% were sentenced to
imprisonment in other penal institutions - mainly prisons. The
annual average population in custody during this period was 71,353*
As Table 2 and Figure 1 demonstrate, the periods 1958-62 and 1968-72
accounted for the highest number of recorded offenders with an
annual average population of 97>153 and. 103,299 respectively. The
reasons for this occurrence appear to be mainly political. The
period 1958-62 mark the last years of the "Bnergency" as well as
the beginning of open African political activity. It was during
this period when the most rapid constitutional changes (eventually
culminating in independence in 1963) were taking place. It was
also during this period when the most acrimonious discussions about
the future role of the settlers in Kenya were taking place. Since
the colonial government with its characteristic bias in favour of
the settlers was still in control, its activities in mopping up
the last pockets of "Mau Mau" resistance seem to have been mirrored
in the records of those sentenced to imprisonment.
There is a parallel of the political activity during this period
and that of 1968-72. During this period, the K.P.U. revolt was at
its highest. Consequently, the high record of those sentenced to
custody seems to reflect the activities of those in power to re¬
establish their appearance of authority and control rather than an
increase in crime per se. Hence we may argue here that the various
crime rates in Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 1 are more of a reflection
of an authority struggling to present a semblance of power and
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control during situations of rapid social change and threatening
political circumstances.
In the context of Kenya's colonial and neo-colonial development,
a closer examination of these rates tend to support the above
argument in the sense that they do not show any significant differ¬
ences between those rates produced during the colonial period
62 and those produced during the neo-colonial period (Table 2 and
Figure 1). Moreover, as Figure 1 demonstrates, the trend was towards
an increase rather than decrease during both periods. This tends
to support our argument in Chapters Three and Four about the role
law in general and criminal law in particular played in the contin¬
uation and maintenance of the capitalist mode of development after
independence. These rates also tend to demonstrate the centrality
of a particularistic use of criminal law in the capitalist system
of social control and much more so in situations of rapid social
change involving intense social conflict. These rates also tend to
reflect the structure of control in existence at particular histori¬
cal periods.
For example, an examination of Table 3 a-nh Figure 1 reveals
that the emergency period, especially 1958-62, saw the highest
concentration of convicted persons, in particular those sentenced
to detention camps. During this period as we mentioned earlier,
normal colonial constitutional activity was suspended and the contain¬
ment of "Mau Mau" - hence political control was at its most intense.
Detention camps proved the most convenient institutions for the
control of "Mau Mau" suspects since they did not require elaborate
185.
25
and time consuming legal procedures . The average population
for those in detention camps during this period 1958-62 was 68,570
as compared to 28,583 for those in other penal institutions (prisons).
However, it is important to note here that the trend changed after
independence in 1963• In an effort to obliterate the colonial image
without abandoning the colonial capitalist mode of development, the
neo-colonial authority shifted the emphasis away from detention
26
camps (without discarding their use) in favour of prisons and
extra-mural Penal Employment camps. As we have already noted, this
27
shift appears most marked in 1968-72 and interestingly coincides
with the banning of the K.P.U., the effective application of the
28
Public Order legislation and intense political activity on the
part of the neo-colonial authority to establish a semblance of
political control and authority through the exclusive use of custo-
29
dial treatment for mundane crime. The absence in the official
records of any detailed information on the type of offences committed
by those sentenced tends to lend weight to the proposition that the
aim was not to control crime, but to portray a public order image.
25





See discussion in Chapter L|..
29
See generally K. Ndeti; Differential Deprivation and the Patterns
of Criminal Behaviour in Kenya. Seminar Paper. Department of
Sociology, University of Nairobi, October, 1971. See also
R.P. Abreo, (J.J. Wambua (ed.)). The Historical Review of the
Kenya Prisons Service. Government Printer, Nairobi, 1972, p.29.
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Muga (1975)j taking a sample of 29,820 offenders out of the
[4.6,039 convicted and sentenced to prison (not detention camps)
in Kenya in 1970, points out that 50% had committed offences against
property, 35% offences against the person and 15% other unspecified
offences under the penal code. The urban areas accounted for 1+3%
of this number whereas the rural areas accounted for 57% ♦ However,
considering that the urban areas account for only 20% of the total
Kenyan population, the impression given here is that the urban areas
account for most of the crime rates found in Kenya. Moreover, given
the still traditional nature of control in the rural areas, the
concentration of offender rates in the urban areas tends to support
the assumption that the political semblance of authority is much
more effective when demonstrated in the urban areas. This seems to




Out of a total of 1,12+1,5^+3 persons convicted and committed
to prisons (not detention camps), 85% were men and 15% women. As
we note in Table i;, this difference was highly significant P > 0.05
(Chi test) implying that there was a general tendency (deliberate
or otherwise) during the colonial and neo-colonial periods to arrest,
convict and commit women into custody. This reflects the general
capitalist tendency which can only be meaningfully understood with=
in the context of capitalist social organisation.
For example in Kenya, during the colonial period and to a
large extent during the neo-colonial period the chief characteristic
of the "developing" capitalist social structure was the competition
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for the control of the means of production. The most visible
symbol of this competition was the control of both land and labour
with the struggle for the control of labour being the most signifi¬
cant. The deliberate exclusion of women from control served to
stabilise the regulation and cost of labour (especially during the
colonial period) in that they ensured the continuation of the
subsistence economy which was necessary for the development of the
colonial and neo-colonial class structured economy. It is import¬
ant to note here that in spite of the relatively minimal effects
of the control system on women (with reference to criminal control),
the rate of conviction for women, like that of men does show an
upward trend. For a comparison between the two, see Table 1;. The
demonstrated increase in the rate of women offenders tends to re¬
flect the greater integration of the female population into the
capitalist mode of production. It also reflects a gradual but
definite shift in favour of capitalist social stratification and a
decline of the traditional system of control which tended to protect
women against the consequences of the capitalist mode of social
control. As we shall show in the following section, these consequen¬
ces are most conspicuously reflected by the number of offenders in
their early productive years.
3- Age Differentials
Out of a total of 1,11+3,51+3 persons convicted and sentenced to
30
custody in prisons during 191+3-1977, b&% were aged 15-25 years ,
•^As classified by the Department of Prisons, Nairobi.
188.
1*7% between 26-50 years and 5% over 50 years. According to these
figures, 95% of those committed to prison were in their early
productive years. Ndeti (1977) in bis analysis of economic depri¬
vation and its relationship with crime patterns during 196I4.-68
makes similar observations. In his analysis he points out that
those sentenced to imprisonment during this period were mainly
young adults - 1*2.9% falling between the ages of 15 and 25 years.
This on its own may not be significant. However, its significance
is revealed when we examine those trends in the context of the
wider social control system. As Figure 2 demonstrates, during periods
of rapid change and intense social conflict, the number of those
arrested and sentenced to imprisonment tends to suddenly increase.
The increase as the same Graph demonstrates tends to involve the
mainly young and male members of the population.
For example during 1953-57> there is an obvious upward kick
(figure 2) in the number of offenders falling between 15-25 years
and a similar kick in the category of those aged between 26-50 years.
As we have mentioned elsewhere in this discussion, this period marks
the first five years of the "Emergency". Hence there seems to be
a direct correlation between the anti- "Mau Mau" control measures
and the number of those processed and sentenced to imprisonment.
Predictably the measures were directed against those most likely
to join the "Mau Mau" - the young and mainly male members of the
population.
A similar pattern appears during the 1973-77 period but for
slightly different reasons. During the "Mau Mau" period political
control was the chief characteristic of the control system. In
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1973-77j economic and to a certain extent socio-political control
"became the chief characteristic. According to the ILO (1972),
the early 70's were characterised by high unemployment, especially
among the young school-leavers who according to the 1969 Population
Census comprised the bulk of the 12 million population. This as
Saikwa (1972a) observes, appears to coincide with a major admini¬
strative campaign on "Law and Order". The high representation of
the young in the prison population (Table 5 and Figure 2) tend to
reflect these socio-economic and political conditions. In this
sense crime rates as such do not exist, but what exists is a pro¬
duct in the form of offender rates of the organised activities of
the existing system of control. Outside this context, these rates
become meaningless and hence lose their usefulness as analytical
material in the study of crime in its historical specificity. This
view seems to find support in the Kenyan sentencing pattern.
U. Sentencing Pattern
Earlier in this chapter, we made some reference to the cen-
trality of custodial treatment for offenders in the Kenyan crimin¬
al justice system. Jackson (1978), commenting on the trend towards
a completely exclusive use of custodial criminal control notes that
the practice was becoming entrenched by legislative action in favour
of statutory sentences. In his analysis of the sentencing system,
he endeavours through a synthesis of the bias in favour of custo¬
dial treatment to draw attention to the "political" nature of its
use. Saikwa (1976) commenting on the role of penal institutions
31
Saikwa was Commissioner of Prisons in Kenya I96J4-78.
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in crime control argues that the structure of crime control as it
is demonstrated, by the exclusive use of imprisonment for convicted
persons, does not seem to bear any relevance to the nature of crime
in any given Kenyan situation. Underlying these observations is
the view that these rates are not indicators of either the nature
or the amount of crime in Kenya. Rather, they are a reflection
of the organised activities of the system of social control for
the sole pupose of maintaining a semblance of law and order.
Moreover, the excessive use of such short sentences as the
Kenyan case demonstrates in Tables 6, 1, 8 and Figure 3 speaks more
of a system struggling for socio-economic and political control
rather than an organised effort in dealing with the so called
"crime problem".
For example, out of the 1,11+3,543 persons convicted and
sentenced to custody in prisons, during the period 19^-3-77 > 15%
received sentences ranging from under one month to six months.
Twenty percent were sentenced for just over six months to 36 months
and only 5% received sentences exceeding 36 months. The pattern
repeats itself when the categories for men and women are examined
separately (Tables 7 and. 8). As Figure 3 demonstrates, the excess¬
ive use of short sentences (under six months) raises great doubts
as to its value as either an indicator of crime or its seriousness
and calls more for an examination of its usefulness within the wider
context of social organisation and control. In the context of col¬
onial and neo-colonial social organisation and social change, the
sentencing structure appears to be more of a reflection of admini¬
strative control and hence an indicator of the organised activities
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of the overall control system. In this sense, it can only be
■understood as a part and parcel of the wider social structure.
For example, during the colonial period rehabili¬
tation and treatment was not so much a factor in the control
of offenders. However, after Independence, the situation changed.
As Saikwa (1972a) and (1972b) points out, rehabilitation and treat¬
ment (involving spiritual transformation) became a factor in the
law and order campaign - hence the appearance of recidivist rates
in 1965 (see Section 5 below). This demonstrates that we cannot
examine official crime rates as though they are independent vari¬
ables to be accepted or rejected on their own right. Consequently
any analysis of these rates which does not take into account their
relationship with the system of control is as barren as any analysis
that takes crime as though it were a constant variable to be found
in all societies at all times.
5. Recidivism
An examination of the available information on recidivism shows
32
that the average rate of recidivism for serious offences is y/o
and the rate for first offenders for serious offences is L\%- It is
however not possible Id calculate the general recidivism rate for
all offences since the above percentage refers only to those arrested
and convicted for the third and subsequent times. The available
information does not give any separate category for those sentenced
for the second time for serious offences neither does it provide a
32
A serious offence is interpreted as one for which the sentence
imposed is two years or more. See Annual Report, Treatment of
Offenders, 1970, p. 20. Republic of Kenya, Government Printer,
Nairobi.
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separate category for recidivism for minor offences and for those
sentenced to Detention Camps and Extra Mural Penal employment.
Below is a comparison of the rate of recidivism for serious offences
and the rate of first offenders for the period 1965-1977* There is










Period number No. % of total No. % No. %
1965 35,961 1,1+26 b 1,765 5 32,770 91
66 32,275 1,329 b 1,651 5 32,295 91
67 38,027 1,662 b 1,962 5 3l+, 1+03 91
68 39,562 1,782 5 1,610 1+ 36,170 91
69 1+1,199 1,573 1+ 1,855 5 37,771 91
70 1+6,039 1,207 3 1,1+69 3 1+3,363 91+
71 56,61+8 1,193 2 1,660 3 53,795 95
72 bk,791 1,1+62 3 2,206 5 1+1,123 92
73 1+6,690 970 2 1,937 1+ 1+3,783 91+
7b 51,611 1,595 3 2,315 b 1+7,701 93
75 59,381 1,61+3 3 2,937 5 51+,801 92
76 68,672 1,608 2 2,801+ b 61+, 260 91+
77 65,700 1,1+80 2 2,1+90 2 61,750 96
193 ♦
CONCLUSION
In the wider context of social organisation and social change,
the Kenyan case demonstrates that official crime statistics, as the
end product of the existing system of social control, do not and
cannot represent an indice (adequate or otherwise) of the amount of
crime in society. This being the case, they cannot be separated
from what entails crime as it is defined in this thesis. This in
itself may not be significant. However, viewed in the context of
criminological theory and its application to the analysis of crime,
especially in the "Third World", it does assume some significance.
What we mean here is that official crime statistics or any other
crime statistics for that matter do not and cannot stand as inde¬
pendent variables capable of analysis outside the social, political
and economic environment in which they find their expression. Like
crime, as it is defined in this thesis, crime statistics, be they
♦
official or non-official are intricately tied up with the society's
social control structure. Consequently, viewed on their own with¬
out reference to their relationship with the social control system,
they present little of any criminological value. However, viewed
in the wider context of social organisation and social change, they
become useful in the analysis of "the society's social control
structure and its consequences for the general social fabric.
In the following chapter, we shall examine the general impli¬
cations of crime and social control (as we have seen it in this
thesis) on criminological thinking especially its application to
the "Third World".
19l+.
Table 2 Convicted Persons in 19U3—1977 ? General distribution.









Source - Records held at Prisons Headquarters, Nairobi,
1980
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191+3-1+7 71,178 1l+, 236 58,957 11,791
1924.8—52 92,2+93 18,1+99 87,079 17,1+16
1953-57 183,600 36,720 163,526 32,705
1958-62 31+2,851 68,570 11+2,915 28,583
1963-67 269,373 53,875 170,773 31+, 155
1968-72 288,251; 57,651 228,239 1+5,61+8
1972-77 106,066 21,213 292,051+ 58,1+11
Total 1,353,815 38,680 1,11+3,51+3 32,672
Source: Records held at Prisons Headquarters, Nairobi, 1980.
Note: The differences between the two categories were highly-
significant at the 0.05 level of significance = 200,
D.P = 6
o
The method used to calculate the was that devised
by Snedecor and Irwin (1933)•
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Table 4 Sex differentials of convicted and committed to Prisons.
Men Women
Period No. Average No. Average
19U3-1+7 56,314+ 5,122 2,561 512
19U8-52 81,773 16,355 5,236 1,047
1953-57 123,960 24,792 38,471 7,694
1958-62 121,1+80 24,296 21,088 4,218
1963-67 11+3,082 286,164 27,481 5,496
1968-72 192,281 384,562 35,910 7,182
1972-77 255,425 51,085 36,606 7,321
Total 974,345 64,956 167,353 11,158
Source: Records held at Prisons Headquarters, Nairobi, 1980.
Note: The differences between the men and women rates was
highly significant at the 0.0$ level of significance
X2 = 1+6, D.P = 6
The method used to calculate the was that devised
by Snedecor and Irwin (1933)•
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Table 5 Age Differentials
Period 15-25 years 26-50 years Over 50 years Total
1943-1+7 18,408 39,880 669 58,957
1948-52 30,461 55,481 1,137 87,079
1953-57 115,721 43,953 3,852 163,526
1958-62 79,573 58,367 4,975 142,915
1963-67 73,081 89,651 8,041 170,773
1968-72 96,634 119,287 12,318 228,239
1973—77 140,551 132,502 18,991 292,054
Total 554,439 539,121 49,983 1,143,543
Average 15,841 15,403 1,428 32,672
Source: Records held at Prisons Headquarters, Nairobi, 1980.
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Table 6 Sentencing Pattern
Period 0-6 months 6-36 months Over 36 months Total
191+3-47 42,936 14,038 1,983 58,957
1948-52 63,658 20,184 3,237 87,079
1953-57 94,001 43,197 5,717 142,915
1958-62 114,598 46,378 9,797 170,773
1963-72 183,226 33,079 11,934 228,239
1973—77 239,947 38,935 13,172 292,054
Total 856,679 224,502 62,362 1,143,543
Average 24,476 6,414 1,782 32,672
Source: Records held at Prisons Headquarters, Nairobi, 1980.
199.
Table 7 Sentencing Pattern - convicted men.
Period 0-6 months 6-36 months Over 36 months Total
19U3-1+7 39,862 11+,1+39 2,01+3 56,31+1+
191+8-52 58,820 19,780 3,173 81,773
1953-57 71+,972 33,1+76 15,512 123,960
1958-62 73,957 1+1,931+ 5,589 121,1+80
1963-67 87,938 1+5,626 9,518 11+3,082
1968-72 11+8,299 32,202 11,780 192,281
1973-77 202,635 39,831 12,959 255,1+25
Total 686,1+83 227,288 60,571+ 97l+,3l+5
Average 19,611+ 6,1+91+ 1,730 27,838
Source: Records held at Prison Headquarters, Nairobi, 1980.
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Table 8 Sentencing Pattern - convicted women
Period 0-6 months 6-36 months Over 36 months Total
191+3-1+7 2,31+0 119 22 2,561
191+8-52 1+,819 389 28 5,236
1953-57 35,261 2,396 811+ 38,1+71
1958-62 19,827 1,170 91 21,088
1963-67 26,207 1,187 87 27,1+81
1968-72 31+, 989 766 155 35,910
1973-77 35,1+01 1,101 101+ 36,606
Total 158,81+1+ 7,208 1,301 167,353
Average 1+, 538 206 37 1+, 781
Source: Records held at Prison Headquarters, Nairobi, 1980.
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In this thesis, we have attempted as it were a synthesis
of the historical specificity of social control and hence of crime
in the wider context of social organisation and social change.
Taking social control as our point of departure, and in our assump¬
tion that a meaningful explanation of crime is only possible within
an appreciation of the relationship between crime and social control,
especially the role law in general and criminal law in particular
plays in the creation and development of specific social structures,
we argued that crime is a historically specific phenomenon,
inseparably dependent on social control. In this sense we attempted
to demonstrate that crime is not a universal phenomenon comparable
to "primitive" and "civilised" societies and neither is it compar¬
able to'"developed" and "developing" capitalist societies. Hence
our contention that crime, as it is defined in this thesis, is
functionally dependent on a given social order. This necessarily
entails an examination of whether comparative analyses of crime
are possible and if so, what kind of analytical models are capable
of comparative application, especially with reference to the so called
"Third World".
The question of comparative analysis in criminology is char¬
acterised by several different points of view. First there is
the "total uniqueness" view which maintains that societies are
"entities unto themselves" - hence they are incapable of cross-
cultural analysis. Secondly there is the "objectivist" view which
maintains that "every item in any given society has a parallel in
other societies and that the items may be treated as if they were
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the same in each comparative exercise" . Thirdly there is the
middle range view - what Robertson and Taylor (1973) refer to as
the comparative - analytic "benchmark" approach which maintains that
it is possible to conduct comparative analysis by developing con¬
cepts and generalisations "at a level between what is true of all
societies and what is true of one society at one point in time and
p
space" . In this sense, and through a synthesis of the limitations
of comparative analyses on deviance and social control, Robertson
and Taylor (1973) endeavour to move away from the question of
whether comparative analysis is possible or not to the more signi¬
ficant question of what type of models are capable of cross-cultural
application.
Informed more by their awareness that social control, espec¬
ially law is not a transcendent entity to which non-deviants orient
in a unitary fashion, Robertson and Taylor (1973) reject as in¬
adequate the use of models or approaches which treat crime as though
it were a relatively constant phenomenon. Underlying their argument
is the assumption that legal characteristics across cultures do not
3
and cannot occur in a "Standard Sequential Order" . In this con¬
text, they maintain that the location of examples of criminal
behaviour in one society does not provide an automatic warrant for
its juxtaposition with phenomena in different societies. Consequently
1
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they reject as inadequate the indiscriminate application of con¬
cepts or models derived from particular social situations on alien
and different social situations^". Thus they reject, not the
possibility of comparative analysis per se, but the use of "wrong"
or irrelevant models in such analysis. Instead they advocate the
use of an approach that emphasises the relationship between con¬
trollers and controlled and between those who sanction and those
who deviate^.
However, having stated the primacy of social control in any
meaningful comparative analysis of deviance and/or crime, Robertson
and Taylor (1973) limit the application of their approach by the
manner in which they go about explaining social control. In their
analysis, they tend to reduce social control to social reactions in
g
the form of control agencies * In this sense their approach becomes
reductionistic in that it fails to consider the historically specific
nature of social control. Moreover, it fails to grasp the signifi¬
cance of the social organisation and social change, especially the
political and socio-economic contingents and their consequences for
social control and hence crime. Consequently, whether we are talk¬
ing about the relationship between "controllers" and deviants or
even the wider structure of social control, it is important that
we recognise the broader processes that characterise social control





to particular capitalist structures. This we consider inevitable
to any comparative analys.es of crime, especially those intended for
application in the "Third World".
For example in our analysis of capitalist social control in
Kenya, we demonstrated that the imposition of English capitalist
law did not recreate Kenya in England's image, but instead exhibited
a special sort of dualism. Thus Kenya, in spite of its English
legal structure did not develop as England did. Implied here is
that although Kenya developed into a capitalist structure (with
characteristic capitalist social organisation and social strati¬
fication) , this did not necessarily replicate that which developed
in England. What this means is that social control, especially
law is as Seidman (1978) points out,"non-transferable". By exten¬
sion, crime as a social phenomenon, inseparably dependent on social
control is also "non-transferable" - an aspect that has significant
consequences for the study of crime in particular social structures,
the most basic being the applicability of criminological theory in
cross-cultural situations. This entails that we cannot study crime
in different social structures as though these structures evolved
in the same way and as though social control, especially law
necessarily takes similar forms. As we noted elsewhere in this
thesis, social structures do not and cannot replicate themselves.
Consequently, we cannot go about explaining criminal behaviour in
non-western "developing" capitalist society, through the application
of criminological perspectives developed with special reference to
western capitalist society, without any specific reference to
structural differences and indeed without any reference to the
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existing system of social control. Differences do exist and these
must of necessity be taken into account in any cross-cultural
analysis of social control and indeed of crime.
Por example, Chambliss (1975)> in his comparative analysis
of crime and law enforcement in Nigeria and Seattle in the United
States, did encounter significant differences in the law enforce¬
ment systems of the two countries. Since this was so in spite of
the capitalist structures of the two countries, he was then able to
explain the differences as well as the similarities found in the
crime rates in the wider context of social organisation and social
control - hence his conclusion that law-enforcement systems are not
organised to reduce crime or enforce public morality or what
Durkheim would call the collective conscience. Rather they are
organised to "manage" crime. In this sense he was then able to place
the emphasis on the system of control in his attempt to explain the
phenomenon of crime in Seattle (USA) and Nigeria in the context of
the social structures found in the two capitalist situations.
Saikwa (1972a), influenced more by his experience as Commissioner
of Prisons in a rapidly changing environment, demonstrates a rare
notion of historicity (rare in the "Third World" context) in his
reaction against the hypothesis that there is more crime in "develop¬
ing" countries than in the developed ones. In his argument Saikwa
(1972a), although recognising that social change and its consequences
for crime is a factor in all societies, in comparing crime rates
across cultures, he maintains that these cannot be separated from
the historical and indeed specific nature of social change. In this
respect, he argues that any analysis of crime rates without special
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reference to the differences in existence in the wider social
structure is meaningless or rather erroneous. Thus Saikwa (1972a),
although failing to expound any theory of crime and social change
nevertheless reocognises its significance in any cross-cultural
analysis.
Mushanga (1976), purporting to write an introduction of
criminology in East Africa begins by defining crime in terms of
the State and its laws. In this context, he argues that crime is
a product of the legislative (hence political) activity of the
7
State . However, the manner in which he goes about explaining crime
in East Africa, speaks more of a perspective based on the traditional
"universality" of law rather than a perspective based on an under¬
standing of the problematics of social organisation in its histor¬
ical set up. As a result, he fails to grasp the sense in which
crime is functionally dependent on a given social order. We con¬
sider this inevitable, whether we are talking about crimes of vio¬
lence against the person or crimes against property. - Without this,
we are left with nothing more than the often general and unsubstan¬
tiated claims that economic development and social change account
for the various differences.
For example, Clinard and Abbot (1973)5 in their remarkable
attempt to explain crime comparatively in "developing" countries
e.g. India and Uganda (both capitalist) begin their exposition on
the assumption that it is possible to ascertain whether "similar
7
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social processes account for crime in technologically developed
Q
and less developed societies" . Underlying this assumption is
the proposition that social structures in developed capitalist
society e.g. Europe, replicates itself in "developing" society
such as India and Uganda. Moreover, this assumes that social
control, especially law is universal (hence transferable). Assuming
this to be the case, Clinard and Abbot (1973) engage in what amounts
to the juxtaposition of traditional criminological perspectives on
"developing" capitalist structures as though these structures were
simply replicas of western social structures. In this sense, they
fail to recognise the historical specificity of these structures as
well as the significance of social control and its consequences for
crime. Thus they fail to grasp the significance of the manner in
which the evolvement and development of specific social structures
(as the Kenyan case demonstrates) affect the system of social control
on the one hand, and how on the other hand the system of social
control contributes to the maintenance and development of these
same structures with significant consequences for crime.
For example India and Uganda are both ex-British colonies and
both are characterised by "developing" capitalist social structures.
However, by their own evidence and irrespective of the measurements
they use, Clinard and Abbot (1973) argue that there are significant
differences in the crime rates of both countries. They present India
as a case of a slow increase of crime whereas Uganda is presented as
Q
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a case of a rapid increase of crime . Confronted with such
significant differences (by their explanation), Clinard and Abbot
(1973) attempt to explain them by making reference to economic
development without necessarily expounding the way this development
fits in the wider social structure. In this sense, they fail to
provide an analysis of crime in the wider context of social organ¬
isation and social change that is capable of cross-cultural appli¬
cation. Thus they fail to explain the socio-economic and political
contingencies in which social control, especially law (hence crime)
finds its expression and we may also argue its legitimacy.
What this demonstrates, and as we have also demonstrated in
our analysis of colonial and neo-colonial capitalist control in
Kenya is that a comparative analysis of crime is possible. However,
in order for it to be meaningful, it must include as its primary
task, a historically specific analysis of social control in the
wider context of social organisation. In this sense, it would then
be possible to examine meaningfully those aspects of social control
and hence of crime that are true to capitalist society in general
as well as those that are specific to India and Uganda. Hence in
the Kenyan case, especially in our analysis of the specificity of
colonial and neo-colonial capitalist political and economic control,
we have attempted to demonstrate that any approach that does not
recognise the centrality of social control in its analysis, whether
this analysis be comparative or not, is as inadequate as any approach




Thus a synthesis of Kenyan social control in the wider context
of social organisation and social change demonstrates that any
meaningful analysis of crime, especially in the "Third World" will
"be determined by the extent in which it appreciates the historical
specificity of social control, especially the role law in general
and criminal law in particular plays in the creation and develop¬
ment of specific social structures and its consequences for the
general social fabric.
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